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ABSTRACT
This study examines how the interaction between globalisation and domestic politics shaped
the evolution of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) between 1991 and 2000. Previous
studies have argued that AFTA, a project of open regionalism, was adopted to attract foreign
direct (FDI) investment to the region. Accurate to a degree, this dissertation argues that the
concern with FDI is only part of the AFTA story, albeit an important part. The FDI
explanation is unable to explain why market access and national treatment privileges were
offered to national (domestic) investors from the ASEAN countries at least ten years ahead of
foreign (non-ASEAN) investors in AFTA's investment liberalisation programme.
The dissertation explains this departure from open regionalism, which has yet to be accounted
for in the literature, by advancing the notion of 'developmental' regionalism. Underwritten by
strategic trade theory rather than neoclassical economics, developmental regionalism
emphasises the nurturing of domestic capital by using the expanded regional market and
temporary protection or privileges for domestic capital as the means to build up domestic
firms capable of meeting global market competition. Unlike existing models of the
globalisation-regionalism relationship, which do not integrate domestic politics or do so in a
limited way, the model of developmental regionalism considers domestic capital to be a key
analytical variable, and takes seriously its location within domestic politics and society.
Using documentary research and elite interviews, and guided by these theoretical insights, the
study shows that AFTA encompasses the features of both open and developmental regionalism
due to the political significance of both foreign and domestic capital in the ASEAN
economies. While both forms of regionalism were driven by the imperative of growth,
distributive concerns were weaved into the concern with growth in developmental
regionalism, as governments sought to nurture those segments of domestic capital that were
important in sustaining elite rule.
1INTRODUCTION
1.	 The Research Problem
When the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formally
announced their decision to form the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in January 1992,
ASEAN watchers did not expect the project to advance beyond the slow pace and limited
scope originally envisaged for AFTA (Australia, 1994: 45). 1 The project was initially
designed to lower tariffs on manufactured goods and processed agricultural products to
between 0-5 per cent by 2008 over a 15-year period. The decision by the member
governments of the core ASEAN states to form AFTA, even in its initially limited form,
surprised ASEAN watchers, scholars and even the business community who were not
consulted by governments prior to the AFTA decision (Stubbs, 2000: 304). Incidentally,
the core members of ASEAN, who are also the founding members of AFTA, are defined
to include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.2
The economic incentives of AFTA were regarded as far from overwhelming to sustain the
regionalist project (Means, 1995; Ravenhill, 1995: 866; Dixon, 1999: 124; Mattli, 1999:
169). The move to form AFTA among countries that were not 'natural trading partners'
and that were, instead, far more closely linked through trade and investment flows with
countries outside the ASEAN grouping was felt to be essentially unsound as it would lead
to substantial trade diversion (Ariff, 1994). 3 Moreover, the AFTA project was expected to
'ASEAN was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Brunei joined the grouping in 1984 on its independence from Britain. Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos
and Myanmar in 1997, while Cambodia joined the Association in April 1999, bringing ASEAN's
total membership to ten.
2 The new members of ASEAN acceded to all AFTA agreements on joining the Association.
3 Intra-ASEAN exports among the six core members in 1990 stood at about 20 per cent, while their
exports to the industrial countries totalled 58 per cent of total exports. Data calculated from the
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1996.
2involve substantial distributional implications both within and between member countries,
which many believed would lead to the project's eventual collapse (Ariff, 1994: 20;
Means, 1995; Low, 1996: 201-2; Ravenhill, 1995: 866; Dixon, 1999: 124; Mattli, 1999:
169).4 The widely held perception that AFTA was unlikely to advance significantly did
not appear to be misplaced in view of the setbacks experienced in AFTA during its initial
years and the disputes between member countries that emerged during the project's
course.
Yet, AFTA has not merely persisted, it has been accelerated and its scope expanded.
AFTA is now due for completion by 2002/2003 when tariffs on all manufactured products
and processed agricultural products will be at the 0-5 per cent level while a zero tariff
ASEAN is due in 2010. In addition, the scope of AFTA has been expanded to include
unprocessed agricultural products, services, and investment. The ASEAN countries
pledged to go beyond their World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitments in agriculture
and services while ASEAN's attempt to develop a regional regime for investment
liberalisation goes beyond the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) agreement
negotiated under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Thus, AFTA soon
became a composite project of ASEAN economic regionalism comprising three
component programmes. The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme
governed liberalisation of goods trade, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
(AFAS) governed liberalisation of services trade, and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA)
scheme governed investment liberalisation.
4 The inability to address distributional considerations and place regional interests over narrow,
national interests was cited as a major reason for the failure of ASEAN's first venture into
economic cooperation during the 1970s and 1980s. See Chng (1985: 52) and Tongzon (1998: 64).
3Despite these advances in the commitments made, implementation has had mixed success.
On the one hand, tariff reductions on manufactured goods were essentially on schedule.
Since 1994, tariffs were progressively lowered under the CEPT programme of annual
tariff reductions. In the tariff reduction package for 2000 submitted by these countries,
almost 90 per cent of the total tariff lines were already in the 0-5 per cent band. In
addition, many of the tariff reductions negotiated under AFTA were extended to products
originating from non-ASEAN sources, seemingly making AFTA an exercise in 'open
regionalism' . 5 On the other hand, petrochemicals in the Philippines and most notably
automobiles in Malaysia remain excluded from the CEPT schedule of tariff liberalisation,
ostensibly for a temporary period of time although all manufactured goods had been
scheduled to come under AFTA disciplines from 2000. The deadline for trade
liberalisation in key unprocessed agricultural products was also pushed back to 2010 from
the original 2003 deadline while a number of exceptions to the end tariff rate of 0-5 per
cent were allowed for particular agricultural items. Negotiations in services liberalisation
have been slow, especially in the financial services and telecommunications sectors.
Apart from the more cautious approach to AFTA in these areas, the other significant
development concerns the distinction made in the investment liberalisation programme
between ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors. The ASEAN member governments pledged
to extend national treatment and market access to ASEAN investors by 2003 in the
manufacturing sector and 2010 in other sectors, while offering these concessions to all
foreign investors only in 2020. In other words, while trade liberalisation in goods may be
characterised by open regionalism, the same cannot be said of liberalisation in investment.
5 The notion of 'open regionalism' is discussed in Chapter 1.
4How do we interpret these rather ambiguous trends in AFTA? It is important, in this
context, to recognise that unless coerced, national governments are not compelled to make
international commitments that do not conform to their interests (Chayes and Chayes,
1993: 179). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the ASEAN governments had agreed to
participate in AFTA and to expand its scope because it was in their interests to do so,
however those interests may be defined. The fact that the ASEAN member governments
agreed to ambitious commitments, especially on potentially contentious items, is in itself
significant irrespective of the implementation record. It indicates the desire or willingness
of these governments to submit these areas to joint decision-making. In any case,
disjuncture between commitments and implementation is not uncommon in international
cooperation, and this is usually attributed to changing domestic political dynamics or
because external conditions change (Chayes and Chayes, 1993: 195-201; Yarborough and
Yarborough, 1992: 80; Lipson, 1991: 518). If the ASEAN member governments were not
forced into accepting AFTA, and implementation is problematic, we also need to ask why
this is the case and how member governments sought to overcome these problems.
Key Research Questions
These developments in AFTA between 1991 and 2000 raise at least three empirical
questions that guide the dissertation's analysis of AFTA. First, why did the ASEAN
countries, already committed to open trade and investment regimes since the end of the
1980s and which were already trading extensively worldwide and participating in
international investment flows engage in forming a regional free trade area? Second, how
do we interpret the discriminatory treatment between ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors
in the regional investment liberalisation programme? If, as the current literature on AFTA
suggests AFTA was motivated by the desire to attract global investment capital, then the
privileging of ASEAN investors over global investors is rather puzzling. Third, what
5accounts for the subsequent shift to a more cautious programme of liberalisation in sectors
like agriculture, petrochemicals, automobiles and services? Was the initial scepticism
about the long-term viability of AFTA borne out by such developments?
AFTA as part of the worldwide resurgence of regionalism
While AFTA certainly represents a novel development for ASEAN, 6 it is also important
to remember that AFTA is part of a worldwide resurgence of economic regionalism
beginning from the mid-1980s that followed almost two decades of a decline in the
phenomenon (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995: 1). The revival of regionalism began with the
decision by the European Community in the mid-1980s to forge ahead with the
completion of the Single European Market and to engage in European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). A second notable shift towards regionalism occurred in North
America when the United States, Canada and Mexico successfully negotiated the North
American Free Trade Area Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992. A plan for hemispheric
economic cooperation between North American and Latin American countries through the
Enterprise of the Americas Initiative soon followed, while existing regionalist projects in
Latin America were revived and others, notably the Southern Cone Common Market or
MERCOSUR, newly created.' There was also a new momentum towards economic
cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region through the formation of Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) 8
 in 1989, while the ASEAN countries decided to form AFTA in
6 Economic cooperation is not a new agenda item for ASEAN, having been first initiated in 1976. It
has, however, enjoyed very little success until the advent of AFTA. Moreover, the decision to adopt
AFTA was unprecedented for ASEAN, since ASEAN members have, with the exception of
Singapore, always been averse to the idea of forming a regional free trade area. Comprehensive
discussions of ASEAN economic cooperation between 1976 and 1990 are found in ASEAN
Secretariat (1997a: 1-88); Frost (1990: 7-14); Suriyamongkol (1988); and Cling (1985).
7 The Treaty of Asuncion creating MERCOSUR was signed between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguary
and Uruguay in 1991. On the other regionalist projects in Latin America, see Grugel (1996).
8 APEC groups together the United States, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Papua
New Guinea, China, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, the six core ASEAN members,
61991. These were notable events in the regional political economy of the Asia Pacific,
given regional governments' long aversion to formal multilateral economic cooperation.
Even in parts of the world like Africa where regionalism had for long been discredited,
African leaders began urging the formation of regional groupings.9
The revival of economic regionalism in so many different parts of the world at roughly the
same time points analysis towards broad international level factors (Fawcett and Hurrell,
1995: 3). Globalisation, more specifically, has been cited as the principle driving force of
contemporary economic regionalism (Oman, 1994; Gamble and Payne, 1996: 249-50;
Higgott, 1997a; Hveem, 2000; and Mittelman, 2000: 4). While it is true that no region in
the present time can be wholly insulated from outside pressures (Hurrell, 1995: 46), the
substantial differences in the agenda, scope and institutional form of the different projects
of economic regionalism in the world today implicate regional and domestic level
dynamics as well.'° Explanations that focus solely on a single level of analysis are,
therefore, not likely to advance our understanding of contemporary economic regionalism
(Hurrell, 1995: 72). Nevertheless, it is logical to consider globalisation, to be defined in
Chapter 1, to be a significant driving force of regionalism, and consequently for the
international level to be a key level of analysis in studies of contemporary economic
regionalism, including AFTA.
Russia, Vietnam, and Peru. The last three countries are APEC's newest members, having joined the
grouping in 1998, after which APEC members voted to impose a moratorium on new members for
a period of time.
9 For instance, former Nigerian head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo called on African countries to
emulate the Europeans and form their own regional grouping to pool capacities and take charge of
African economic development (Aluko, 1991: 37).
1 ° Mansfield and Milner (1997: 15) note the substantial diversity of contemporary regional
arrangements.
7Outline of the chapter
Before attempting to answer the research questions outlined above, it is useful to review
the existing literature on AFTA and ask how scholars of AFTA have explained what was
then regarded as an unexpected turn to regional economic cooperation in 1991. What were
the main reasons advanced for this move and what theoretical approaches did these
answers draw on? More importantly, how well are these studies of AFTA able to provide
answers to the questions raised above? This is the focus of Section 2 of this introductory
chapter. Based on this discussion, Section 3 advances some thoughts on an appropriate
analytical framework to govern the dissertation's study of AFTA and defines the scope of
the study. Section 4 discusses in some detail the research methodology. The concluding
section outlines the structure of the dissertation, briefly summarising the main arguments
and findings of the dissertation as they appear in the various chapters. It also highlights the
original contribution that the dissertation claims to make to the literature.
1.1	 Definitions and Clarifications
Before proceeding to Section 2, it is important to first define key terms from the literature
on regionalism that are used in this dissertation. Scholars of international politics employ
terms like 'regionalism' and 'regional cooperation' to describe similar activities and
processes. Andrew Wyatt-Walter defines regionalism as "the conscious policy of states to
coordinate activities and arrangements in a greater region" (Wyatt-Walter, 1995: 77), a
definition that is adopted in this dissertation. Economic regionalism then refers more
specifically to the regional coordination of economic activities, instruments, and
arrangements. Robert Keohane defines cooperation as occurring when the actions of
separate individuals or governments previously not in harmony are "brought into
conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as
policy coordination" (Keohane, 1984: 51). In this dissertation, the term 'economic
8regionalism' is also used interchangeably with the term 'regional economic cooperation',
since both concepts stress the process of economic policy coordination among
governments within a particular region.
Economists, on the other hand, adopt the term 'regional (or preferential) trading
arrangement' to refer to what students of international politics term economic regionalism
or regional economic cooperation." These are essentially similar concepts, as they focus
on policy coordination to reduce barriers to economic interactions between countries,
although regional trading arrangements, by definition, focus specifically on policy
coordination to reduce barriers to trade or exchange relations. Nevertheless, regional
trading arrangements may be considered to be a subset of the analytically broader concepts
of economic regionalism or regional economic cooperation, since they are all the outcome
of the political choices of national governments to coordinate economic policy regionally.
Regionalism and regionalisation
Many scholars make a conceptual distinction between regionalism and regionalisation.
The former is interpreted as a policy-driven process while the latter is viewed as the result
of market-led processes of social and economic interaction within a region (Wyatt-Walter,
1995: 77; Hurrell, 1995: 39). While state policies may eventually result in regionalisation,
the most important driving forces behind the growth of economic interactions within a
region come from markets, namely from the decisions and actions of private traders and
investors. Although the two terms 'regionalism' and `regionalisation' may be related
analytically as well as in practice, it is best to conceptually distinguish between them,
simply because different sets of explanations may be required to explain 'regionalism' and
I ' See, for instance, Mansfield and Milner (1999: 592).
9`regionalisation'. Notwithstanding their conceptual and practical interrelationship, this
dissertation is primarily concerned with explaining economic regionalism, or the political
decision of governments to cooperate, rather than regionalisation. Nevertheless, the
empirical discussion reveals how ASEAN economic regionalism may well be altering
regionalisation dynamics in Southeast Asia and in the wider East Asian region.
2.	 Limitations of Current Studies of AFTA
Although there is a substantial body of work on AFTA, much of this is either atheoretical
or largely economistic, the latter focusing essentially on the welfare implications of AFTA
on its member economies. When frying to explain why the ASEAN member governments
decided to establish AFTA, scholars, especially economists, have merely cited a range of
political and economic reasons that possibly motivated the ASEAN leaders to consider
forming a free trade area in 1991 (Imada, 1993; Ariff, 1994; Low, 1996; Chia, 1998). In
their view, AFTA is the outcome of a complex interplay or conjunction of the following
political/strategic and economic factors at the beginning of the 1990s.
AFTA is explained as the economic instrument that ASEAN members adopted to give
ASEAN new political purpose after the end of US-Soviet confrontation and the resolution
of the Cambodian crisis, and to provide the foundation of Southeast Asian regionalism in
the 1990s (Buszynski, 1997: 557). ASEAN members, it is argued, were committed
through the AFTA project to maintaining ASEAN's identity as a purposeful and viable
regional organisation in a post-Cold War era (Soesastro, 1991: 2; Ariff, 1994: 31-32;
Ravenhill, 1995: 853). This was all the more urgent amidst fears that APEC would
marginalise ASEAN in regional affairs as well as drive a wedge between ASEAN
members by meeting their different economic needs (Buszynski, 1997: 566-68; Bowles
and MacLean, 1996: 340).
10
The very real possibility in 1991 that the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT would
fail, coupled with the turn towards regionalism in North America and Europe was believed
to have also stimulated the decision to form AFTA as an insurance should the world
economy turn protectionist. Being highly trade-dependent economies (Ariff, 1998: 2-4),
the ASEAN countries were fearful that their major markets in the industrial world would
become increasingly closed to their exports. The single regional market was also regarded
as a means to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to the ASEAN countries that, at the
beginning of the 1990s, appeared in danger of being diverted to other newly emerging
markets (Ravenhill, 1995: 854; Bowles and MacLean, 1996: 336; Low, 1996: 198; Chia,
1998: 218).
Clearly, a range of factors, both strategic and economic, probably influenced the decision
by the ASEAN leaders to form AFTA. This dissertation acknowledges that public policies,
including foreign economic policies, are usually formulated with multiple objectives and a
range of anticipated eventualities in mind. Nevertheless, some sense of the relative causal
importance of these diverse factors would have been useful in anticipating the future
evolution of AFTA. As such, some of the pessimistic predictions in the literature about
AFTA are widely off the mark.
Unanswered questions
While these factors help to account for the 1991 decision to form AFTA, they are less able
to explain why the project was sustained and indeed advanced after 1991, particularly as
many of the initial reasons for AFTA's formation were no longer salient. For instance, the
Uruguay Round negotiations were successfully concluded in 1993. By 1995, APEC had
become far less threatening than in 1993 through the grouping's decision to adhere to the
11
principles of voluntarism and non-binding commitrnents. 12 Moreover, it was clear by this
time that Europe and North America were not turning away from free trade into
protectionism. Global foreign direct investment flows had, by 1995, resumed their growth
trend after the decline experienced during the early 1990s (Dicken and Yeung, 1999:
111).13
Why then did the ASEAN governments take the political decision to sustain the project
despite the emergence of domestic opposition to it, and in fact, to subsequently accelerate
the project and expand its scope if the original forces behind the initial decision to
establish AFTA had become far less salient? it is insufficient to orily focus on exclairriag
the initial decision in 1991 to establish AFTA. We need to ask why and how the project
was sustained, what accounts for its substantial expansion through the decade, and indeed
how to explain some of the notable departures from the project's original commitments.
Better theorisation is clearly needed to determine the primary forces underlying these
developments.
Although the literature on AFTA is noticeably atheoretical, the writings may be grouped
into three broad categories of implicit theoretical approaches. A large portion of the early
literature on AFTA adopted a neoclassical framework of analysis that essentially sought to
assess the project's net welfare benefits. These writings were less able to provide plausible
explanations for why AFTA was established, both on theoretical and empirical grounds.
Economic studies of regionalism, in general, pay little Attention to the political choices and
conditions shaping regionalism (Mansfield and Milner, 1999: 589). Later works that
moved away from a pure neoclassical model of trade but that continued to stress the key
12 Ravenhill (2000) discusses APEC's mode of operation.
12
role of economic incentives have fared better, particular those focusing on investment
rather than solely on trade flows. 14 Some works adopt an implicit realist interpretation of
AFTA, seeing AFTA as a means by which the ASEAN member governments sought to
attain strategic goals. A third set of writings on AFTA adopts a political economy
approach that integrates economic and political dynamics in attempting to account for
AFTA.
2.1	 Neoclassical Approaches
Neoclassical analyses of regionalism are based on customs union theory and calculations
of the net welfare gains arising from the trade creation and trade diversion associated with
regional trade liberalisation. 15 Early studies of AFTA based on the neoclassical perspective
thus relied on calculations of economic gains to suggest why regionalism might constitute
an economically rational policy choice. These calculations revealed instead that unilateral
or globally negotiated trade liberalisation would yield far superior economic gains
compared to AFTA. 16 This confirmed the key theoretical insight from customs union
theory, namely that only a global union would be welfare superior since it would avoid all
trade diversion. ASEAN's core trading links were with the non-ASEAN world, and any
diversion of trade patterns towards the region as a result of AFTA was expected to be
detrimental to the growth prospects of the ASEAN economies (Ariff, 1998: 8-9).
For this reason, the wider APEC forum established in 1989 was felt to be a far more viable
project of regional economic cooperation compared to AFTA owing to the greater
13 Also see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
14 See, among others, Bowles and MacLean (1996); Athukorala and Menon (1997); and Petri
(1997).
15 The seminal contribution to customs union theory is Jacob Viner (1950).
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economic benefits APEC offered to the essentially export-oriented ASEAN member
countries (Mattli, 1999: 171). Net welfare gains were calculated to be higher in APEC
than in AFTA (Low, 1996: 200-205). This is unsurprising, as among APEC's members
were the two major markets for exports from the ASEAN countries, namely the United
States and Japan.
Although some dynamic gains from exploiting scale economies in AFTA were expected to
boost the project's overall welfare gains, the scale economies argument by itself cannot be
sustained on theoretical grounds. There is no logical necessity for a regional arrangement
to exist before scale economies can be exploited, provided global markets in general are
not closed (Panagariya, 1999: 121). When local production is expanded in order to reduce
costs, whatever is not consumed locally may quite easily be exported. Thus, Oman (1994:
23) notes that the scale economies argument does not provide a rational justification for
ASEAN regionalism since the member countries have extensive trading links with other
counties. The successful conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations in 1993
reinforced Oman's point, however uncertain the prospects for an open, multilateral trading
system had seemed just three years earlier.
Limitations of the neoclassical framework
A fundamental shortcoming of the neoclassical model is its central emphasis on trade.
Analyses based on this approach attempt to account for the formation of regional trading
arrangements by focusing on the welfare gains generated as a result of trade specialisation
within regional groupings. By doing so, the neoclassical approach assumes an excessive
economic rationality on the part of policymakers centred on their knowledge of the
16 Low (1996) provides a comprehensive review of the various empirical studies that yield this
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expected welfare gains arising from trade-induced specialisation that regionalism will
yield in order to explain current political decisions to cooperate. Moreover, the model's
utility as an explanatory tool in the contemporary world economy is limited since other
forms of economic interactions, notably investment flows, which are equally, if not more,
salient are neglected.
Part of the reason for traditional trade theory's limited utility in explaining contemporary
economic regionalism lies with its underlying assumption of perfect markets.' Because
firms are price takers in the neoclassical world, they and the activities that hinge on firm
behaviour like production, foreign investment and technological development tend to be
invisible in analysis (Helpman and 1Crugman, 1985: 39-40; McCulloch, 1993: 39). The
neoclassical perspective thus says little about the role of the very large firms that
undertake much of the world's production, trade, investment and technological innovation
(McCulloch, 1993: 39)• 18 This makes it difficult to use neoclassical theory to analyse the
globalisation-regionalism relationship, since one of the key features of globalisation is the
growing dominance of large firms in the world economy.
The traditional emphasis in neoclassical analysis on the notion of segmented national
economies linked to each other by trade flows is similarly limiting. In these models, an
economy or country is regarded as a basket of resources — capital, labour, land, raw
materials — which collectively constitute its comparative advantage, and "which are
assumed to stay within its borders" (Petri, 1997: 191). In the contemporary world
conclusion. See also Australia (1994).
17 These are characterised by constant returns to scale; a large number of small firms that are price
takers in the market; unchanging demand and tastes; costless access to technology; and perfect
information.
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economy, where capital flows often surpass the flow of goods, economic growth depends
less on what factors a country is originally endowed with than on what factors it is able to
attract through the world economy.° This suggests there may be a role for an activist
government in creating the conditions that can draw in FDI, a conclusion that is at odds
with the normative emphasis in neoclassical theory on minimal state regulation of the
market, unless it is to correct market imperfections.
Neoclassical theory regards the economic and political domains as two separate spheres of
activity with their own distinct dynamics. The market is viewed as an impersonal device
that allocates resources based on the price mechanism, and by extension is seen as
apolitical, while the state 2° is regarded as a collective set of political actors and institutions
likely to interfere with the self-regulating market. This view of a state or political authority
essentially distinct from the self-regulating market or economy is not consistent with
reality (Polanyi, 1944: 71). In Southeast Asia, moreover, the market has long been
employed by political authority to achieve particular social and political outcomes (Beeson
and Jayasuriya, 1998: 316).
The state-market relationship is better conceptualised in the scholarly field of International
Political Economy (IPE), which emphasises the reciprocal connection between the control
18 While the analysis of trade and investment policies in small or developing countries has often
revolved around concerns involving imperfect markets, these phenomena are essentially treated as
departures from mainstream or neoclassical economic theory.
19 It also depends on what factors it can create through policy, such as skilled resources and
technology development capabilities, giving rise to the notion of dynamic comparative advantage.
20 The state is best defined as a political community formed by a territorially defined population and
subject to one government (Hague et al, 1998: 6). Internally, it comprises a distinct set of political
institutions that govern the life of the internal political community in line with the latter's common
interest (McLean, 1996: 472). These institutions include the political executive or government; the
administration including the bureaucracy, central bank and public enterprises; the legislature; the
judiciary; the various organs of coercion (police, military); and sub-central or local governments
(Miliband, 1973: 46-51).
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of economic resources in the market economy and the exercise of political power
(Underhill, 2000: 4). Markets are not merely mechanisms that enable the efficient
allocation of economic resources they also allow the allocation and consolidation of
political power. This suggests that political leaders and policymakers will evaluate any
development that affects the market and economy not merely in terms of its economic
effects but also for its political implications. In such a context, regionalism outcomes are
likely to be driven by the interaction of both economic and political imperatives.
Neoclassical economic theory does not reject the close relationship between economics
and politics, in fact partly attributing departures from the economic rationality suggested
by neoclassical models to political factors, the other being misinformation on the part of
policymakers. The problem with this approach is that it leaves much real-world
developments unanswered because it abstracts from the political dimension of the market.
2.2	 AFTA as a Strategic Project — The Strategic Realist Interpretation21
Many scholars of ASEAN have also advanced essentially realist-based explanations that
focus on the strategic dynamics associated with ASEAN to account for the AFTA project.
The strategic realist approach, because of its emphasis on power, security and survival as
central variables, points to the formation of regional groupings as strategic responses to
power political competition, with no difference between political/strategic regionalism and
economic regionalism (Hurrell, 1995: 49). Stephenson's argument that AFTA is pursued
"more for foreign policy and strategic reasons than for economic reasons" reflects this line
of thinking (quoted in Pangestu, 1995: 136).
21 The interpretation is termed 'strategic' realist to distinguish it from the economic realist
perspective on IPE.
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As already noted, AFTA is also viewed as an economic instrument adopted to revitalise
ASEAN and give it renewed strategic significance in a post-Cold War world. In this realist
interpretation of events, waning superpower confrontation between the United States and
the Soviet Union from the late 1980s reduced not only the strategic significance of
ASEAN to external powers, particularly the US, it also weakened the utility of the
association to its own members. The strategic interpretation of AFTA is, however, limited
by the realist preoccupation with the political/strategic over the economic, and the
tendency to regard the state as a black box in analysis. Domestic dynamics are ignnred,
while the actions of state actors are regarded as driven purely by systemic forces.
Discarding the unitary state assumption: AFTA has real domestic economic effects
Once the black box of the state is opened up and the domestic level admitted into the
analysis, it becomes difficult to see how AFTA could have been sustained and in fact,
expanded in terms of its agenda purely as a political/strategic project. The economic
policy shifts required to implement AFTA would inevitably have introduced material
changes to the respective economies of the core ASEAN countries. These policy changes
had the potential to alter domestic distributional arrangements, especially in the new issue
areas like agriculture, services and investment, all of which had been used by one or more
of the core ASEAN governments to achieve domestic social and political objectives. The
tendency to treat the state as a black box in much realist analyses obscures these crucial
domestic dynamics that are likely to shape political responses.
It is, therefore, not unreasonable to argue that political leaders would have been unlikely to
accept the material changes that a regionalist policy like AFTA would have introduced
into their national economies unless these changes were desired in themselves. Otherwise,
it would have been difficult for the ASEAN countries to sustain AFTA, important though
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the political/strategic goal of ensuring ASEAN's future may have been. The core ASEAN
countries have always placed great emphasis on domestic economic needs, and continued
to do so well into the 1990s (Kurus, 1994: 38). 22 Political/strategic imperatives arising
from the end of superpower confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union
towards the end of the 1980s may have been partly responsible for the initial decision by
policymakers from the core ASEAN countries to establish AFTA. It is, however also clear
that we need to understand more precisely the role of AFTA in the domestic political
economy calculations of the ASEAN member economies if we are to explain the evolution
of the project through the decade.
2.3	 Political Economy Approaches
A number of studies have attempted to explicitly or implicitly link economics and politics
in their explanations of AFTA, using insights from a range of theoretical traditions in
International Relations (IR) and International Economics.
Trade-centred explanations
Drawing on transaction cost economics (or the new institutional economics) and neoliberal
institutionalism from IR in his study of comparative regionalism, Walter Mattli develops a
model of demand and supply conditions for successful economic integration, which he
uses to predict that AFTA is likely to fail (Mattli, 1999: 169).23 He argues that regionalism
is more likely to succeed if there is strong market-led pressure for cooperation arising
from the significant "potential for economic gains from market exchange within a region"
22 The notion of 'national resilience', a core doctrine in ASEAN, reflects the centrality of domestic
politico-economic priorities. It emphasises the crucial role of domestic economic development as a
means to a materially satisfied citizenry who would then be less vulnerable to internal and external
subversion. See Leifer (1989: 3-4).
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(Mattli, 1999: 42). AFTA does not meet this critical demand-side pre-condition for
successful economic cooperation because the volume of trade in the ASEAN/AFTA
region remains low. 24 Thus, there is little incentive for business leaders to apply pressure
on governments to promote regional cooperation to reduce the costs of cross-border
exchange relations.
Although Matti is correct to emphasise the importance of locating explanations for
economic regionalism in the context of the economic gains that accrue from regional
cooperation, his focus on exchange or trade relations as a source of those gains while
neglecting the investment dimension is limiting. Moreover, this approach suffers from a
key shortcoming of neoliberal institutionalism, namely its argument that growing
economic interdependence between countries is a necessary precondition for formal
cooperation due to the convergent preferences that interdependence creates. 25 Thus, the
low level of intra-ASEAN trade is argued to preclude successful regional cooperation in
ASEAN. This is, unfortunately, an overly static approach to regionalism that does not take
into account the possibility that convergent preferences in favour of regionalism may well
arise from other sources, the international or systemic level for instance, despite low levels
of regional economic interdependence.
FDI-centred explanations
A number of scholars interpret AFTA in terms of its role in attracting FDI. The growing
importance of FDI-sponsored growth in the different ASEAN counties made AFTA a
23 Yarborough and Yarborough (1992) provide a comprehensive discussion of the new institutional
economics, while the main arguments of neoliberal institutionalism are detailed in Keohane (1984,
1989).
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perceived necessity when changes in the international political economy substantially
increased worldwide competition for FDI (Ravenhill, 1995: 854; Bowles and MacLean,
1996: 333-36; Hay, 1996: 267-68). Economists who had previously regarded AFTA as an
inferior exercise in welfare terms and inconsistent with global free trade have now come to
accept this interpretation.26 AFTA, in these accounts, is regarded as an instrument through
which investment diversion from the ASEAN region would be avoided rather than a
means to trade creation as in neoclassical approaches (Petri, 1997). It is, thus, the political
economy of foreign direct investment that is salient to understanding the development of
AFTA (Higgott, 1997b: 261).
The FDI-centred explanation is, however, incomplete. Most importantly, it does not
explain why foreign investors, ostensibly the main actors AFTA is purported to attract, are
treated less favourably in the AFTA investment liberalisation programme than ASEAN
investors. The latter are scheduled to receive national treatment and be allowed market
access by 2003 while foreign investors are to receive these benefits only by 2020. The
wisdom of such a policy move has, in fact, been questioned in view of AFTA's perceived
role as a means to attract foreign capital (Menon, 1998: 18; Tham, 1998: 32-33). While
AFTA may be a response to the growing international competition for foreign investment,
it is also clear that we need to consider other dynamics centred on the distinction between
domestic and foreign capital if we are to account for this inconsistency in the AFTA
project. It is likely that the answer lies in the domestic political economy of the member
countries, specifically in the political significance of domestic capital.
24 Intra-ASEAN trade in 1985 was 18.6 per cent of the total trade of the six core ASEAN countries,
falling marginally to 17.4 per cent in 1990 although it rose to about 20 per cent in 1995. See Ariff
(1993: 2) and Tongzon (1998: 50).
25 See Keohane (1989: 2).
26 Compare, for instance, Ariff (1994) and Ariff (1998).
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Emphasising domestic politics
Unfortunately, many political economy studies that attempt to integrate domestic political
economy dynamics when explaining the decision to form AFTA do so only in a limited
way. None of the studies reviewed point to a relationship between the political
significance of domestic capital and the form that regionalism takes. Bowles and MacLean
(1996: 337-39), for instance, emphasise the growing influence of reform-minded business
interests and the prior adoption of neoliberal economic reforms in removing any serious
political opposition to AFTA. Stubbs (2000) similarly accords primary explanatory
importance to the shift in the domestic balance of power from economic nationalists in
government and the bureaucracy who had adopted essentially inward-looking economic
policies to the liberal reformers/technocrats who favoured economic liberalisation.
While these internal political economy developments may explain why it was politically
feasible to establish or sustain AFTA, they do not account for the political decision to
establish AFTA in the first instance. These domestic political changes are just as likely to
have led the ASEAN governments to engage in unilateral trade liberalisation or to focus
exclusively on multilateral or even APEC trade liberalisation. Arguments about the
domestic political ascendancy of reformers favouring a more liberal economic regime do
not also explain why member countries would agree to treat foreign investors less
favourably than ASEAN investors when offering market access and national treatment.
There is also failure to recognise that the shift towards economic liberal policies in the
ASEAN countries was not unequivocal. Both sets of policies co-existed during the 1990s
in the core ASEAN countries, though to different extents. These complexities, which have
substantial implications for the conduct of regional economic cooperation, are ignored in
these analyses.
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Accounting for implementation: the role of regional-level political processes
Scholars like Stubbs (2000) and Mattli (1999) fill a gap in the literature on regional
economic cooperation by emphasising the importance of implementation processes that
are as necessary to secure successful international cooperation as are convergent
preferences. The analysis of regionalism all too often focuses on the initial decision to
establish a particular regionalist project and fails to ask how the commitments made are
implemented, or if they are not, why, and how non-compliance is dealt with at the regional
level by the grouping's members.
Stubbs (2000) suggests that the regional political culture — the 'ASEAN Way' — that
emphasises flexibility, informality over formal rules, consultative processes and
consensus-building played a significant role in helping to move AFTA forward. 27 This
argument is, however, inadequate. It neglects the growing significance of rule-based
institutions in AFTA, as the discussion in Chapter 6 reveals, which are clearly departures
from what Stubbs stresses to be ASEAN's normative preference for informality. Stubbs is,
nevertheless, correct to emphasise the role of consultations, compromises and flexibility in
helping to advance AFTA, although he does not provide conclusive evidence that this was
due to adherence by member governments to ASEAN norms, rather than being driven by
interests. Many international agreements are advanced through similar processes (Jonsson
and Tallberg, 1998), a point that weakens the cultural explanation in the AFTA case.
27 The 'ASEAN Way' is a regional code of conduct that is characterised by informality, aversion to
formal institutions, flexibility, pragmatism, expedience, the practice of consensus, a high degree of
discreteness, and non-confrontational bargaining styles developed through a process of elite
socialisation over a period of time (Acharya, 1997: 329).
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Mattli (1999: 12) points to the role played by a regional leader and centralised institutions
in ensuring that implementation proceeds in accordance with treaty commitments.28
Hegemonic power and institutions are stressed in this framework. A regional leader is
emphasised as crucial in easing distributional problems by acting as regional 'paymaster'
and in providing a normative focal point for the regional standards and policies that are
necessary for deeper integration beyond tariff liberalisation (Mattli, 1999: 170). The
absence of a regional leader in ASEAN, according to Mattli, does not augur well for
AFTA on both these counts (Mattli, 1999: 169).
Mattli does not, however, consider the alternate possibility that distributional functions
may be performed through other mechanisms, institutions for instance. 29 He also fails to
recognise that a regional leader is probably unnecessary as a normative focal point since
the ASEAN countries have opted to harmonise regional policies, standards and regulations
to international norms where these exist, a logical move given their predominantly global
economic focus. The emergence of rule-based though decentralised institutions in AFTA,
discussed in Chapter 6, is also missed by Mattli, who adopts a Euro-centric view that only
supranational or centralised institutions for monitoring and enforcement matter in
implementation (Mattli, 1999: 54).39
Building on these political economy studies in the dissertation
Despite their limitations, these political economy studies are a substantial improvement
over the more common atheoretical or economistic studies of AFTA. First, they emphasise
28 This constitutes the supply-side of Mattli's model for successful economic integration.
Leadership is the critical supply condition, with centralised institutions only a weak condition for
successful integration (Mattli, 1999: 42-43).
29 See, for instance, Martin and Simmons (1998: 739-42).
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other forms of economic interactions and activities that are far more salient in the
contemporary world economy such as investment flows and, therefore, are potentially able
to enhance understanding of the turn to economic regionalism in the 1990s. Second, they
explicitly seek to relate system-level structures and processes to the political decision to
engage in regionalism made within the context of domestic political and social structures
and processes. These interactions remain under-conceptualised in these studies, however.
Third, they point attention to the need to consider how regionalist projects are sustained
and advanced further once established.
3.	 An IPE Framework of Analysis
This dissertation builds upon the political economy studies reviewed above by exploring
the relationship between the systemic, domestic and regional levels of analysis in greater
depth as a way to answer the questions posed at the start of this chapter. The study is
broadly located within an TPE framework of analysis, emphasising, therefore, the close
interrelationship between states and markets, or between politics and economics, as well
as the interaction between the domestic and international levels of analysis (Underhill,
2000: 6). The study also considers capital and production to be key issue areas rather I
trade or exchange in line with the emphasis of the 'new' IPE. 31
 Finally, the disserta on
considers capital or business actors to be part of social wholes and rooted in domestic
society rather than atomistic units, which consequently alters their relationship with state
actors in ways that are likely to be significant for regionalism. 32 The neglect of one or all
of these considerations is responsible for much of the shortcomings of the current
literature on AFTA, as the discussion in the previous section revealed.
30 A study on international institutions by Kahler (1995) reveals that successful implementation 16
not always achieved through centralised institutions.
3 1 Murphy and Tooze (1991) discuss the theoretical foundations of the 'new' IPE.
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The Globalisation-Regionalism Relationship: Theoretical Perspectives on IPE
More specifically, the dissertation locates the analysis of AFTA within the theoretical
literature on the globalisation-regionalism relationship. Most scholars argue that
contemporary economic regionalism is an outcome of globalisation, which any
explanation of regionalism needs to take seriously. This literature is critically examined in
Chapter 1, which reviews the two basic models of the globalisation-regionalism
relationship. In short, globalisation is regarded in the dissertation as the relevant systemic-
level condition that structures the operating environment for state actors and other social
groups.
For the purposes of this chapter, the following discussion first summarises the
shortcomings of the liberal political economy perspective on lPE, which underpins the
model of open/neoliberal regionalism, the dominant model of the globalisation-
regionalism relationship in the literature. The discussion then advances some preliminary
ideas on an appropriate theoretical approach for the dissertation's analysis of ASEAN
economic regionalism by examining structuralist and economic realist perspectives on
IPE.
The liberal political economy perspective 
The liberal political economy perspective on IPE shares many of the weaknesses of the
neoclassical model, which provides its economic foundation. This approach emphasises
the primacy of economics and of economic incentives in explaining outcomes, a
separation of the state and market and the notion of capital or business actors as atomistic
32 See Murphy and Tooze (1991: 19-20).
26
units devoid of a social or historical context (Underhill, 2000: 14). Global market forces
are, moreover, taken as a given and are regarded as benign, conferring benefits on all in a
positive sum game. Governments accommodate to these beneficial market forces through
neoliberal policies of deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation that also integrate their
economies with global markets. The systemic level is, therefore, paramount in
explanation.
The liberal perspective is rejected as a suitable theoretical approach for the dissertation for
two reasons. One of the main shortcomings of this perspective is the absence of a realistic
notion of politics. States, or rather their governments, acquiesce in and act in accordance
with the logic of global market forces. The relationship between state and capital or
business actors is simply one of governments freeing up the market for business activity.
Politics is present to the extent that governments adopt protectionist policies due to their
capture by uncompetitive business actors concerned with limiting the workings of the free
market. In either case, governments are regarded as acting on behalf of business interests
from whom they remain distant in social and political terms. This picture is at odds with
the reality in Southeast Asian countries where state and business actors, particularly
domestic business actors, are often close partners in elite governance political systems.
Outcomes in international politics are inevitably influenced by this relationship, which
consequently needs to be explicitly considered in the analysis of AFTA.
The structuralist perspective
The structuralist perspective on IPE derives from Marxist notions of political economy
applied to the study of international politics. It conceptualises the relationship between
state and capital in terms of the state acting as an instrument of the capitalist class, or of
particular capitalist actors. International politics, thus, derives from the concern with the
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development of capital on a global scale (Hoogvelt, 1997: 8). Unlike the liberal approach,
the structuralist perspective injects politics into structuralist analyses by regarding the
outcome of international economic relations as a redistributive, zero-sum game. The
perspective allows for the possibility of agency, albeit limited, in international politics —
"voluntaristic and reformist actions" — as governments respond to and try and overcome
global structural interdependencies and inequalities (Barry Jones, 1995: 34).
This perspective is rejected due to its strong element of economic determinism. Actions
and outcomes in international politics are driven entirely by the logic of global capitalism,
with the state acting as the instrument of capital. Although states are considered in
analyses, they are not seen as political communities in their own right but merely as
constituent units of a world capitalistic system. Domestic considerations and priorities
stemming from domestic political constituencies are, therefore, irrelevant in structuralist
analyses. Moreover, structuralist approaches focus exclusively on social groups derived
from the capitalist mode of production — capital and labour, whether national or
transnational — while ignoring other social groups, ethnic groups for instance that are
significant in a number of ASEAN countries. In such instances, ethnicity often gives rise
to vertical cleavages within capital and labour groups.
The economic realist perspective 
The dissertation adopts the economic realist perspective on IPE as the most appropriate
theoretical model for its study of ASEAN economic regionalism, compared to the liberal
and structuralist perspectives. The economic realist perspective, clearly outlined by Barry
Jones (1995: 30-32), comes from the realist tradition in IR from which it derives its three
central features.
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The realist school, of which E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau are the dominant
contemporary intellectual pioneers, regards nation-states as central actors in international
politics. 33 Second, the realist school infers international outcomes from the internal
attributes of these nation-states (Burchill, 1996: 78). Morgenthau, for instance, specifies
that interests, which drive international political action depend on the political and cultural
context within which foreign policy is formulated (Morgenthau, 1948/85: 10-11). Finally,
the realist school accepts the possibility that states have the potential to transform the
international system. Morgenthau suggests that the contemporary world could be
transformed "through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have
shaped the past as they will the future" (Morgenthau, 1948/85: 12). The realist school and
by extension the economic realist perspective on lPE, therefore, part company with
Waltzian neorealism on all three counts. 34 Neorealism exaggerates the importance of
international structure in conditioning the actions of states whose internal attributes are
consequently irrelevant to outcomes while also underestimating the potential of states to
alter the international system (Burchill, 1996: 90).
Because nation-states are central in economic realist analysis, this approach is well suited
to the study of the international politics of Southeast Asia where the nation-state matters a
great deal (Alagappa, 1998: 680-85). The economic realist perspective moreover regards
international economic relations in zero-sum terms, unlike the liberal economic
perspective, therefore allowing for the possibility that governments would marshal power
to interfere in global markets on behalf of their respective states in competition with other
states (Hoogvelt, 1997: 7). There is potential for agency in this perspective as governments
attempt to alter the structures and processes of the global economy through inter-state
33 See Carr (1939/84) and Morgenthau (1948/85).
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politics to realise the interests of the state (Barry Jones, 1995: 40). 35 The study rejects,
however, the realist conception of these interests in terms of security and survival of the
state in inter-state power political competition and instead derives these interests at the
domestic level. Security for developing states in particular is often conceptualised in terms
of the security of domestic political institutions and governing regimes (Ayoob, 1995: 8).36
Incorporating the domestic level with the economic realist perspective
In contrast to the liberal economic and structuralist perspectives, governments in the
economic realist perspective are driven by the (security) interests of the state or political
community, rather than from interests derived from the logic of (global) market forces or
structurally derived from the logic of global capitalism. Unlike the structuralist
perspective, the economic realist perspective regards states as independent units,
notwithstanding their interdependent relations with other states and with non-state actors.
Because nation-states are conceptualised as independent political communities in the
economic realist perspective, there is no methodological problem with integrating an
appropriate model of domestic politics with an economic realist analytical framework.
Moreover, in substantive terms, the realist tradition does accord analytical priority to the
domestic level, unlike its neorealist counterpart. The primary insight of two classical
thinkers who laid the foundations of realism — Machiavelli and Hobbes — is that domestic
political structures and processes and international structures and processes are closely
intertwined (Ayoob, 1998: 39-40; Williams, 1996: 215). As already noted above,
Morgenthau similarly emphasises the importance of domestic context in shaping state
34 The seminal neorealist text is Waltz (1979).
35	 •	 •This insight stems from this perspective's realist origins. Neorealism, on the contrary, leaves
little room for systemic change induced by the units — states — themselves (Burchill, 1996: 87).
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interests in international politics. Many contemporary scholars of international politics,
Peter Gourevitch for instance, have long urged other scholars to examine domestic and
international politics as a whole (Gourevitch, 1978; Kapstein, 1995).
The assumption made in the analysis is that governments respond in the first instance to
domestic political constituencies on whom they rely for political support and for their
legitimacy (Underhill, 2000: 18). In developing countries, legitimacy concerns are closely
linked to concerns with the security and stability of prevailing political systems or
regimes. Thus, while governments may be driven by concerns related to capital for
instance, these are not derived from the logic of global capitalism, nor in relation to
freeing up the market for business in some technical sense, but instead stem from
domestically derived political priorities. Although the dissertation focuses on the
relationship between capital and state/political elites in explaining particular outcomes in
regionalism, this is not to suggest a Marxist or neo-Marxist conception of capital and of
state-capital relations. As the discussion in the following section illustrates, the
relationship between state and capital in the ASEAN countries is one conditioned by the
imperatives of elite rule rather than the imperative of capitalist production."
The international level — globalisation — nevertheless also structures the environment in
which governments and other social groups operate, providing both constraints on some
forms of action as well as opportunities for others. In short, the argument is that the
domestic level is a key level of analysis, mediating between globalisation and regionalism,
while the relationship between state and capital, or government and business, is more
nuanced and less deterministic than in structuralist or even liberal perspectives. Moreover,
36 Regimes are defined in Chapter 1 (Section 3).
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the focus on the domestic level allows the analysis to distinguish between foreign and
domestic capital, a distinction that is missed in the liberal perspective but which Chapter 1
shows is crucial in the study of AFTA.
3.2	 Choosing an appropriate model of domestic politics for the study of AFTA
The dissertation adopts the elite governance model of domestic politics as the most
appropriate to characterise domestic politics in the core ASEAN countries. 38 An elite
governance political system is most usefully viewed as a project whose principal aim is to
maintain elite power, autonomy and exclusivity (McCargo, 1998). A survey of domestic
politics and economic policymaking in the core ASEAN countries reveals that governance
and policymalcing during the 1990s continued to remain the preserve of elites. Elite
coalitions usually comprised political, bureaucratic, military and business elites although
the precise composition of these elite coalitions varied across the different countries. A
growing middle class and the emergence of other social groups in these countries did not
significantly alter the elite nature of governance and economic policymaking, even in
Thailand and the Philippines where the middle class had become politically more active in
increasingly democratic political systems. 39 Nevertheless, policymakers in the different
countries did, to varying extents, recognise the interests and needs of these emerging
social groups in making policy choices.
As the discussion in Chapter 1 reveals, elite governance political systems are characterised
by tension that potentially exists between the growth and distribution imperatives inherent
37 Thus, the terms capital and business are used interchangeably in the dissertation.
38 Other models of domestic politics include pluralist models, institutional theories, elite theories,
and Marxist models (Milner, 1992: 494-95).
39 See Robison (1996) for Indonesia; Rodan (1996) for Singapore; Pinches (1996) for the
Philippines; Kahn (1996) for Malaysia; and Hewison (1996) for Thailand.
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in these systems.4° Both these imperatives are ultimately linked to political concerns
centred on the legitimacy and security of governing regimes. Growth is defined as the
expansion of economic wealth of a country, irrespective of its distribution among different
groups, firms or individuals. Distribution is defined as the conscious allocation, usually by
governments, of income, rents and other benefits to particular individuals, groups or firms
who would otherwise not have received these gains through the workings of the free
market. Distribution, in the context of this dissertation, does not, therefore, incorporate any
normative connotation. The notion of distribution as used in the study is not to be seen as
an egalitarian act, as something that is inherently 'progressive' involving the allocation of
material and other benefits from rich to poor. Distribution may well involve the
'regressive' reallocation of wealth, from the poor to the rich, particularly to partners of
ruling elites as the latter attempt to maintain elite cohesion and their power base.41
Based on these insights, the central hypothesis in the dissertation is that the type of
regionalism that emerges out of the dynamics of globalisation is mediated by domestic
political economy dynamics centred on the growth-distribution relationship, even for
regionalism projects that seek engagement with globalisation. Chapter 1 discusses this
argument in some detail, and derives from it three specific propositions relevant to AFTA.
Alternative approaches to characterising domestic politics in the ASEAN countries
essentially rely on broad or higher-level generalisations of either the nature of the political
regime — whether democratic, authoritarian, or semi-democratic — or the
structural/institutional character of state forms — whether developmental or neo-
4° Chapter 1 discusses the dynamics of elite governance systems in greater detail.
41 See the discussion in Strange (1988/94: 212-13) on the idea of both progressive and regressive
welfare systems.
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patrimonia1.42 Both these alternatives were rejected on the grounds that they were overly
stark representations of the domestic politics of the ASEAN countries that hid more than
they revealed about particular political relationships and how policy choices are made. The
bureaucratic polity model, in which governance and policymaking is dominated by
bureaucrats, is also not an appropriate model of domestic politics for the ASEAN
countries in the 1990s. 43 If bureaucrats did exert a dominant influence on policy, it was
because they were permitted to do so by political leaders. Moreover, bureaucrats were
often constrained by emerging commercial interests, which were often allied with political
elites or which had political roles to play that were defined by political elites. Thus, it is
the complex relationship between political, bureaucratic and business elites that is key in
explanation.
The point is, neither the type of political regime nor the institutional/structural character of
the state captures the core political and economic relationships among different groups of
elite actors that predominate in the ASEAN countries. The elite governance model, on the
other hand, focuses on precisely these underlying relationships. It is, thus, better able to
account for economic policy choices in these countries, including policy choices regarding
AFTA, irrespective of the political regime or the institutional/structural character of the
state, although these are not entirely without influence.
3.3	 The regional level matters
The regional level is also crucial in analysis, because it is at this level that political
negotiations and bargaining take place to generate joint commitments to cooperate as well
42 It is also important to note that apart from developmentalist Singapore, all the other core ASEAN
countries display both patrimonial and developmental orientations. See Cotton (2000: 156 & 111.4).
43 Laothamatas (1992) provides a useful discussion of the bureaucratic polity model.
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as where implementation is accomplished. Because regionalism itself has the potential to
affect domestic distribution, it is likely that sustaining cooperation would be an onerous
task. Moreover, the different approaches among national governments to the growth-
distribution relationship means that amidst the broad commitment to regional economic
cooperation, divergent preferences on particular agenda items are more than likely. Thus,
rather than being purely a technical process, implementation is likely to be as much a
political process as is the initial stage of developing joint commitments through political
negotiation. Chapter 6 draws on the considerable theoretical literature on 'compliance
bargaining' for insights on how implementation issues are addressed by regional partners,
particularly in non-hegemonic settings like ASEAN.
3.4	 Scope of the research
The research covers the 1991 to 2000 period, and focuses on five of the six core ASEAN
countries.44 Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and to a lesser extent, the
Philippines were responsible for not only initiating the AFTA project they were also
instrumental in determining the way the project evolved through the decade. 45 Moreover,
major disputes or disagreements in AFTA over compliance and implementation were
between two or more of these countries. The research also examines in greater detail three
instances of disputes or tensions over trade liberalisation, namely in agriculture,
automobiles and petrochemicals as a way of understanding more fully how international,
domestic and region level variables interact in processes of regionalism.
44 Although Brunei is a founding member of AFTA and is regarded as a core ASEAN country, its
domestic political economy will not be examined in detail in the dissertation. Being an oil-rich state
whose major economic activities are oil production, refining and export, its domestic political
economy differs substantially from the other ASEAN countries, and relates very differently to the
AFTA project compared to the other ASEAN countries as a result. Thus, Brunei is of marginal
importance to the way the AFTA project has shaped up, at least up to the time of writing, although
the Brunei government has always been a strong advocate of AFTA.
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Although the research attempts to integrate domestic politics into the analysis, the
dissertation takes neither a single country nor a comparative approach. Instead, it attempts
to locate explanations for developments in AFTA in broad patterns of domestic politics in
the core ASEAN countries using the framework of elite governance. As such, the analysis
of domestic politics in the study must necessarily remain at a fairly general level, unlike
other studies of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia that explore in great depth
domestic level variables by focusing on a single country or by using the comparative
approach. 46 Nevertheless, the dissertation's emphasis on the interaction between the
international and domestic levels of analysis will hopefully provide new insights into the
political processes shaping ASEAN economic regionalism that previous studies do not
reveal, or at best have only hinted at.
4.	 Research Methods
This dissertation adopts the case study approach involving the detailed study of a sequence
of social events and processes in order to identify particular relationships among historical
events (Little, 1991: 29-31). The aim is to construct a causal narrative of AFTA — to
account for the development of the AFTA project between 1991 and 2000. Construction of
a causal story of AFTA requires first, detailed knowledge about the sequence of events
within AFTA as well as within the global and domestic political economies of the late
1980s and 1990s, and second, credible hypotheses or propositions drawn from theory.
45 The analysis will concentrate on all five countries where relevant. Otherwise, the focus will be on
the countries most pertinent to the issue(s) at hand.
46 See Anwar (1994), Lim, K.T. (1998) and Hamilton-Hart (1999a).
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The analysis employs documentary research as well as semi-structured elite interviews as
sources of empirical material, both of which were crucial for the dissertation's study of
AFTA. While secondary sources — official documents and newspaper archives — were used
to build the narrative of AFTA between 1991 and 2000, primary data/information gleaned
from elite interviews was key to providing the behind-the-scenes knowledge of
negotiation, bargaining and decision-making processes in AFTA that secondary
documents do not capture.47 It was not possible to gain access to minutes of meetings
related to internal decision-making and consultative processes in AFTA. Final official
statements or agreements present only the outcomes of these processes. In such
circumstances, elite interviews were used to provide crucial information with regard to the
position of national governments on key issues in AFTA as well as to build a picture of
how final decisions were reached through negotiations and bargaining. In addition, elite
interviews were also useful in understanding the interviewee's subjective analysis of a
particular episode or situation.48
4.1	 Documentary Research
Documentary evidence came from secondary sources from the ASEAN Secretariat located
in Jakarta, Indonesia and national governments. From the former, it was possible to obtain
all formal agreements, declarations, programmes, protocols, amendments to agreements
and communiqués relating to AFTA (and ASEAN where relevant), usually from the
Secretariat's official website (www.aseamorld). In addition, official press statements of
all annual AFTA Council Meetings from 1992-2000, official press statements of all annual
47 Primary sources refer to materials compiled first-hand by eye witnesses or participants of the
event in question, and include diaries, memoirs, court records, minutes, memoranda, and letters.
Interviews constitute one source of primary information. Secondary sources refer to published
material based on primary sources, and include treaties, agreements, press releases, government
white papers, official publications, and parliamentary debates. See Burgess (1984/90: 123-24).
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ASEAN Economic Ministers Meetings from 1987-2000, and official press statements of
all leaders' meetings from 1992-2000 were also collected from this website. The ASEAN
Secretariat also publishes a range of material on AFTA ranging from reports, information
packs, and data sets that were useful in constructing the AFTA narrative as well as in
piecing together evidence for the dissertation's main arguments. All material from the
ASEAN Secretariat is in English, the official language of ASEAN.
Official documents from national governments relating to international, regional and
domestic economic policies as well as national data/statistical sources provided additional
empirical material while information on international economic trends were easily
obtained from publications put out by international organisations. Only material that was
written in English or in the Malay/Indonesian languages was accessed. While this allowed
the analysis of official material from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore (and the
Philippines where relevant), only those official documents issued by the Thai government
that had been translated from Thai into English were utilised. 49 Information on national
policies in Thailand and Indonesia were also obtained from tertiary documents such as
scholarly analyses where available. Finally, scholarly papers on economic regionalism and
globalisation more generally, and of ASEAN and AFTA more specifically, were also
consulted for empirical information and additional insights on AFTA as well as to locate
the development of AFTA within broader developments in the international political
economy.
48 This is one of the key functions of elite interviews (Richards, 1996: 200).
49 Official documents in Malaysia are prepared both in English and in the official Malay language
(Bahasa Malaysia). Indonesian government documents are essentially in the Indonesian language
(Bahasa Indonesia), which is very closely related to the Malay language, although translations are
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Newspaper sources stretching from 1991 were a very valuable resource when constructing
the AFTA narrative. Both national level and regional/international daily newspapers and
weekly news journals were consulted. These were essentially in English, although
newspapers and news journals in the Indonesian language were also consulted. Newspaper
sources, however, are not always accurate. Where possible, newspaper coverage of items
on AFTA was cross-referenced across a range of newspapers from different country and
international sources to minimise the possibility that national biases or the biases and
interpretations of the journalist colour the way a particular story is presented.
4.2
	
Elite interviews
Elite interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way between July and September
2000. Instead of a rigid questionnaire, an aide memoir was used that could be referred to
during the interview. A total of 26 separate interviews were conducted with 29 individuals
in this manner, for about one hour per interview (although a few interviews lasted about
40 minutes) in four countries — Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. It was not
possible to conduct field interviews in the Philippines due to time and funding constraints.
This was not a serious limitation, however, since the Philippines was not at the forefront
of major developments in AFTA. Moreover, Philippine responses to AFTA agenda items
were extensively reported in regional newspapers. One interview was conducted through
electronic mail using a set of questions to which the interviewee, from Malaysia,
responded in writing. Further clarification from interviewees, if needed, was obtained
either through electronic mail or telephone.
sometimes available. Singapore government documents are in English. Documents issued by the
Thai government are always in the Thai language, while translations are usually rare.
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Elites are essentially individuals or groups who hold, or have held, a privileged position in
society and thus, likely to assert a stronger influence on political outcomes than members
of the general public (Richards, 1996: 199). Thus, logical interviewees would be ministers,
senior officials in government such as permanent secretaries and their deputies, as well as
heads of government departments, agencies and research institutes or think tanks. For this
dissertation, interviews were also conducted with middle level officials and scholars. The
former generally has detailed operational knowledge of government and inter-
governmental workings and processes while the latter is able to provide valuable local
knowledge, particularly about political dynamics that helps in the interpretation of
events.50 Thus, interviewees for this study of AFTA included two ministerial level
subjects, namely the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General of ASEAN, senior
and middle level officials from the Secretariat and from national governments in the four
ASEAN countries, as well as scholars. None of the persons contacted for interviews turned
down the interviewer's request, with the exception of one political scientist in Thailand
who had for some years moved into a senior administrative position in the university and
felt he was unable to shed new light on political dynamics in Thailand.
Interviews can be taped or notes made throughout the interview or a combination of both.
For this dissertation, following Richards (1996: 202), interviews were not taped as it was
believed that taping would result in interviewees being less forthcoming in the information
they provide if they knew their remarks were being recorded. Interviews have generally
been "on the record"; hence the dissertation is able to attribute information and insights to
5° Civil servants are thought by some scholars to be the best interviewees, as they tend to be
dispassionate, are good at observing action, and often are veritable storehouses of valuable
information. See Richards (1996: 201).
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individuals where relevant. Only one interviewee, from Malaysia, requested anonymity,
while other interviewees indicated which information should not be attributable.
The reliability of information is always a problem in interviews, where interviewees tend
to present their personal, subjective view of events. In general, information and
interpretation of events gleaned from one interview was cross-referenced with material
obtained from other interviews on the same event. In particular, the cross-referencing of
interviews across countries helped to reveal the personal or national biases of
interviewees, although these in themselves were useful or even central to the interviewer
and the study as they indicated national differences in the way events were perceived.
No interviews were conducted with business representatives. This may appear, at first
glance, to be a shortcoming given that the dissertation deals with globalisation and
capital/business. Informal discussions with scholars who study business behaviour in the
ASEAN countries as well as a perusal of newspaper interviews of business leaders reveal
that it is very difficult to make accurate generalisations about the position of business
actors in complex industrial structures. Industry-level generalisations from a limited set of
interviews of business actors are thus not possible, and likely to lead to erroneous
conclusions, particularly when an industrial sector comprises a range of firms that differ in
the positions they advocate on trade liberalisation more generally and AFTA more
specifically. Industry or business associations tend to include a mix of various types of
firms, making a unified policy position difficult to ascertain, a problem commonly
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experienced by national governments engaging in consultations with peak business
associations.51
This dissertation, nevertheless, utilises official documents and public statements from
relevant business associations as well as public statements and newspaper interviews of
relevant businesspersons as a way of understanding the different reactions of individual
corporate actors towards AFTA. It also uses the results of surveys of business executives
on the subject of AFTA conducted by a range of organisations — the Japanese Export-
Import Bank, the Nomura Research Institute, the Economist Intelligence Unit as well as
the regional news journal, the Far Eastern Economic Review. The results of these surveys
were reported in analyses of regional business trends in various newspapers and news
journals.
5.	 Conclusion: The Dissertation in Outline
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 1 reviews the theoretical literature on the
globalisation-regionalism relationship, beginning with a conceptual clarification of
globalisation as a way to enable better theorisation of its relationship with regionalism.
While the theoretical literature identifies two models of the globalisation-regionalism
relationship, one centred on acquiescence to global market forces (open/neoliberal
regionalism) and the second emphasising resistance to globalisation, Chapter 1 advances a
third theoretical model — what I call developmental regionalism — by using a combined
economic realist-domestic politics theoretical framework. The main emphasis in
developmental regionalism is the nurturing of domestic capital and the building up of
domestic industrial and technological capabilities. Explicit attention to domestic politics,
51 Newspaper reports in the different countries reveal that different firms within the same industry
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specifically to the politically important role of domestic capital led to this theoretical
insight. The economic realist approach also allowed a subtle distinction to be made within
the dominant open regionalist model in the literature between a neoliberal variant and an
FDI model. While both variants emphasise engagement with global market forces,
neoliberal regionalism is driven by concern with economic efficiency while the FDI
variant is driven primarily by the need to attract FDI rather than efficiency considerations,
and thus, may display only limited neoliberal characteristics.
These theoretical insights enabled a more nuanced reading of the empirical trends
associated with AFTA, which are detailed in Chapter 2. While the current literature
explains AFTA as a project of open regionalism focused on the need to attract FDI to the
region, the dissertation advances the argument that AFTA encompasses the features of
both open and developmental regionalism due to the political significance of both foreign
and domestic capital. Chapters 3 ands 4 respectively develop these arguments.
In the case of open regionalism, which was centred on the CEPT and displayed only
limited neoliberal features, the ASEAN governments attempted through AFTA to offer
foreign investors who were increasingly practising a regional division of labour an
alternate regional space of production vis-à-vis China. China by itself offered investors a
potentially competing regional investment site in the Asia-Pacific region, and was
regarded by all the core ASEAN countries as ASEAN's primary competitor for FDI.
Globalisation had, by the early 1990s, significantly increased competition for FDI, and
provided an external trigger for regionalism in ASEAN, which was reinforced by the key
role of foreign capital in the domestic political economy.
did not always share similar policy positions and preferences on AFTA.
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Notwithstanding the importance of foreign capital for economic growth, the political
significance of domestic capital in a number of member economies prompted governments
to also adopt the idea of developmental regionalism through the AIA component of
AFTA. Concern about the future of domestic capital, as with the anxiety about FDI, was
similarly triggered by developments at the systemic level. In this instance, globalisation
manifested itself through changes, or anticipated changes, in its institutional underpinnings
and as a hegemonic cognitive structure. ASEAN policymakers and leaders were
confronted with the possibility of new multilateral rules that would privilege foreign firms
and disadvantage fledgling domestic firms, while they also increasingly perceived an
unrelenting globalisation involving intense international competition with global/foreign
corporations. These pressures, while to some extent reinforcing open regionalism in
AFTA, also raised substantial concerns in some countries with regard to the future of
domestic capital.
Developmental regionalism was the outcome of these concerns, and it accounts for
ASEAN's puzzling offer of earlier market access and national treatment privileges to
domestic/ASEAN investors ahead of foreign investors in the AIA, which governments
hoped would stimulate the growth of internationally viable domestic firms. Strategic trade
logic, rather than neoclassical logic, provides the economic foundation for the notion of
developmental regionalism. Although both forms of regionalism were driven by the
concern with growth, the growth imperative in developmental regionalism was infused by
political priorities involving the distribution of economic benefits to domestic capital. In
short, the type of regionalism that emerged in response to globalisation was mediated by
domestic political economy dynamics centred on the growth-distribution tension inherent
in elite governance political systems common in the ASEAN setting.
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Despite their keen interest in pursuing both open and developmental regionalism through
AFTA, the ASEAN governments were, nevertheless, prepared to renege on their original
commitments in particular instances in order to protect the interests of politically
important social groups and domestic firms that had close ties to the political elite. Chapter
5 elaborates on this argument, namely that distribution concerns were sometimes so
overwhelming that they overrode the concern with growth and led to setbacks in AFTA.
Although this invariably led to disputes within ASEAN, member governments also
engaged in compliance bargaining processes as Chapter 6 reveals to find ways to balance
these particular domestic political priorities centred on distribution while also ensuring
that the AFTA project continued to advance. One outcome of compliance bargaining,
highlighted in Chapter 6, is the strengthening of institutions in ASEAN/AFTA through
rule building. The concluding chapter sums up the results of the dissertation, provides an
overview of the arguments put forward as well as assesses the conceptual and
methodological approach adopted in the analysis. New issues and questions raised by the
analysis are highlighted, while promising lines of further inquiry are identified.
The discussion thus far points to at least three original contributions the dissertation can
claim to make to the scholarly literature. It makes a substantial empirical contribution to
the literature on ASEAN and on economic regionalism by providing a detailed narrative
discussion of AFTA from 1991 when the project was initiated to 2000 using an extensive
range of sources that were outlined in the previous section. This is detailed in Chapter 2 of
the dissertation, which describes not only the commitments made in AFTA in all three
component programmes — CEPT, AFAS and the AIA — it also analyses implementation of
these commitments. This had yet to be done for AFTA at the time of writing. Moreover,
the dissertation contributes to the study of regionalism more generally by combining a
theoretically informed and empirically detailed analysis of regional processes in a setting —
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Southeast Asia — outside Europe and North America, a neglected area in the study of
regionalism.52
Second, the empirical analysis of AFTA reinforces the dissertation's theoretical critique
that domestic politics is key to mediating globalisation forces and shaping the form of
regionalism that results, even in instances where regionalism seeks to engage with
globalisation. Specifically, an explicit treatment of the domestic level allows the analysis
to consider domestic capital as a key analytical variable, and consequently to advance the
notion of 'developmental regionalism' as a third model of regionalism.
The dissertation also claims to make a contribution to the literature on ASEAN more
generally. The analysis of implementation processes in Chapter 6 reveals that partial
institution building involving strengthening rules and procedures has taken place in
AFTA. This insight challenges the prevailing wisdom that ASEAN member governments
prefer only limited forms of institutionalisation involving processes of socialisation and
consensus building, and employing minimal rules. Chapter 6 explains why ASEAN,
always regarded as a hard case for rule-based institution building, should embark on this
very process in AFTA. The findings of this chapter challenge the long-held view of an
Asian hostility to western formalism 53 in the institutional design of regional cooperation.
52 Breslin and Higgott (2000: 341) call for more studies of regional processes outside Europe and
North America, as well as point to the need for a 'marriage' between area studies and disciplinary
studies.
53 See Ravenhill (1998: 159).
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CHAPTER 1
GLOBALISATION AND ECONOMIC REGIONALISM:
A Review of the Theoretical Literature
1.	 Introduction
Many studies dealing with the resurgence of regionalism since the middle of the 1980s
note that it has occurred in parallel with the rise of globalisation (Gamble and Payne,
1996; Coleman and Underhill, 1998; Grugel and Hout, 1999; Hveem, 2000, and
Mittelman, 2000: 4). Although subject to a variety of definitions,' an underlying theme of
glob alisation is that it generates increasingly intense interactions between nation-states an.d
societies through flows of goods, money, people, ideas, images and information, in the
process making territorial boundaries less salient (Hurrell, 1995: 54). But, what is distinct
about globalisation as opposed to other processes associated with the worldwide
interaction of social forces is that it involves the reconfiguration of social space beyond
notions of delineated territory (Hughes, 2000: 4). Thus, the relationship between
globalisation and regionalism appears to be a paradoxical one. While globalisation de-
emphasises boundaries, regionalism imposes them through defming a new, larger
territorial space out of pre-existing, smaller territorial spaces, namely nation-states.2
The growth of regionalism since the mid-1980s against the backdrop of globalisation has,
therefore, generated considerable scholarly interest in the relationship between
globalisation and regionalism. The literature identifies two basic or ideal-type models of
the globalisation-regionalism relationship depending on whether the relationship is
'See Scholte (2000: 44-46).
2 Nevertheless, the larger space is rarely if ever a new political unit or superstate. Even the
European Union, the most advanced regionalist project cannot yet be termed a super-state or
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conceived of as being accommodating or antagonistic. The former is the dominant model
in the literature, conceptualising regionalism as a way station to globalisation, a means
through which policymakers enhance the participation of their respective national
economies in globalisation processes. Alternatively, regionalism represents an attempt by
state or other actors to resist globalisation. The chapter advances the argument that the two
basic models of the globalisation-regionalism relationship in the literature are theoretically
limited, which consequently have implications for how they allow for the interpretation of
empirical trends.
Although providing considerable insight into developments in the contemporary world
economy, these basic models suffer two interrelated weaknesses. The conceptualisation of
the state-market or economics-politics relationship is inadequate in both models.
Moreover, firms are conceptualised as atomistic or individualistic rational economic
agents, devoid of any social and political context. The latter consequently results in the
neglect of what the dissertation considers to be a crucial distinction between foreign and
domestic capital. This distinction is especially relevant in the developing world in general
and Southeast Asia in particular. In these settings, domestic capital often performs vital
social and political roles, often fulfilling distributive goals, while foreign capital addresses
the growth priorities of national governments. The chapter advances a third model of
regionalism — developmental regionalism — which is theoretically possible once a
distinction is made between foreign and domestic capital. Developmental regionalism is
intended to stimulate the growth of domestic firms in the face of globalisation pressures by
providing domestic firms the means to expand through regionalism but with either
temporary protection from, or temporary privileges over, foreign capital.
political entity. It continues to remain an inter-governmental project although it has a high level of
institutionalisation and supranational governance.
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Before elaborating on these two ideal-type models and their limitations in Section 3,
Section 2 first defines more fully the term globalisation. It draws out the predominant
features of globalisation that impinge on the ways in which economic activity is
conducted, particularly for the developing world. The next stage is to use this model of
globalisation to explore why regionalism might emerge as a response, using the main
models of the globalisation-regionalism relationship in the literature as the starting point
for analysis. Based on this discussion, Section 4 discusses the key role of the domestic
political economy in analysing regionalism, using the example of ASEAN as an
illustration as well as to flesh out the dissertation's main propositions that are developed
from the theoretical critique.
2.	 Conceptions of Globalisation
Globalisation has been defined in a variety of ways that emphasise distinct processes, key
actors, causes and normative positions (Higgott and Reich, 1998). Some see it as the
spread of cultures across the globe, while others emphasise the worldwide diffusion and
assimilation of Western, specifically US values, norms and standards for both the
economic and political spheres of life. Globalisation as a material economic phenomenon
is often seen to be synonymous with internationalisation, or the expansion of economic
activity across national borders leading to greater economic integration and
interdependence between nation-states and societies. Still others regard it as a neoliberal
economic process of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation.
Hughes argues that these definitions do not capture the essential feature of globalisation,
namely as a process that disengages human activity from territory (Hughes, 2000: 3-4).
His point, earlier stressed by Scholte (1997b: 431), is that globalisation is qualitatively
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distinct from these other processes of universalisation, internationalisation and
liberalisation because of its potential to "reconfigure social space away from and beyond
notions of delineated territory" (Hughes, 2000: 4). Nevertheless, it is important to avoid
the 'hyper' globalisation thesis that the world is moving inexorably towards a borderless
world.3 Moreover, the 'de-territorialisation' that is argued to be the essential feature of
globalisation is still a limited phenomenon, with national borders continuing to constrain
the unfettered flow of global market forces. 4 'De-territorialisation' is perhaps confined
largely to the world of global financial flows and the intemet where finance and
information flow instantaneously around the globe unconstrained by territorial borders and
removed from territorial space.
Nevertheless, Hughes raises a crucial point about the tendency of globalisation processes
towards the reconfiguration of social, including economic space beyond prevailing notions
of territoriality, namely nation-states. But, what exactly is it about globalisation that has
the potential to reconfigure economic space? More specifically, how is economic space
being reconfigured? How might this relate to regionalism? To answer these questions
requires an examination of the underlying drivers of globalisation. This exercise also
provides us with a better understanding of the implications of globalisation for
governments, business and other social groups, including in the developing world. The
following discussion is structured around the three dimensions of globalisation — the
material, institutional and ideational/cognitive — which mutually reinforce globalisation as
a set of processes.
3 Ohmae (1990, 1995) is the most notable advocate of this thesis. Strange (1995) and Cerny (1990:
220; 1995: 597) make a weaker though related argument regarding the 'retreat' of the state — that
states have become increasingly dysfunctional, losing the capacity to manage the national economy.
4 The notion of 'de-territorialisation' comes from Scholte (1997b: 431) who conceptualises
globalisation as the rise of what he terms 'supra-territoriality', when national borders are 'not so
much crossed or opened as transcended'.
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2.1	 The Material Dimension of Globalisation
Historical similarities exist in patterns of trade, finance, and production between earlier
periods and the present, post-1970 world economy, which is argued to represent most
clearly the globalisation period (Oman, 1994: 33)• 5 Yet, many students of globalisation
point to the sharp differences in the volume, scope, speed, clustering and depth of the
processes and interactions in the world economy between the two periods (Petrella, 1996:
64-66; Sjolander, 1996: 605-7; Higgott, 2000: 70). Contemporary global linkages are
argued to be "organically different" due to changes in the "manner in which firms organise
production and both cooperate and compete with each other". 6 This is a valuable point,
because it draws attention to underlying firm-level dynamics that underpin globalisation
processes and that also drive the particular ways in which economic space is reconfigured
under globalisation.
The changing microeconomics of production and the new competition
One of the most important driving forces of globalisation is the diffusion and adoption of
the post-fordist or flexible model of corporate and industrial organisation, particularly in
the post-1970s world economy (Oman, 1994: 83-99). 7 Flexible production systems
increasingly underpin the growing prominence of functionally integrated transnational
production patterns that has been noted in the contemporary period (Dunning, 1993: 4;
Oman, 1994: 97; Dicken, 1998: 175). Governments and firms concerned respectively
5 Other interpretations see globalisation as a continuing process of the last 100 years (Hirst, 1997:
410), a development dating from 1945-50 (Amin, 1996: 244-45), or emerging in its 'fully-fledged'
form since around 1960 (Scholte, 1997a: 19).
6 See the Research Agenda of the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
(CSGR) at the University of Warwick available at: http://wwvv.csgr.org/agenda.html.
7 Flexible production systems emphasise flexibility of the production process, of its organisation
within the factory and of relationships with customers and with supplier firms. Dicken (1998: 165-
72) and Oman (1994: 86-89) provide useful overviews of flexible and fordist production systems.
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about economic growth and profitability find themselves having to respond in one way or
another to the new competition associated with these changes in the way production is
increasingly organised.
The turn to flexible models of production has been accompanied by a shift in the sources
of wealth creation from natural assets such as unskilled labour, land and natural resources
to created assets, particularly in the manufacturing sector (Stopford and Strange, 1991: 82;
Dunning, 1993: 6; Lall, 1995: 6). Created assets, which are argued to be firm specific and
thus, potentially mobile centre on information, technological innovation, as well as
management and organisational competence. Although broad generalisations need to be
made with care, since natural assets remain important in a number of economic sectors, it
is also evident that technology and skills have become crucial in manufacturing,
particularly in higher value-added activities (Dicken, 1998).
These changes in production dynamics also underpin the growing structural power of
global capital. Developing country governments concerned about high value economic
growth are increasingly reliant on the firms that possess 'created assets' to establish
production activities in or involving their respective economies, underscoring the crucial
importance of FDI in the world economy (Stopford and Strange, 1991: 1). 8 Production
decisions, however, remain the purview of the global firms that governments are
increasingly trying to attract (Pete11a, 1996: 74). Competition for FDI among countries
has, therefore, become far more intense since governments are all courting essentially the
same types of firms to their respective economies than in previous times, having adopted
broadly similar export-centred economic policies. The worldwide liberalising trend has,
8 Finns themselves seek joint ventures, strategic alliances or mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in
order to gain access to such assets belonging to other firms in a bid to remain competitive.
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moreover, widened the location choice available to the firms who own these mobile assets
(Stopford and Strange, 1991: 1; Dunning, 1993: 13-15). This makes competition for FDI
likely to be more intense than ever even if the ability of a firm to relocate, once
established, is more restricted than is commonly presumed. Countries will more than ever
compete with each other to attract these mobile assets before they become location bound
once production is established.
Although governments have always had to bargain with foreign firms, they were not
totally helpless in that relationship when they possessed competitively priced natural
assets that firms needed in production — land, natural resources or labour — or were able to
use various policy instruments to attract foreign firms (Safarian, 1993: 53). Walter notes
that investors, despite clearly preferring a completely unrestricted policy environment,
nevertheless, privilege other factors above investment policies, such as "market size,
growth prospects, geographical location, access to large regional markets, local
infrastructure, human capital, and political stability" (Walter, 2000: 65). Of these, the
importance of access to regional markets is especially relevant in the context of the
dissertation, and one that may be engineered by governments through regional
cooperation.
It is not only governments that need to respond to the new competition, however.
Globalisation has led to a more complex business environment for firms and more intense
competition, particularly as the "coordination and configuration of production chains has
become the key to creating and sustaining competitive advantage" (Dicken and Yeung,
1999: 118). This imposes an enormous burden on emerging firms, especially in the
developing world, that are new to the game and which also usually lack the ownership-
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specific assets to compete with well-established transnational corporations (TNCs) from
the advanced countries in global competition.
Globalisation and the reconfiguration of economic space
Emphasising the underlying microeconomics of production not only reveals the growing
competitive pressures on national governments and firms it also helps us understand how
economic space is reconfigured in globalisation. While the seemingly logical answer
would be 'global', meaning a global division of labour, this is not necessarily the case.
Flexible production may well be contributing to a phase of economic agglomeration
through the spatial concentration of production activity. 9
 Globalisation is helping to re-
defme economic spaces beyond existing notions of territoriality, namely the nation-state,
but not necessarily towards a global economic space. In short, both centrifugal forces
(expansionary logic of capitalism) and centripetal tendencies (the agglomeration logic) co-
exist in globalisation.
This is because flexible models of production are highly dependent on physical proximity
between producers and suppliers on the one hand, and between producers and customers
on the other (Oman, 1994: 17; Dicken, 1998: 241). Although this does not in any way
imply in deterministic fashion particular forms of geographical clustering of production
activities, it does explain the growing prominence of regionally, as opposed to globally,
integrated production in the world economy (Rodan, 1993: 234; Oman, 1994; Dicken,
1998: 216-17; Studer-Noguez, 2000). These new forms of production, driven by the
shifting corporate strategy of TNCs, are different from the cross-border economic activity
that multinational corporations (MNCs) had engaged in previously during the 1960s and
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1970s. Then, MNCs had exploited low labour costs in offshore production sites, producing
for export to markets outside the region, usually to the industrial world and the MNCs'
home markets. Although involving cross-border economic interactions, this form of
internationalised economic activity did not reconfigure economic space in any
fundamental way. Production was still organised on the basis of territorial nation-states,
even if cross-border economic interactions were prominent. Since then, the dynamics of
global production have altered, although this is not to suggest that the end of the state is
anywhere near.
Critics of the globalisation thesis point to the regional clustering of economic activity as
evidence against the emergence of a single global market place, and thus of
globalisation. 1 ° On the contrary, this chapter argues that these are the very outcomes of
underlying fundamental changes in the microeconomic dynamics of production associated
with globalisation. Whether and where such regional clusters emerge depends not only on
policy choices, but more importantly on the corporate decisions of firms that are, in theory
at least, able to locate production anywhere in the world. Storper (1997) suggests that
particular geographic locations are entirely substitutable apart from nominal cost
differences. Because the assets required for production are located within firms
themselves, firms are theoretically able to relocate worldwide, provided local conditions
meet with their new production needs. As already noted, these are not necessarily the
traditional cheap labour requirements, but rather those that support flexible modes of
production, notably skilled human resources, modern infrastructure, and crucially for the
dissertation, access to large, regional markets.
9 This borrows from Paul Krugman's idea that firms tend to geographically cluster in particular
regions due to increasing returns to scale, both internal and external to firms; lower transport costs;
and high market demand (Krugman, 1991: 14-15).
I ° Hirst and Thompson (1992), and Weiss (1998: 176-7) employ this line of argument.
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2.2	 Reinforcing Globalisation: The Ideational and Institutional Underpinnings
One of the distinguishing features of the post-1970s world economy — the globalisation
period — is that the changes in the material structures of production have occurred in
combination with the spread of a single ideology, a shared consciousness of globalisation,
and are underpinned by supportive multilateral rules (Higgott, 2000: 70). This makes
globalisation a potentially powerful constraining structure constituting the "context of
habits, pressures, expectations and constraints within which actions take place" (Cox,
1981/96: 97-98). Governments, business and other social groups have to respond to these
forces in one way or another, but they cannot ignore them.
The neoliberal underpinnings of globalisation
Globalisation, far from being purely a material phenomenon, is sustained by a coherent set
of by now widely practised neoliberal economic ideas. These ideas emphasise and
advocate, among other things, a free market economy with limited government
involvement in and control of economic activity through policies of liberalisation,
deregulation and privatisation, as well as the ideal of market competition (Higgott and
Reich, 1998)." These ideas have become especially prominent from the middle of the
1980s, and are widely practised in both the industrial and developing world (Biersteker,
1992) although they do not go unchallenged. 12 The pre-1970s internationalisation period,
in contrast, was not associated with any consistent set of ideas about the best way to
organise economic production. Neoclassical ideas about free trade and free markets often
co-existed with beliefs about the benefits of greater state intervention in the economy
(Hoogvelt, 1997: 135).
11 Scholte (2000: 34-35) sets out the neoliberal underpinnings of globalisation.
12 George (2000) discusses these emergent challenges.
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Awareness, consciousness and perceptions of globalisation
While neoliberal ideas are a crucial component of and sustain globalisation, at a more
fundamental level it is perhaps the growing instantiation of `globalisation' itself and of
global economic competition especially that influences how people respond to global
economic change. Mittelman (2000: 4) notes that "globalisation has become normalised as
a dominant set of ideas". Palan and Abbott (1996: 32) argue that perception of
globalisation is possibly the main cause for changing patterns of behaviour today. Actors,
in their view, respond not only to actual external pressures or changes, they are
increasingly responding to perceived environmental change.
This is not an unusual point. Perceptions are, after all, of considerable importance in
practical politics and policymalcing (Barry Jones, 1995: 7). This is not to suggest that only
one kind of behaviour is possible — that which entrenches globalisation. Ultimately, actors
will respond to these perceptions in ways that are also governed by their location within
distinct domestic social and political contexts. The point remains, though, that actors may
respond in anticipatory fashion to the perceived needs and demands of global competition
to stay one step ahead of the game even if there are no immediate or serious market
pressures on them.
Multilateral organisations reinforce globalisation
While governments may be attracted to neoliberal economic ideas that promise simple
recipes for creating economic wealth for societies — liberalisation, deregulation, and
privatisation — it may not be possible for governments to select particular elements from
this package of policy prescriptions while ignoring others, or even to reject them
altogether. It is increasingly the case that international organisations, especially the World
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Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the WTO underwrite globalisation
processes by developing neoliberal rules to which national governments eventually have to
conform. Either these rules are binding on governments if they are members of the WTO,
or governments have to subscribe to the neoliberal policies dictated by the IMF or the
World Bank in return for financial assistance during economic crises. In short, the post-
World War II period of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1998: 72-76) has given way since
the 1970s to what Hoogvelt (1997: 135) terms `unembedded liberalism'.
Embedded liberalism allowed governments to intervene in the domestic economy to
safeguard domestic social stability provided border barriers to international trade were
progressively reduced. This compromise, which effectively allowed governments to deny
market access and national treatment to foreign firms if they so wished, began unravelling
over a period of time beginning from the early 1970s (George, 2000). It was only from the
mid-1980s, however, that new rules were adopted, particularly in world trade that
redefined, or more precisely markedly reduced, the purposes for which the government
could legitimately intervene in the domestic economy, including restricting or
discriminating against foreign firms. The new rules consequently advanced the interests of
foreign firms, especially the TNCs that are the agents of globalisation. In short, the
neoliberal ideas associated with globalisation have been increasingly institutionalised
through a multilateral rule-based framework that has substantial authority over national
governments, especially through the WTO.
To date, the WTO has been perhaps the pre-eminent institutional agent of globalisation,
having a more extensive reach both in terms of geographical coverage and ever widening
scope compared to other global institutions. Unlike the IMF, which enters the scene during
times of economic distress when governments need emergency financial assistance, the
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WTO is a more constant influence or constraint on national governments and firms. Not
only does the WTO boast 142 contracting parties with others awaiting entry, I3 its
functional scope has dramatically expanded and its authority sharply strengthened
compared to its predecessor, the GATT. Since the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations of
1986-94 that launched the WTO, disciplines addressing intellectual property rights
protection, market access and national treatment for foreign service firms, as well as trade-
specific investment measures were explicitly incorporated into the multilateral trade
regime. Rules on domestic competition and investment liberalisation are eventually
expected to fall under the ambit of the WT0. 14
 In these new issue areas, market
deregulation is prescribed while state intervention in the market is proscribed, impinging
directly on the government's ability to direct the market.
Moreover, the influence of the major (Triad) powers, namely the US, the European Union
(EU) and Japan in multilateral organisations allows them to create and sustain the
institutional conditions that permit economic actors, particularly their own TNCs to
operate "in pursuit of maximum profir(George, 2000: 22). This essentially means that
advanced country firms, the TNCs in particular, are able to operate in a global
environment that is almost tailor-made to their needs. On the other hand, emerging firms
from the developing world are increasingly disadvantaged because their governments,
while obliged to allow foreign firms domestic market access and other privileges, are
being prevented from providing preferential treatment to domestic firms.
13 As at 26 July 2001.
14 Working groups are currently studying the possibility of including investment and competition
within the purview of the WTO. See the WTO official website: http://www.wto.org .
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2.3	 Conclusion: Globalisation as an Altered Structural Condition
Three points need to be kept in mind from the preceding discussion. First, while
globalisation involves the reconfiguration of economic space, this does not necessarily
imply either re-definition towards a global economic space or a single global division of
labour, nor the absence of territoriality. Instead, the optimal economic space appears to be
regional. This is not to suggest a functionalist line of explanation for the relationship
between regionalism and globalisation. Nevertheless, the functional relationship between
these two phenomena implies that corporate actors may respond positively to regionalism,
particularly of the kind that further entrenches globalisation — open regtonabsm
Globalisation, in other words, opens up space for agency, particularly on the part of state
actors to influence corporate behaviour. The discussion also identified three sets of
potential globalisation pressures that might result in the adoption of policies for regional
cooperation — material economic pressures, cognitive influences, and institutional rules.
There is, however, no determining logic that points to open regionalism as the only policy
response to globalisation. Countervailing tendencies may well result in other forms of
regionalism, notably the resistance model. Much depends on how actors located within
domestic social and political contexts respond to the structural pressures associated with
globalisation on the one hand and to domestic political and social imperatives on the other
that may collide with the globalisation logic. There are today significant counter-currents
in the world economy that challenge both the neoliberal discourse and globalisation itself
(Hveem, 2000; Mittelman, 2000). It is in this sense that globalisation is not a stable
structure or a fully entrenched order, but one that can be challenged.16
15 Open regionalism is defined in the next section.
16 Challenges have increasingly been mounted against globalisation through street protests, for
instance during the WTO Ministerial in Seattle in 2000, the 2000 IMF/World Bank meetings, the
2001 World Economic Conference at Davos and the June 2001 EU Summit in Sweden.
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While it is true that globalisation is partly driven by technological innovations and the
uncoordinated individual actions of rational economic actors out to maximise economic
gains — the liberal economics reading — this is not the same as saying that globalisation is
an inexorable economic force. It is necessary to recognise that globalisation is a process
driven by the policy choices of a variety of actors — governments, business, international
organisations and individuals who put in place the necessary institutional structures that
support globalisation processes (Higgott, 1999: 27). What this also implies is the
possibility for human agency, including that of governments, to manage the process or to
attempt to shape it in preferred ways (Hirst and Thompson, 1995). It is out of such
conscious policies that regionalism emerges in response to globalisation.
3.	 Globalisation and Regionalism
The preceding discussion suggests that the relationship between globalisation and
regionalism may be complementary. The outward-looking nature of most contemporary
regionalist projects leads many observers to surmise that these projects are designed to
enhance the participation of member countries in globalisation processes (Gamble and
Payne, 1996: 251-52)." This is the notion of 'open regionalism' in the current literature on
regionalism, often contrasted with the 'closed' regionalism of the 1960s (Grugel and Hout,
1999: 10). It is the dominant theoretical model of the globalisation-regionalism
relationship, as well as the most common form of regionalist project found in the
contemporary world economy (Mittelman, 2000: 126). It is a model of regionalism that is
underwritten by a liberal political economy perspective.I8
17 Hettne (2000) provides a useful survey of the key features of contemporary regionalism.
Previously, regionalism had been adopted to insulate countries from the world economy and to
develop some measure of regional economic self-sufficiency.
18 Breslin and Higgott (2000) offer an insightful theoretical critique of the regionalism literature.
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3.1	 Engaging with Globalisation: Open Regionalism
Open regionalism, as the term was originally used, meant a form of regionalism based on
the principles of unilateral liberalisation rather than formally negotiated liberalisation, as
well as non-discrimination, meaning that regional concessions were offered to both
members and non-members alike (Drysdale and Garnaut, 1993: 187-88). While retaining
these liberal economic underpinnings, the term is now used in a more general sense to
characterise regionalist schemes that are fundamentally about engaging with globalisation
and the global market. Therefore, regionalist schemes characterised as open regionalism
do not generally involve a common external tariff, I9 while the exchange of preferences
among regional partners is not accompanied by the imposition of new barriers to non-
partners (Gamble and Payne, 1996: 251). Some scholars also define an open regionalist
project as one whose members are willing to admit new members into the grouping
provided they conform to group rules and arrangements (Grugel, 1996: 131; Mittelman,
2000: 113).20
While the discussion in the previous section suggests how globalisation may be
functionally related to regionalism, this alone does not explain regionalism as a political
choice. The liberal perspective in IPE that is the dominant 'theoretical perspective
underlying the model of open regionalism provides only limited answers to this question.
This perspective leads many authors to regard open regionalism as a project of regional
19 Although MERCOSUR involves a common external tariff, it is, nevertheless, aimed at
integrating the economies of its four member states — Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay —
with the global economy. See Grugel (1996) and Phillips (2000).
20 Compared to the closed projects of the 1960s and 1970s, virtually all regionalist projects in the
world economy today have either already admitted new members or are in the process of admitting
new members, or at least are committed to doing so sometime in the future.
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liberalisation driven by concern with economic efficiency and competitiveness.21
Alternative theoretical frameworks provide different understandings of open regionalism,
however, which also point to distinct trajectories of regionalism rather than the idea that
open regionalism tends towards ever-widening processes of regional liberalisation.22
A liberal political economy interpretation: neoliberal regionalism
Liberal political economy perspectives emphasise the primacy of economic incentives and
the search for efficiency and competitiveness in explaining outcomes (Underhill, 2000:
13-14). Much of the literature on regionalism uses liberal insights to explain regionalism
as a project of governments responding to the needs of corporate actors to improve
competitiveness in global markets, using regional action to ride on globalisation (Grugel
and Hout, 1999: 10; Hveem, 2000: 70-74; Mittelman, 2000: 121). Regionalism that is
aimed at deep engagement with the process of globalisation is an example of `meso-
globalisation' .23
A liberal interpretation of regionalism also suggests that these projects are likely to include
a strong deregulatory agenda associated directly with the regionalist scheme or
underpinning it through national neoliberal agendas, both aimed at reducing the state's
role in economic life, which is expected to yield efficiency gains. 24 The effect of such
actions is to markedly reduce transaction costs for firms engaged in transnational
economic activities across national borders. In short, this form of regionalism — neoliberal
regionalism — subordinates the economies of member countries to what are seen as the
21 See the discussion in Grugel and Hout (1999: 10); Mittelman (2000: 112-13) and Hveem (2000:
71).
22 See Mittelman (2000: 113) on the latter point.
23 See Phillips (2000: 286, fn 7) who attributes the idea of `meso-globalisation' to Richard Higgott.
24 Phillips (2000) and van Apeldoorn (2000) note this trend respectively in Latin American
regionalist schemes and in European integration.
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beneficial forces of global markets. It is a regionalism that is informed by neoliberal
economic ideas. Open regionalism and neoliberal regionalism are often regarded as
synonymous in the literature.25
A strict liberal interpretation would, however, see global liberalisation to be superior to
regional liberalisation (Mittelman, 2000: 126). Even though regionalism and globalisation
may be related functionally through changing production dynamics, global liberalisation
would ideally provide a global economic space for TNCs. Even if their preference is to
organise production regionally, global liberalisation allows corporations maximum choice
about where to invest and in whatever spatial configuration best accommodates the firm's
needs. This is borne out by actual trends in the world economy. While global corporations
today tend to organise production on a regional basis, locating regionalised production
operations in different parts of the world, this is usually part of a global strategy. A classic
example is Ford Motor Company, whose global corporate strategy is based on a number of
distinct regional production operations located worldwide (Studer-Noguez, 2000).
The regime literature (neoliberal institutionalism), a variant of the liberal theoretical
perspective, provides an answer to the 'why regionalism?' question that strict liberal
perspectives might find difficult to answer without resorting to • functionalist logic. For
regime liberals, firms and governments opt for regionalism because cooperation is easier
to negotiate with smaller numbers than would be the case for negotiating global
liberalisation (Oye, 1985). Regionalism is a solution to the collective action and
transaction costs problems that impede cooperation among large numbers. Moreover, by
creating both an incentive and a potential bargaining tool for further negotiations, regional
25 See, for instance, Mittelman (2000: 112-13, 126).
64
cooperation can potentially advance global liberalisation (Oye, 1992). Liberal readings of
regionalism thus see the phenomenon as a building block to global liberalisation.
This particular interpretation suggests that we are also likely to see ever-widening
processes of regionalism as more and more nation-states are brought into existing regional
projects in an effort to build up global liberalisation. The current process of enlargement in
the EU, although primarily explained in security terms, can also be accommodated within
a liberal economics interpretation of extending the original regional market outwards,
though within prevailing political and cultural constraints. Hemispheric cooperation in the
Americas can be interpreted in a similar light, as the outward extension of the original US-
Canada Free Trade Area and NAFTA.
Liberal readings of regionalism thus emphasise the regional project's embrace of global
market forces and its intended engagement with globalisation processes. In short, the
political decision to participate in regionalism is made in order to subordinate the national
economy to global market forces. Regionalism thus involves very little purposeful
political action by governments of states to alter or manipulate prevailing patterns of
global economic activity. The implicit assumption in liberal perspectives is of patterns of
economic activity generated by spontaneous market forces and thus, outside the scope of
human agency (Barry Jones, 1995: 38; Underhill, 2000: 13-14).
Alternative perspectives in EPE, the economic realist approach for instance, provide
different understandings of open regionalism, which consequently have implications for
the precise form of regionalist project that emerges as a result of globalisation and
regionalism's future trajectory. Economic realism recognises that state actors can and
often do manipulate inter-state politics to try and influence some aspect of the
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international political economy. While the actual success of such agendas may be limited,
especially in the case of developing countries, nevertheless by allowing for purposeful
action the economic realist perspective re-introduces the political into liberal frameworks
of regionalism.
Economic realist perspectives: modifying understandings of neoliberal regionalism
The economic realist perspective is analytically useful for the study of the globalisation-
regionalism relationship because it provides for the "possibility of purposeful action to
alter or transform prevailing patterns of economic capability and advantage" (Barry Jones,
1995: 31). It suggests that even in the case of open regionalism where governments seek
engagement with the global economy, governments may be using regionalism in a
purposeful manner to influence particular aspects of globalisation processes to benefit
regional members. It encompasses the notion that governments are not always totally
helpless in the face of globalisation, and may find the space to engage in actions through
cooperation that alter or interfere with global market outcomes in certain desired ways.
Mittelman (2000: 133) alludes to this when he suggests that the logic of global capital,
namely its tendency to engage in regional production, offers nation-states an incentive to
collaborate "to attain market shares and augment trading and investment opportunities".
Economic realist frameworks emphasise this particular point — that governments may seek
to consciously manage inter-state relations in order to transform prevailing patterns of
global economic activity to benefit their respective states. Regional cooperation is one
means of doing so. It may be used to re-direct beneficial global economic forces, global
capital for instance, to the region in question using the instrument of the single regional
market to which corporate actors are likely to respond positively, as the preceding
discussion on globalisation suggests. In such instances, open regionalism is driven less by
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narrower concerns with economic efficiency and more by concerns with attracting FDI,
which is a key source of economic growth for many countries. It is an agenda that is most
likely to appeal to developing countries.
Developing countries, in particular, may respond to the structural power of transnational
or global production capita126 by actively using regionalism to attract new production
capital to the region and through that process to individual national economies.
Governments are likely to respond with a policy of regionalism to external developments
that are seen as having the potential to divert investment away from the national economy,
provided they recognise the potential of regionalism in retaining or attracting production
capital. Policymakers may become aware of the potential of regionalism as a magnet for
FDI once they realise that foreign investors are registering strong interest in and are
actually investing in regionalist projects established elsewhere.
Developing countries, usually with limited indigenous capabilities for global production,
often look to attracting TNCs that do possess these assets to their respective economies. In
a situation where FDI can theoretically locate in a variety of locations, developing
countries will want to prevent the potential loss of these wealth-creating assets owned by
TNCs to other locations. TNCs may not be involved in direct lobbying or bargaining with
governments, but policymakers are likely to make policies with this thought — the need to
attract or retain global capital — in mind. Although this may be accomplished though
providing a more liberal national regulatory environment for investors, market size and
access to large regional markets are among the main criteria now influencing the decision
about where to invest, rather than the national FDI regime. Engaging in regional
26 The structural power of capital rests on the ability of capital owners to deny investment
(Lindblom, 1977).
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cooperation allows governments to exploit global capital's functional preference for
regional markets.
The economic realist interpretation: embedded neoliberal regionalism
Regionalist projects driven primarily by the desire to attract global capital are instances of
open regionalism to the extent that they are about engaging with globalisation processes.
In that sense both economic realist and liberal theoretical perspectives provide similar
readings of regionalism. These contrasting perspectives offer distinct views on two issues,
however — the precise features of the regionalist project and its likely future trajectory.
Regionalist projects designed primarily to attract FDI need not necessarily encompass the
strong neoliberal, deregulatory agenda often associated with neoliberal regionalist projects
driven by efficiency concerns. The overriding concern in the former is more broadly with
economic growth.' Efficiency is attained to the extent that the incoming capital operates
efficiently, but the regionalist project is not necessarily underpinned by neoliberal ideas
nor associated with a strong neoliberal agenda. It was already noted that foreign investors
privilege other factors above the policy regime when making investment decisions,
although they would clearly prefer less to more government intervention in markets.
Provided key areas of economic life that are crucial for foreign investors are relatively
unrestricted, such as trade flows and financial regulations on profit repatriation, investors
appear able to live with some degree of government restriction in markets.28 Regionalism
primarily motivated by the desire to draw in FDI may, therefore, display only limited
27	 •Mule the relationship between efficiency and growth is a close one, growth can, nevertheless,
proceed in the presence of some level of economic inefficiency by simply increasing inputs of the
factors of production, notably labour or capital. Efficiency pertains to maximising output and
returns from a given amount of inputs. Paul Krugman's claim about the myth of the East Asian
miracle rests on this distinction. See 1Crugman (1994).
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neoliberal characteristics. These projects are best termed 'embedded neoliberal projects'.29
While these projects are, nonetheless, instances of open regionalism designed to remain
engaged with global market forces, they continue to retain some degree of government
intervention in markets.
An economic realist reading of open regionalism also suggests that the prospects for
extending the regionalist project to include new members will be contingent. Since
regionalism is directed at offering global capital a distinct functional space of production,
extending the project to new members could weaken the distinctiveness of the original
regional project. This will be especially the case if the new member is itself a very
attractive site for FDI, potentially able to draw in substantial amounts of incoming FDI
with limited spillover benefits to other members in the project through vertical and
horizontal production linkages.
For instance, regional projects involving a group of small countries may not always
benefit from the membership of a large country like China which itself effectively offers
foreign capital a 'regional' site of production by virtue of its size and internal industrial
complementarities. There is a significant possibility that foreign investors may prefer to
establish production networks within the Chinese territory, but trade the resultant output to
the other members of the regionalist scheme, thus defeating the purpose of the regionalist
28 This does not necessarily stop TNCs from lobbying for neoliberal policies, particularly through
multilateral organisations.
29 The notion of 'embedded neoliberal' regionalism is borrowed from van Apeldoorn (2000: 241)
who uses it to describe the emerging European regional order in which the state continues to play a
role in the provision of public goods like education and infrastructure. The original term comes
from Ruggie (1998: 72-76).
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exercise for its original members. 3° The benefits of extending the regional project to new
members are not unequivocal, unlike the case of efficiency-driven neoliberal regionalism.
Key limitations of the basic model of open regionalism
By moving beyond the dominant liberal interpretation of open regionalism and drawing on
economic realist insights, the discussion identified two variants of the open regionalist
model. The distinction between them is analytically significant because they offer
contrasting predictions about the future trajectory of open regionalism. Economic realist
interpretations of open regionalism are moreover useful because they focus analysis on
FDI as a key analytical variable. Domestic capital is invisible in the analysis, however.
This stems from the systemic focus of the economic realist approach and the tendency by
scholars to adopt the unitary state assumption, which means the domestic political
economy is not an explicit focus of analytic attention. The liberal perspective does not
even make a distinction between domestic and foreign capital, regarding all business
actors including firms as individual, rational economic agents engaged in maximising their
earnings. As will be seen below, a distinction between foreign and domestic capital can
give rise to a third model of regionalism in which domestic capital is a key analytical
variable.
Despite the analytical leverage provided by the economic realist perspective, both liberal
and economic realist approaches derive the motivation for regionalism in developments at
the systemic level, the former in material pressures from global markets and the latter in
inter-state power political competition (Barry Jones, 1995: 31-32). The latter approach
suggests that state authorities seek to consciously manipulate patterns of international
30 Although there is always an element of competition among the members of a regional project for
incoming FDI, particularly for high valued-added production, the presence of complementarities
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economic activity for strategic purposes. While this may be a relevant proposition in the
case of the major powers and potential strategic rivals like the US, Japan, or the EU, it
applies less well to small, developing countries. The latter are more likely to be driven by
concerns rooted in the domestic political economy.
Many developing countries are preoccupied by domestic political priorities that are
broadly centred on the fragile nature of political legitimacy, 31 both of the regime32 or
political system and of the governing elite (Ayoob, 1995: 9-15). In these societies,
governments often attempt to direct economic development for social and ultimately
political purposes. Political elites in many developing countries derive legitimacy from
their ability to deliver economic growth in their countries and improve the wealth of
citizens, which often also includes a distributive agenda. Foreign economic policies,
including regionalism, often fit into such domestically derived goals and priorities.
Integration of the domestic political economy with the economic realist perspective can
therefore provide richer forms of economic realist analyses.
3.2	 Regionalism as Resistance to Globalisation: Emphasising Domestic Politics
An alternative ideal-type model of the globalisation-regionalism relationship in the
literature explicitly brings in the domestic level, and is thus a useful corrective to the basic
model of open regionalism that focuses on systemic level forces only. Although
encompassing a range of variations, the essential feature of the basic resistance model is
that it seeks to preserve through regionalism particular forms of national policy
among members usually ensures some form of balance is achieved.
31 Political legitimacy is essentially the 'right to rule'. See Barker (1990: 11) for a fuller definition.
32 'Regime at the state level usually refers to the existing political system that defines the collective
interests of society and decides the way power is allocated. See Case (1996: 4). It is to be
distinguished from the notion of international regimes in the IR literature that refers to the
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instruments or domestic social and economic arrangements that are difficult to sustain
individually amidst globalisation (Mittelman, 2000: 116-30).
Domestic level dynamics: the central role of legitimacy
The resistance model thus emphasises concern with non-economic or social values like
distribution and social justice as the main driving force for regionalism, in contrast to the
basic model of open regionalism that emphasises growth and/or efficiency as a key driving
force. Although systemic forces — globalisation — do come into the picture, the response to
them — resistance regionalism — is mediated through the domestic political economy.
Attention moves beyond a focus on economic actors, or actors with purely economic
interests only to emphasise non-state actors or social groups apart from state and corporate
actors as well as domestic political institutions and processes.
Legitimacy is usually a key concern in this form of regionalism (Hveem, 2000: 75-78;
Mittelman, 2000: 116-30). Governments, deriving political legitimacy from their capacity
to undertake traditional social responsibilities for the societies they govern, may be
compelled to turn to regional collective action as the only viable option to maintain
national social/economic arrangements like the welfare state apparatus (Hirst and
Thompson, 1996: 162). Globalisation increasingly appears to make such arrangements
more costly to maintain at the national level. This is why it has been suggested that the
future of social democratic economic systems and re-distributive policies in European
countries lies in a European regional project (Kurzer, 1993: 254).
framework of rules, procedures, expectations and norms that govern relations between states in the
international system.
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Although the resistance model is a theoretical possibility, most instances of regionalism in
the world economy are examples of open regionalism, particularly of the neoliberal variant
(Mittelman, 2000: 126). Nevertheless, there is the possibility of a dialectical process
emerging out of globalisation to challenge the neoliberal trend in regionalism. The
resistance model may consequently emerge as an empirical feature as well as a theoretical
alternative. It may also emerge as regional projects that were originally designed to engage
fully with globalisation are themselves challenged by domestic groups suffering the effects
of regional liberalisation, particularly if social protection or compensatory measures are
unavailable as a result of neoliberal approaches to market liberalisation (Higgott, 2000:
80-81). Neoliberal regionalism consequently may challenge the authority and legitimacy
of governments under these conditions. In such instances, governments may attempt to
withdraw from the regionalist project, or alternatively seek to change the project's original
terms and conditions. The tendency to use regionalism to ride on globalisation may not be
a lasting one (Hveem, 2000: 71).
Regionalism should, therefore, not be viewed only in static terms as the outcome of a one-
off decision to cooperate. New forms of regionalism could emerge from what was
originally a neoliberal project if the re-negotiation option is adopted. How the original
regionalist project might eventually be transformed will also depend on dynamics at the
regional level where re-negotiations and bargaining take place between governments,
especially when the desire to re-negotiate the original project is not shared by the other
partners in the project.
Domestic level dynamics and the politics-economics relationship
One of the shortcomings of the 'resistance' or legitimacy model is its imposition of a
separation of economics and politics by conceptualising growth or efficiency (economics),
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the primary concern of open regionalism, and legitimacy (politics) as opposed to one
another. This is because the analysis of domestic politics in the resistance model does not
extend to uncover the bases of legitimacy. Such an exercise is likely to reveal that in
certain political contexts, growth/efficiency and legitimacy may be closely interrelated,
and complementary rather than opposed. Much, therefore, depends on the sources of
political legitimacy in a particular society. The ASEAN case, for instance, illustrates this
point particularly well.
Economic performance is often a crucial basis of political legitimacy in the ASEAN
countries where elite governance political systems dominate, and where political
legitimacy remains fragile (Castells, 1992: 59-60; Alagappa, 1995: 330). In these
countries, high rates of economic growth not only satisfy mass aspirations to material
well-being they also allow elites to maintain their right to rule (Case, 1996: 18). In such
instances, the presumed tension between legitimacy and growth/efficiency is either
relieved or at least, reduced. The alliance between state elites and transnational foreign
capital, for instance, far from being a source of legitimacy crises, instead can help prevent
such crises from developing by sustaining national competitive advantage in the global
economy (Yeung, 2000: 140). Concern with legitimacy could thus entrench open
regionalist projects, if these contribute to growth rather than result in challenges to them.
This points to the need to pay closer attention to domestic political dynamics that specify
more clearly what the bases of legitimacy are, in particular the relationship between
growth and distributive priorities. Clearly, the domestic level is crucial, mediating between
forces of globalisation and regional outcomes.
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3.3	 Developmental Regionalism: Privileging Domestic Capital
As already discussed, the literature identifies two ideal-type models of the globalisation-
regionalism relationship, with the open regionalist model dominant in the world economy.
In theoretical terms, open regionalism privileges globally oriented capital as a key
analytical variable. Regionalism is designed primarily to advance the competitive position
of business in global competition (the liberal economic interpretation) or to attract FDI to
the region (the economic realist interpretation). 33
 Unlike the resistance model whose
proponents seek to resist globalisation, the advocates of neoliberal and open regionalism
fully accept engagement with globalisation, although those concerned with attracting FDI
attempt to manipulate global market forces through regionalism.
This chapter advances a third model of regionalism that is theoretically possible once a
distinction is made between foreign and domestic capital. The proponents of this type of
regionalism, usually national governments, are not necessarily resisting globalisation
through regionalism. They do not fully accept the anticipated hegemony of foreign/global
firms that is associated with globalisation, however, and attempt to support the
development of domestic capital through regionalism. This form of regionalism, which I
term developmental regionalism, is likely to be relevant in the context of the developing
world in general and Southeast Asia in particular. Deriving from the notion of the East
Asian developmental state, developmental regionalism, thus, encapsulates the
developmental state idea of state intervention in markets to promote national development
agendas, particularly to build up domestic or national firms and more broadly, indigenous
33 This is not to imply that FDI is never a concern in the former, but simply that the primary
concern of neoliberal regionalism is to stimulate economic efficiency. The economic realist
interpretation, on the other hand, regards the need to attract FDI as the primary concern of
policymakers.
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industrial and technological capabilities. 34 Developmental regionalism, it is argued, is
designed to stimulate the growth of domestic capital in the face of globalisation through
providing domestic firms with the means to expand through regionalism, but with either
temporary protection from or temporary privileges over foreign capital. The model,
therefore, employs strategic trade insights from the international economics discipline as
its theoretical base, rather than neoclassical economics.
Insights from strategic trade theory
Strategic trade insights suggest that it is not only the large, regional market that is crucial
in providing the conditions for business to expand and become internationally competitive,
it is the protected regional market that is key. 35 By employing selective
protection/privileges (preferential treatment only to group members) and regional market
expansion (creation of the larger regional market), governments can use regionalism to
help develop competitive domestic industries to survive global market competition and
eventually become world market leaders. This line of argument is based on theoretical
insights drawn from one of the three main strategic trade models found in the literature.36
Paul Krugman's 'import protection as export promotion' model reveals that when a
domestic firm is given a privileged position in one market, usually the home market, it
enjoys an advantage in scale over foreign rivals that enables the firm to realise 'learning
by doing' benefits (Krugman, 1984). Size is an implicit part of this model, and it suggests
34 See Johnson (1999) and Woo-Cumings (1999) on the developmental state.
35 Strategic trade theory derives its conclusions from assumptions that depart from those of
neoclassical trade theory: that markets display increasing returns to scale, that learning effects or
the experience of firms is important, and that technological innovations matter (Helpman and
Krugman, 1985: 3; Brander, 1986: 25; Krugman, 1986: 8). Under these imperfect market
conditions, an interventionist trade policy is shown to secure welfare gains for the country (Brander
and Spencer, 1985; Krugman, 1986: 12-14; McCulloch, 1993: 49-50).
36 A
 useful discussion of these models is found in Matthews and Ravenhill (1994).
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that a larger protected or privileged home market would potentially offer greater dynamic
scale and learning effects to the privileged firm than a smaller market.
Strategic trade insights, thus, suggest that developmental regionalism is not always or
necessarily about governments "putting a lifebelt around a declining industry" (Higgott,
1987: 27). Instead, they point to the potential role of governments in facilitating the
competitiveness of domestic firms through temporary protection, or through providing
them temporary privileges, before exposing them to global market competition. This is
part of the broader argument in the strategic trade literature that sees a role for national
governments in actively laying the basis for high quality economic growth by using a
trade-industrial policy mix to develop the international competitiveness of domestic firms
(Reich, 1983; Krugman, 1986; Zysman, 1988). While strategic trade theory provides the
economic rationale for developmental regionalism the answer as to why political actors
would seek to nurture domestic capital must be found elsewhere.
Domestic capital and its social/political context
It is difficult to integrate strategic trade insights with liberal theoretical perspectives
because of a fundamental tension between the two approaches. Strategic trade theory
emphasises (and advocates) a central role for an activist government, while liberal
approaches reject any such notion. Liberal perspectives are also unable to accommodate
developmental regionalism simply because they do not make a distinction between
domestic and foreign capital. Liberal approaches regard firms as atomistic, devoid of any
social or political context (Underhill, 2000: 14). Business actors are, nevertheless, part of
social wholes and consequently have roles beyond mere economic agents engaged in
profit-making activity (Murphy and Tooze, 1991: 19-20). It is only by considering the
distinct role of domestic capital in the domestic political economy that this model of
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developmental regionalism may be recognised as a distinct form of regionalism, rather
than merely as inconsistencies in open regionalism or as instances of protectionism.
The open regionalism model does not make an adequate distinction between foreign and
domestic capital, although foreign capital is privileged in the FDI variant. If a distinction
is made at all, it is to view domestic business as agents of protectionism likely to resist
regional (and global) liberalisation. This is also because of the model's focus on the
industrial world in which domestic capital is likely to be relatively well developed, unlike
the situation in the developing world. In developing countries, where domestic capital is
usually not as well developed as foreign capital but often plays a crucial political role,
governments may well respond to globalisation in ways that attempt to preserve and
nurture domestic capital. This reflects one dimension of distribution, involving the
selective direction of economic gains to domestic capital vis-à-vis foreign capital.
Although it may be increasingly difficult to distinguish business in terms of its nationality
— the 'who is us?' question posed by Robert Reich (1991: 304) — such a distinction,
nevertheless, remains relevant in particular political contexts, as is the case for developing
countries that do consciously make this distinction for various reasons.
Developmental regionalism and its underlying strategic trade insights are easily
accommodated within economic realist perspectives, which allows for an activist
government role in both the domestic and external spheres. Why governments would do so
depends on domestic political economy dynamics, as already noted in the introductory
chapter, rather than in inter-state power political competition. 38
 The explicit consideration
37 Reich (1991: 136-53) writes of the "coming irrelevance of corporate nationality".
38 Hence, the model of developmental regionalism advanced in this dissertation is distinct from the
notion of neomercantilist regionalism, the latter seeking to build up the national economy through
protection and by excluding foreign firms, primarily to gain international strategic/political power.
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of the domestic level in analysis can provide insights into the social/political context for
domestic capital, and thus offers an understanding of why political actors might wish to
privilege domestic capital over foreign capital.
Gamble and Payne's model of strategic trade regionalism
Before proceeding further, it is necessary at this point to take a closer look at Gamble and
Payne's notion of strategic trade regionalism (Gamble and Payne, 1996: 252).
Superficially, their idea of strategic trade regionalism appears to be similar to the model of
developmental regionalism advanced in this chapter. The authors argue that all open
regionalist projects are informed by a strategic trade view. They see regionalism as a
means to enable industries to develop their competitiveness through protection of selected
sectors as well as through supply-side policies like training, research, public procurement,
and infrastructure provision.
There is, however, a fundamental difference between the model of developmental
regionalism advanced in this chapter and the idea of strategic trade regionalism proposed
by Gamble and Payne. Crucially, the latter does not make a distinction between domestic
and foreign firms, with selective protection to industries provided only through the
restriction on imports from outside the region. 39
 Thus, both domestic and foreign firms are
either both protected or privileged through regionalism. Theoretically, these firms are also
able to compete with each other within the regional market once the foreign firm has
established operations in the region. Developmental regionalism, on the other hand, is
explicitly about nurturing domestic firms through either temporary protection from, or
temporary privileges over, foreign firms. It encompasses the features of both open
39 Imports from outside the region are restricted through the higher prices that must be paid for
them compared to imports from regional partners.
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regionalism as well as the resistance model, and is, therefore, distinct from the notion of
strategic trade regionalism advanced by Gamble and Payne that is fundamentally a model
of open regionalism.
Mittelman's model of development integration
Mittelman's (2000: 116-17) development integration model of regionalism is also
fundamentally distinct from the notion of developmental regionalism advanced here.
Development integration, according to Mittelman, links trade integration with state
attempts to promote coordinated regional industrial development. It is a model that clearly
reflects the sentiments of the first wave of 'closed' regionalism of the 1960s and 1970s,
particularly as it is implicitly underpinned by the idea of import substitution "to redress
external dependence" (Mittelman, 2000: 117). In fact, ASEAN itself adopted this form of
regionalism during the 1970s and 1980s, albeit unsuccessfully. State coordination of
regional industrial projects that is found in Mittelman's development integration model is
not a feature of developmental regionalism, which is about nurturing domestic capital
through the strategic provision of selective privileges over foreign capital.
5.	 Globalisation and Regionalism: Incorporating Domestic Politics
The discussion so far suggests that globalisation, while structuring the external
environment for countries and providing the initial impulse towards regionalism, cannot
bear the full analytical burden in explaining regional outcomes. Regionalism may be one
of three basic types, namely open regionalism (either a neoliberal or embedded neoliberal
form), a resistance model, or a developmental version. Which project ultimately emerges
is determined at the domestic level, where the domestic social and political setting
mediates globalisation in significant ways. Milner, in fact, suggests that the domestic level
is paramount because "cooperation is a continuation of domestic political struggles by
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other means" (Milner, 1997: 10). Domestic politics alone, however, cannot bear the full
analytical burden as Milner suggests though she makes a valuable point about the
importance of domestic politics. A domestic politics based explanation of regionalism
would have to account for the simultaneity of domestic developments in all regional
partner countries that would induce national governments to act jointly in a regional
response.
Nevertheless, based on the preceding discussion, a key assumption in the dissertation is
that governments respond to essentially domestic political constituencies in the first
instance, on which they rely for political support. The particular domestic political
economy setting often influences the way international events are interpreted by
policymakers and other groups and their potential impact assessed. Policy choices in
response to external developments are also made with one eye on their potential impact on
domestic political dynamics, including their distributional implications. In short, while the
systemic level may well provide the initial trigger or impulse, domestic political dynamics
mediate the final outcome. The importance of the domestic level is best illustrated by
reference to the specific case of ASEAN.
4.1	 Domestic Politics in ASEAN: The Elite Governance Model
Domestic politics in the core ASEAN countries is best conceptualised as a system of elite
governance, which is most usefully viewed as a project whose principal aim is to maintain
elite power, autonomy and exclusivity (Case, 1996: 20; McCargo, 1998: 127). Although
the domestic political systems in these counties are not identical, nevertheless, the
dynamics of the domestic political economy all share the basic features of the elite
governance model. Notably for the dissertation, elite governance political systems are
characterised by tension that potentially exists between the growth and distribution
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imperatives inherent in these systems. Both sets of priorities relate to political legitimacy
in these societies, which remains contested in the core ASEAN countries (Alagappa, 1995:
330). As already noted, growth/efficiency and distribution are the key driving forces of the
three models of regionalism discussed in the previous section. The former drives the turn
to open regionalism while concern with social equity underpins the resistance model.
Developmental regionalism is driven by concern with both growth and the distribution of
economic benefits to domestic capital.
Economic growth and elite governance
The tension between growth and distribution in elite governance systems emerges from
the bases upon which elite rule, and its political legitimacy, is maintained. 40 In elite
governance systems, political competition is usually restricted to elites, and governance is
generally the function of "a narrow set of interlocking elite interests" (McCargo, 1998:
126).41 Thus, a core foundation of elite rule is elite unity, making elite accommodation a
vital task in domestic politics (Case, 1996: 9-33). Economic growth is key in this regard.
Additionally, economic growth also undergirds the second pillar of elite governance
systems, namely the relationship between governments and citizenry. In these settings,
economic growth secures mass satisfaction through material wellbeing. While ruling elites
have been known to maintain their position and to ensure a basic level of regime stability
while blocking economic growth, their failure to deliver economic growth may be
Political legitimacy, particularly of ruling regimes continues to be problematic in the core
ASEAN countries, although in now democratic countries like Thailand and the Philippines it is the
legitimacy of incumbent governments rather than the democratic regime that is more often
contested (Alagappa, 1995: 330-33; Sukatipan, 1995: 221).
41 Elites may be defined as "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful
organisations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially" (Burton et al, 1992:
8). They are the principal decision-makers in the largest or most resource-rich political,
governmental, military, professional, communications and cultural organisations in society. State
elites gather at the apex of the state apparatus, and may be usefully divided into governing elites,
bureaucratic elites, and military elites. Not all these component elites are important across the
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politically damaging over time (Case, 1996: 18). This can occur through mass challenges
and/or through a breakdown in elite unity.
In less than democratic political systems where the means for registering mass
dissatisfaction are limited, economic grievances stemming from economic recession and
crisis often give rise to protest actions by middle and lower income groups. Unlike elite
groups, middle and lower income groups may be controlled by repression. Nevertheless,
economic crises provide new opportunities to political oppositions or opposing elite
factions to draw adherents from these latter groups and, thus, to challenge the prevailing
regime and/or the ruling incumbents by linking adverse economic conditions to the
exclusionary nature of the present regime (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997: 268).
Even though economic distress is not the primary source of factional or inter-elite
conflicts, it is likely to exacerbate them. Fewer internal divisions within the ruling elite are
likely when economic growth is strong. Declining economic performance often disrupts
the political bargains rulers typically forge with other elite groups in society, for instance
the business elite (Case, 1996: 17-20).42 Rulers often co-opt business elites as partners in
economic development by providing them with the broad conditions for growth that
business actors typically seek. In turn, business groups not only spearhead economic
growth they can also constitute a significant support base for rulers, especially in the case
of domestic or national business interests in patronage-based polities.° The defection of
different ASEAN countries, while their importance can also vary within a country over time. See
Case (1996) and McCargo (1998).
42 Business or economic elites are essentially the owners and managers of private capital that are
crucial in national investment, production and development processes. These elites often head
financial, commercial, landed or industrial organisations.
43 In patronage-based political systems, political elites grant special privileges to favoured
individuals or firms in return for material and political support. Crouch (1986) provides a useful
discussion.
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business partners in such settings can leave incumbents politically weak not only through
loss of both the source of growth in the economy as well as investor confidence but also of
a vital political (and often material) support base for ruling incumbents. The end result is a
weakening of elite cohesion and the power base of incumbent elites, while opposition
groups gain from the defection of business and other elites previously aligned with the
incumbents (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997: 267-68).
The challenges posed to ruling elites by declining economic performance have been amply
demonstrated in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia. In Indonesia, political turmoil and the
ousting of incumbent ruling elites quickly followed financial and economic troubles as a
result of the Asian financial crisis that began in mid-1997. Malaysia too has witnessed
substantial elite cleavages as a result of the financial crisis, although an emergent mass
challenge to the ruling incumbents has been contained (Khoo, 2000). In short, economic
growth allows elites to maintain their right to rule, and by doing so, ensures regime
stability (Case, 1996: 4-18; McCargo, 1998: 127).
Distribution, elite cohesion and elite governance
At the same time, the picture is complicated by the imperative of distribution that is also
inherent in elite governance systems. Very simply, distribution involves the selective
direction of economic benefits, income and rents 44 by government elites to particular
firms, groups or individuals who would not otherwise have received these gains through
the undirected working of the free market. Apart from growth, distribution is also key to
maintaining cohesion among elites through the distribution of economic benefits to
politically favoured groups or individuals. Elite accommodation, as already noted above,
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sustains the political position of incumbent elites since elite cleavages or defections by key
elite partners, notably business elites, opens up space for political challenge to incumbents.
The absence of elite accommodation and unity is potentially a prelude to regime change
(Haggard and Kaufman, 1997).
In addition to distribution to serve particularistic ends and thus ensure elite
accommodation, distribution can also serve broader political goals, as a means towards
some form of equity in society. In Malaysia, ruling elites favour the majority ethnic Malay
community with material entitlements through the ethnic-based distributive policy, which
is crucial to the political legitimacy of the Malay-dominated political regime (Crouch,
1996: 24).45 Policies to ensure some measure of income support to farmers who may be a
key constituency for ruling elites, for instance through maintaining restrictions on imports
of cheaper agricultural products, is another instance of distribution for broader political
goals rather than distributing benefits for particularistic ends. In these instances,
distribution or broader social equity considerations is also vital for perpetuating elite rule
and the stability and security of the regime.
While government policies for distributing economic benefits to politically important
individuals, firms, or groups do not necessarily mean the economy is on course towards
economic decline, distributive policies often involve trade-offs with the growth
imperative. Trade-offs are especially likely when economic rents are created through
artificial restrictions on market competition by governments, which could undermine
44 Economic rents are essentially the excess returns to factors of production that may be secured due
to their scarcity. Governments often create artificial scarcity, through imposing import tariffs or
allocating monopoly rights for instance.
45 In the ASEAN countries, as in most developing countries, internal vulnerabilities are considered
to be far more threatening to state structures and to the governing regime than are external, military
challenges. See Ayoob (1995).
Economic growth
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growth (Bhagwati, 1982). Such policies can potentially also hinder the domestic
operations of foreign firms, thus weakening growth prospects by precluding these
significant agents of growth. Growth need not, however, be disrupted if the extent of
distribution is limited, either to particular sectors or in terms of time.46 Moreover, growth
often enables distribution to take place with fewer costs than under conditions of
generalised economic decline. On the other hand, when efficiency or growth
considerations are paramount, governments' distributive role may be affected. The role of
economic growth and distribution in elite governance systems is depicted in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1
The Role of Growth and Distribution in Elite Governance Political Systems
Satisfies masses
Maintains elite cohesion
(especially among political
and domestic business elites)
Distribution
Satisfies politically
favoured non-elite social
groups (e.g. rice farmers,
ethnic groups)
Core Elite Goals  (essentially political stability)
Maintenance of elite rule (especially incumbents);
Stability of the domestic
political regime (sustains the political status quo);
Maintenance of order & security.
46 Jayasuriya (2001) argues that distributive policies and programmes that were predominant in the
non-tradeable sectors in many Southeast Asian countries were sustained by high economic growth
derived in the more market-oriented and internationally efficient tradeable sectors, often dominated
by foreign firms. FDI-centred growth in export-oriented sectors enabled governments to maintain
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6.	 Conclusion: The Dissertation's Main Propositions
A modified economic realist perspective offers substantial analytical purchase over liberal
perspectives in explaining regionalism as an outcome of globalisation. Its value as a
theoretical tool comes from its recognition that states continue to matter, and more
importantly, that the governments of these states can, and often do consciously manipulate
inter-state relations to try and alter international political economy structures in line with
domestic interests. Regionalism can be interpreted as one such instrument for states to
pool their resources in order to influence the international political economy. This
approach thus shares the basic statist ideas of (Re tegionat governance accicoack
globalisation outlined in Hout (1999: 25-28). Much of the international politics of
Southeast Asia continues to operate along statist lines. As such, the economic realist
perspective combined with a suitable model of domestic politics — the elite governance
model in the case of ASEAN — generates rich insights into the globalisation-regionalism
relationship.
Rather than the two basic models found in the literature, the combined economic realist-
domestic politics framework allowed a third theoretical model — developmental
regionalism — to be advanced, which also draws on insights from strategic trade theory in
economics rather than liberal/neoclassical economics (Table 1.1). Specifically for
ASEAN, the elite governance model of domestic politics reveals the basic tensions
between growth and distribution in the core ASEAN countries, and how these tensions
relate to foreign and domestic capital in the domestic political economy. Most importantly,
it shows why in particular settings where domestic capital is usually not as well developed
as foreign capital but often plays a crucial political role, including distribution,
distributive programmes to favoured domestic firms, many with political connections that were
found in protected and less efficient non-tradeable sectors like services.
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governments may well respond to globalisation in ways that attempt to preserve and
nurture domestic capital. In the model of developmental regionalism advanced in the
chapter, its proponents, although not resisting globalisation, nevertheless do not fully
accept the notion of the hegemony of foreign/global corporate giants that is part of the
globalisation phenomenon, and attempt to support the development of domestic capital
through regionalism.
Moreover, economic realist insights allowed a distinction to be made within the dominant
open regionalist model to reveal two variants, neoliberal regionalism and the FDI model of
regionalism, the latter more likely to reflect embedded neoliberalism (Table 1.1). The
distinction is not a trivial one. The discussion indicated how the two variants of open
regionalism display distinct features and more importantly, different trajectories. The
significance of this distinction will become clear in the concluding chapter, which
discusses the future trajectory of Southeast Asian economic regionalism.
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Table 1.1
Theoretical Models of the Globalisation-Regionalism Relationship
Theoretical Models
(Ideal-Types)
Relationship	 to
Globalisation
Key Driving
Force
Key Features Relationship	 to
Foreign	 and
Domestic Capital
Neoliberal
Regionalism
[Variant of
open regionalism]
Engages	 with
globalisation
Concern with
efficiency
No new barriers to non-
members imposed;
Full	 deregulatory
agenda contemplated;
Also	 associated	 with
agenda	 to	 reduce
government's role in all
aspects	 of	 economic
activity;
Hence	 the	 neoliberal
credentials.
Does	 not
distinguish
between	 foreign
and	 domestic
capital
FDI Model
[Variant of
open regionalism]
Engages	 with
globalisation
Concern with
attracting
FDI, which is
a	 crucial
source	 of
growth;
Efficiency
may be either
a primary or
secondary
concern.
No new barriers to non-
members imposed;
Deregulation	 agenda
could be extensive or
limited;
Ambivalent with regard
to government's role in
the economy;
More likely to be an
instance of embedded
neoliberal regionalism a
Foreign	 capital
(FDI) privileged
Resistance Model Resists
globalisation
Concern with
political
legitimacy
Seeks insulation from
global market forces;
Dominant	 agenda
	 is
social/distributive.
Other	 social
groups, apart from
capital privileged,
notably labour
Developmental
Regionalism
Essentially
engages	 with
globalisation,
although it also
involves	 limited
and	 temporary
resistance to it
Concern with
distribution
initially, with
growth	 a
long-run
concern
Employs	 temporary
protection	 of,	 or
temporary	 privileges
for, domestic capital;
Distribution	 is	 thus
directed	 •	 towards
domestic capital.
Domestic	 capital
privileged
a The notion of an 'embedded neoliberal' regional project is borrowed from van Apeldoorn (2000:
241). Also see footnote 29.
The dissertation's central propositions
The central hypothesis in the dissertation is that the type of regionalism that emerges as a
result of globafisation is mediated by domestic political economy dynamics centred on the
relationship between growth/efficiency and distribution, even in the case of regionalism
projects that seek engagement with globalisation. Based on the discussion in this chapter,
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the following specific propositions with regard to AFTA that derive from the central
hypothesis are advanced, and will be developed in the rest of the dissertation.
The first proposition is that AFTA is likely to encompass the features of both open
regionalism as well as developmental regionalism due to the political significance of both
foreign and domestic capital. Although both projects are the outcome of globalisation, and
driven by a concern with economic growth and with engaging with globalisation, domestic
priorities centred on nurturing domestic capital infuse the growth imperative in the case of
developmental regionalism. This is likely to result in departures from open regionalism in
the design of regional cooperation. Chapters 3 and 4 examine these arguments in detail.
The second proposition is that the distributive imperative may well be so overwhelming
despite initial commitments to cooperate driven by the growth dynamic that governments
opt to shield particular elements of domestic business from the liberalisation required
under both open regionalism and developmental regionalism. Disputes among regional
members are likely as governments renege on their original commitments as they attempt
to balance growth and distributive concerns. Chapter 5 elaborates on this proposition.
Leading from this, the third proposition is that implementation becomes a political process
rather than a technical one of complying with commitments already made earlier. This
requires some form of regional mechanism to address the tension between growth and
distribution and to enable cooperation to be sustained and advanced rather than
abandoned. To develop this third proposition further, additional theoretical insights are
required, which are drawn from the ER literature on compliance bargaining and
international institutions. The latter is discussed in detail in Chapter 6, which also fleshes
out the third proposition.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA (AFTA), 1991 - 2000:
The Unfolding of a Regional Economic Cooperation Project
1.	 Introduction
Before proceeding to develop the dissertation's three main propositions that were outlined
in the previous chapter, it is necessary to have an idea of developments in AFTA during
the period under study. This exercise, the subject of the present chapter, is aimed at
providing the empirical background for the analysis in the rest of the dissertation. More
importantly, it highlights the major trends in AFTA as well as identifies puzzling aspects
of the regional project, issues that were first raised in the introductory chapter and which
the remaining chapters attempt to interpret, and explain. This chapter, thus, describes in
detail the unfolding of the AFTA project between 1991 when the initial decision to
establish a free trade area in ASEAN was made and 2000. It describes the commitments
that were made in AFTA by the core member governments in all three component
programmes — the CEPT, AFAS, and the MA — as well as notes how well these
commitments were complied with, or at least the prospects for their implementation. This
had yet to be done for AFTA at the time of writing.
The discussion in Section 2 reveals that contrary to earlier predictions of its failure, AFTA
has made substantial advances as its pace was accelerated and its scope widened,
particularly to include potentially contentious issue areas like unprocessed agricultural
products, services, and investment. Commitments to jointly reduce tariffs and non-tariff
barriers were forthcoming throughout the decade, while consultations were held to
develop commitments in services and investment liberalisation. Notwithstanding these
achievements, Section 3 discloses that implementation of certain commitments, especially
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in the new issue areas presented problems. Section 3 also briefly introduces the three
major disputes in AFTA that emerged among the ASEAN governments during the course
of the decade — in liberalising trade in agriculture, automobiles and petrochemicals.
2.	 AFTA: Ambitious Undertakings/Commitments
The AFTA project can be divided into three phases for analytical purposes (Table 2.1).
Phase 1 from 1991 through 1995 may be termed the initial consolidation stage. During this
period, the decision to form AFTA was made and its initial agenda worked out. Some
member governments soon went back on some of their AFTA commitments as a result of
recent domestic political changes and growing domestic business opposition to AFTA.
Nevertheless, by the end of 1995, the ASEAN governments had reaffirmed the free trade
goals of AFTA. In addition, they also agreed to hasten its implementation and expand its
scope by committing unprocessed agricultural products, services, and investment to joint
liberalisation.
Phase 2, the expansion phase of AFTA covers the years 1996 and 1997, and is the period
when detailed negotiations on agriculture, services and investment liberalisation, as well
as on industrial cooperation got underway. Phase 3 from 1998 through 2000 represents the
financial crisis and post-crisis period. This was not only a time when existing initiatives
were consolidated, more importantly, a number of new initiatives were undertaken in
response to the crisis. Nevertheless, this was also a time when a number of ASEAN
governments attempted to delay on their AFTA commitments, arguing that domestic
industries already badly affected by the regional financial crisis could suffer further if
subject to AFTA liberalisation as committed to previously. The following sub-sections
provide a more detailed description of the evolution of AFTA through these three phases.
PHASE 1 (1991-95)
Initial Consolidation Phase
PHASE 2 (1996-97)
Expansion Phase 
PHASE 3 (1998-2000)
Financial Crisis & Post-Crisis Phase
Free trade area by 2008
Tariffs on manufactured
products targeted at 0-5%;
Excludes
	 unprocessed
agricultural	 products	 and
services;
Staggered implementation start
date allowed;
New members finish later.
Acceleration of AFTA: new
deadline is 2003
0-5% tariff target;
Implementation date fixed at
1st January 1994;
Includes detailed programme
for non-tariff barriers and trade
facilitation;
New members finish later.
Formal decision to expand
AFTA to include new issue
areas (December 1995) 
Unprocessed	 agricultural
products;
Services;
Industrial cooperation;
Investment;
Intellectual property rights.
First round of services
negotiations begun
Negotiations in seven priority
sectors;
l st Package: December 1997;
2nd Package: December 1998.
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation
(AICO) scheme formally
launched (1996)
Requires minimum 30%
national equity;
Minimum of 2 firms from 2
ASEAN countries required to
participate;
Firms must be involved in joint
industrial production or the
pooling/sharing of raw and
intermediate materials.
The ASEAN Investment Area
(AIA) initiative
Initial negotiations launched.
Unprocessed	 agricultural
products
Negotiations to iron out
differences among members
and to develop suitable
modalities for liberalisation;
Dispute Settlement Mechanism
adopted (19961
New flexible deadline of 2002 (0-5%
tariff target) (1998 decision)
Formal deadline remains 2003.
Zero tariff AFTA (1999 decision)
By 2010 (initially 2015) for original
members.
AIA Framework Agreement signed
(October 1998)
National treatment and market access
initially by 2010 for ASEAN investors
and 2020 for non-ASEAN investors;
Deadlines revised in March 1999: AIA
to be realised in 2003 for ASEAN
investors in manufacturing and 2010
in other selected sectors;
For non-ASEAN investors: 2020.
Protocol adopted on liberalising
sensitive agricultural products (1999)
Liberalisation to begin between 2001&
2003/ 2005;
Completion date: 2010.
Second round of services negotiations
launched
All service sectors;
Negotiations over 1999-2001;
Negotiations targeting all four modes
of service delivery.
Other framework agreements adopted
to support AFTA: 
On goods in transit (December 1998);
Mutual recognition arrangements
(December 1998);
On E-commerce (November 2000).
Short-term Incentives to Enhance
Investment Climate  *
Limited to applications received
between 1-1-99 and 31-12-2000;
100% foreign equity and domestic
market access offered in selected
areas;
Waiver of the 30% national equity
requirement in AICO.
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Table 2.1
The Three Phases of the AF TA Project
* Not directly a part of the AFTA project but, nevertheless, impinge on AFTA.
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2.1	 The Initial Consolidation Phase (1991-95)
In June 1991, the then Thai Prime Minister, Anand Panyarachun, publicly advocated the
idea of an ASEAN free trade area. Anand had, in April 1991, initially broached the idea
with the Singapore Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok Thong, and then pressed the idea on his
other ASEAN counterparts over the next few months (Stubbs, 2000: 304). The idea was
then endorsed as an ASEAN project by the ASEAN foreign ministers in July 1991 and
later at the 23 rd ASEAN Economic Ministers' meeting (23 rd AEM) 1 in October of the same
year.
The ministers at the AEM agreed that all member countries should subscribe to the
establishment of AFTA simultaneously so that within 15 years a single regional market
where internal tariffs were between 0-5 per cent would become a reality. The instrument
that would operationalise AFTA was the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT).
The 23 rd
 AEM agreed that a Framework Agreement should be drafted under which
specific areas of cooperation could eventually be negotiated. Ministers then tasked the
Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) of ASEAN to work out the form and
substance of the Framework Agreement that was scheduled to be signed at the
forthcoming Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992.2
In each country, discussions about AFTA were confined to a small group as leaders,
ministers and officials tried to gauge the minimum level of commitments they could
credibly make (Stubbs, 2000: 304). By the time of the fourth summit, senior officials from
the economics ministries in the various ASEAN governments had together worked out
The annual series of ASEAN Economic Ministers Meetings (AEM) began in 1969 when member
governments first decided to explore the possibility of economic cooperation.
2 The SEOM is a meeting of senior civil servants, usually at the level of permanent secretaries or
their equivalent from the economic or related ministries from each ASEAN member country.
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preliminary details of the two agreements that would launch AFTA and provide its
operational workings. The official summit declaration, namely the Singapore Declaration
set out the broad areas for ASEAN cooperation in the security, political and economic
fields (ASEAN, 1992a). The Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation
(ASEAN, 1992b) and the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme
for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (the CEPT Agreement) (ASEAN, 1992c) focused
specifically on the principles and procedures for establishing AFTA within 15 years.
These two agreements collectively formed what is regarded in this dissertation as the
foundational AFTA agreements.
Initial details are sketchy
Under the AFTA agreements, tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade in manufactured goods
including capital goods and processed agricultural products were due to be lowered to
between 0-5 per cent within 15 years starting from January 1993. Raw materials,
unprocessed agricultural products, and services were not covered in the original
agreement. An ASEAN content of at least 40 per cent was required for products to qualify
for preferential tariffs. 3
 While Anand's original proposal had suggested a 10-year time
frame for the realisation of AFTA, which Singapore and Malaysia supported, the time
frame was extended to 15 years to take account of objections from Indonesia and the
Philippines. The Indonesian and Philippine governments had been concerned that some of
their domestic industries were too weak and had requested for special and differential
treatment under AFTA.4
3 The local content rules are liberal in that once a component reaches the 40 per cent local content
target it is automatically considered to be 100 per cent locally produced for purposes of cumulation.
See ASEAN Secretariat (1993: 42) and Ravenhill (1995: 859, fn. 17).
4 /1 WSJ, 'ASEAN nations endorse plans for free trade zone', 9 October 1991.
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The CEPT became the primary mechanism to implement AFTA although the original
CEPT Agreement containing ten Articles provided only general guidelines on tariff
reduction schedules (ASEAN, 1992c). Article 2 specified that products to be included in
the CEPT were to be identified on a sectoral or product group basis, that is, at the HS
(Harmonised System) 6-digit level. Exclusions at the HS 8 or 9 digit level for specific
products were, however, permitted under the CEPT for those member countries
temporarily wishing to exclude particular products from AFTA disciplines. No limits were
placed on the number of products that might be excluded in this manner There were plans
to review products initially excluded after eight years, although no further details were
provided on what would happen after the review.
Article 4 of the CEPT agreement outlined the tariff reduction schedule. For products with
tariff rates above 20 per cent, ASEAN members were called to initially harmonise internal
tariffs to 20 per cent or less within a five to eight year time frame beginning from 1
January 1993, with each country working out its own schedule of reduction. Although the
CEPT Agreement advised members to adopt an annual rate of reduction, this was
ultimately left to individual members who could, theoretically, undertake the bulk of the
reductions in the final year. Subsequent tariff reductions from 20 per cent to 0-5 per cent
were to be undertaken within a seven-year time frame, making a total 15-year
implementation period. In this case, a minimum annual rate of reduction of 5 per cent was
specified in the CEPT Agreement. The tariff reduction schedule for products whose
prevailing tariff rates were already below 20 per cent on 1 January 1993 was to be
determined and announced by the governments concerned. These schedules were,
moreover, not designated as binding, but as indicative only. There was clearly enormous
flexibility in the CEPT programme, including a very long implementation phase,
especially for products whose initial tariffs were below 20 per cent.
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Despite Article 4, the initial details on tariff reductions were somewhat hazy, while few
clear guidelines were provided for the elimination of quantitative restrictions and non-
tariff barriers (NTBs). 5
 It was only during the course of 1992 that additional
implementation details were worked out by economic ministers. The 24 th AEM in October
1992 reiterated the 1 January 1993 starting date for AFTA. Other operational details of the
CEPT scheme were finalised at the 3rd AFTA Council6
 meeting in December of that year.'
These details were contained in three documents published by the ASEAN Secretariat,
namely the Operational Procedures for CEPT, Rules of Origin for CEPT, and
Interpretative Notes to the Agreement on the CEPT Scheme for AFTA (ASEAN
Secretariat, 1993). The most important of these details were the fast track schedule for 15
product groups, the normal track schedule for remaining manufactured goods, as well as
the nature of exclusions allowed (Table 2.2). These schedules were, however, deemed to
be indicative only, with member governments allowed a faster or slower rate of tariff
reduction provided the targeted tariff rates were reached by the stipulated end dates
(ASEAN Secretariat, 1993: 4-5).
5 See Article 5 (A) of the CEPT Agreement (ASEAN, 1992c).
6 Article 7 of the CEPT Agreement provides for the establishment of the AFTA Council, an inter-
governmental ministerial council comprising one nominee from each ASEAN member country.
The Council is tasked with supervising, coordinating and reviewing the implementation of the
CEPT Agreement. It also handles dispute resolution. Although the AFTA Council and the AEM are
distinct organisational entities, the same minister often participates at both Council and Ministerial
meetings.
7 See Press Statement, Third AFTA Council Meeting, Indonesia, 11 December 1992.
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Table 2.2
Implementation Details of the 1992 AFTA Agreement
AFTA Agreement (1992)
(starting	 date	 1/1/93	 or
1/1/96)a
Target Date for Achieving
0-5% Tariff Rate
Exclusions
Allowed
Fast Trackb Normal Track
Initial Tariff Rates
Above 20%
1/1/2003
(within	 10
years)
Initially	 to	 20%	 by
1/1/2001 or 1/1/98
(within 5-8 years);
Then	 to	 0-5%	 by
1/1/2008
(within 7-10 years)
General
Exemptions'
Temporary
Exclusionsd
Permanent
exemptions
possible'
Initial Tariff Rates
At or below 20%
1/1/2000
(within 7 years)
1/1/2003
(within 10 years)
a The starting date could be later than 1/1/1993 provided target dates were reached on schedule. A
three-year grace period, until 1996, was given.
Covers 15 product items, namely vegetable oils; chemicals; fertiliser; rubber products; pulp and
paper; wooden and rattan furniture; gems and jewellery products; cement; pharmaceuticals;
plastics; leather products; textiles; ceramics and glass products; copper cathodes; electronics.
Allowed to protect national security; public morals; human, animal or plant life/ health; and to
preserve articles of artistic, historic or archaeological value.
6 Includes products that governments feel are not ready for tariff liberalisation. Subject to review at
the end of eight years.
e Permanent exemptions allowed, essentially for unprocessed agricultural products.
Source: Table 1 compiledfrom information in ASEAN Secretariat (1993: 3-4)
Substantial flexibility is allowed
Despite firming up details in the CEPT during the course of 1992, the AFTA project
remained a very flexible programme of trade liberalisation. For instance, while temporary
exclusions were allowed subject to a review after eight years, permanent exemptions were
also possible. The idea behind the rather long eight-year period of temporary protection
was to allow individual member governments sufficient time to prepare their respective
domestic industries for AFTA tariff reductions. 8 There was, however, nothing to prevent
member governments from continuing to exclude products after the eight-year temporary
exclusion period, for instance by transferring products to the permanent exemption list
8 See AWSJ, 'ASEAN officials agree on details of trade area', 14 December 1992.
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(also called the sensitive list). This extremely flexible arrangement added to the
uncertainty inherent in the AFTA project.
Although tariff reductions were scheduled to begin on 1 January 1993, member countries
were later allowed a grace period until January 1995 to begin their respective CEPT
liberalisation programmes The staggered approach had been adopted to overcome plans
by both Thailand and Indonesia to opt out of AFTA altogether for several of the 15
categories of products designated for fast track tariff cuts. 9 These two countries thus
planned to begin accelerated tariff reductions only from 1995, and to delay beginning
normal track tariff reductions until between 1996 and 1999 (Table 2.3). 1 ° On the other
hand, Malaysia and Singapore pledged to begin tariff reductions as scheduled on 1 January
1993. The Philippines was already committed to a unilateral programme of tariff
reductions under Executive Order 470 that was to end in 1995, after which it would
continue to reduce tariffs under the CEPT programme.
Table 2.3
AFTA Tariff Reduction Start Dates (adopted December 1992)
Fast Track Normal Track
Initial	 tariffs
above 20%
Initial tariffs at
or below 20%
Initial tariffs
above 20%
Initial tariffs at
or below 20%
Brunei
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
NA'
1995
1993
Unilateralb
1993
1995
1995
1995
1993
Unilateralb
1993
1995
1994
1998
1993
Unilateral"
NA'
1998
1996
1996
1993
Unilateral"
1993
1999
Not applicable, since there were no tariffs above 20%.
b Unt •il 1995.
Source: Table compiledfrom information in ASEAN Secretariat (1993: 17-20)
9 See AWSJ, 'ASEAN moves closer to paring group tariffs', 26 October 1992.
I ° Thailand, however, reduced tariffs under the CEPT scheme on selected items in February 1993.
See Business Times, `Anand, the white knight of Thai politics', 8 March 1993.
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Attempting to kick-start AFTA
Despite the firming up of some details and the allowances made to ensure the cooperation
of all AFTA founding members, the AFTA project ground to a halt in 1993. Malaysia and
Singapore were unhappy with the staggered approach since that placed their domestic
industries at a disadvantage." Malaysia, in fact, considered delaying its AFTA tariff cuts
until 1995 when all ASEAN countries were obliged to begin CEPT tariff reductions to
ensure that domestic industries were not at an unfair disadvantage in AFTA. 12 The new
Thai government of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai elected in mid-1992 called for a
"transition period" for AFTA, as Thai businesses began pressing the newly elected
government to delay its AFTA commitments. I3 In Indonesia too, the commitment to
AFTA began waning as ministers less committed to trade liberalisation were selected to
the new cabinet announced by President Suharto in mid-March 1993 while protected
businesses, especially the state-enterprise sector, also began pressing policy-makers to
rethink AFTA.14
Nevertheless, by October 1993, senior officials in ASEAN had worked out a proposal to
re-launch AFTA, with five of the six ASEAN countries now pledging to begin AFTA
tariff cuts by 1 January 1994.' 5 Thus, the staggered implementation programme was
replaced in favour of a common start date. At this time, member governments also agreed
to submit 41,147 tariff lines to AFTA disciplines through a revised CEPT package issued
in 1994, accounting for 88.3 per cent of their total tariff lines (ASEAN Secretariat, 1993:
24).
"Business Times, 'Industries hit by AFTA scheme', 10 April 1993.
12 See New Straits Times (NST) 'la may consider delaying tariff cuts', 16 July 1993.
13 NST 'ASEAN needs transitional period', 26 March 1993.
14 A-- cW6J 'ASEAN moves closer to paring group tariffs', 26 October 1992.
15 For administrative reasons, Brunei was to begin CEPT tariff cuts in June 1994. See the ASEAN
Annual Report 1993-94.
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Other serious problems remained despite the advances made in 1993 to kick-start the
project. These included the lack of clear guidelines on how NTBs were to be reduced.
NTBs were potentially a considerable stumbling block to forming a regional free trade
area in ASEAN (Chia, 1998: 218-19; Ravenhill, 1995: 859). The most common NTB s in
ASEAN were customs surcharges, technical measures, and domestic monopoly
arrangements (Table 2.4). In addition, non-harmonised customs classification and
valuations systems also created opportunities for discrimination against imports
(Ravenhill, 1995: 860; Chia, 1998: 226). The institutional arrangements for the AFTA
project were also inadequate in rule interpretation and dispute settlement, which, given the
lack of detail in the foundational AFTA agreements, were particularly necessary. I6 The
preference in ASEAN for political rather than administrative or juridical arrangements for
dispute settlement and problem resolution was seen as placing a substantial burden on
ministerial agendas in AFTA, with the possibility that AFTA could become stalled in the
process (Ravenhill, 1995: 861).
Table 2.4
Most Prevalent Non-Tariff Barriers in ASEAN by Number of Tariff Lines
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)a Number of tariff lines affected
Customs surcharges 2,683
Additional charges 126
Single channel for imports (monopolistic practice) 65
State-trading administration (monopolistic practice) 10
Technical standards (technical measure) 568
Product characteristic requirements (technical measure) 407
Marketing requirements (technical measure) 3
Technical regulations (technical measure) 3
a Definitions of the various NTBs are found in ASEAN Secretariat (1995: 10-15)
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (1995: 15)
16 The foundational AFTA agreements of 1992 took only about 16 pages. The NAFTA Agreement,
in contrast, came up to more than 1,000 pages (Ravenhill, 1995: 859).
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The AFTA project nevertheless advances
In 1994 and 1995, the AFTA programme was substantially modified at the 5 th to the 8th
AFTA Council meetings and the 26 th and 27 th AEM meetings. The ASEAN leaders
formally accepted these amendments at their fifth summit in Bangkok in December 1995
(ASEAN, 1995a, b & c). Five improvements to AFTA were adopted.
First, the 0-5 per cent CEPT tariff target for manufactured goods was to be reached within
ten years instead of the original 15 years, with concomitant changes to the fast and normal
track schedules (Table 2.5). 17 Member governments also agreed to begin implementing
fast track tariff reductions from 1 January 1996. 18
 Moreover, a total of 44,752 tariff lines
were included in the revised 1996 CEPT package, representing over 90 per cent of all
tariff lines in ASEAN.19
Table 2.5
Revised 1994/95 Implementation Details of the AFTA A reement
Revised	 (1994/95)
AFTA Agreement
(starting date 1/1/94)
Target Date for Achieving
0-5% Tariff Rate
Exclusions
Allowed
Fast Track Normal Track
Initial Tariff Rates
above 20%
1/1/2000
(within 7 years)
Initially to 20%
by 1/1/98
(within 5 years);
Then to 0-5% by
1/1/2003
(within 5 years)
General
Exemptionsa
Temporary
Exclusionsb
Permanent
Exemptions'
Initial Tariff Rates
at or below 20%
1/1/1998
(within 5 years)
1/1/2000
(within 7 years)
a Unchanged. See Table 2.1 for definition.
b To be eliminated in 2000. Also, 20 per cent of items in this list to be transferred automatically to
CEPT inclusion list annually over five years beginning January 1996 and ending January 2000.
CA few unprocessed agricultural products only. Also termed the 'sensitive list'.
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (1995: 1-2)
17 See Joint Press Statement, Fifth AFTA Council Meeting, Thailand, 21 September 1994.
18 See Joint Press Statement Sixth AFTA Council Meeting, Thailand, 27 April 1995.
19 See Joint Press Statement, Seventh AFTA Council Meeting, Brunei Darussalam, 6 September
1995 and ASEAN Annual Report 1995-96.
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Second, AFTA's scope was expanded as unprocessed agricultural products were brought
under the CEPT mechanism though with a number of as yet undecided exclusions. This
was a notable advance in AFTA given that all the ASEAN countries except Singapore and
Brunei had sizeable agricultural communities that member governments usually tried to
protect from competing imports. A working group was set up to explore ways to ensure
that the list of excluded agricultural products was kept as short as possible and to find
ways to include into the CEPT framework those agricultural products still excluded.
Third, procedures governing the Temporary Exclusion List were tightened. The revised
rules stipulated that member governments would have to transfer on an annual basis 20 per
cent of the current 3,141 items currently in the Temporary Exclusion List to the CEPT
Inclusion List between 1996 and 2000. The first instalment of 682 products was
transferred to the Inclusion List on 1 January 1996.20 Where previously the Temporary
Exclusion List was only to be reviewed in 2000, the amendments meant that the list would
effectively cease to exist after five years, with the final transfer to the Inclusion List made
on 1 January 2000.
Fourth, senior officials from member countries developed programmes for trade
facilitation and reduction of NTBs (ASEAN Secretariat, 1995: 9-25). The former included
measures to harmonise tariff nomenclature, customs valuation systems and customs
procedures, as well as the introduction of a green-lane system to expedite customs
clearance of CEPT products. Work on the elimination of NTBs included measures to align
product standards to international standards and to facilitate mutual recognition of product
testing and standards. Some aspects of trade facilitation, notably harmonising customs
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nomenclature and valuation systems among the ASEAN countries were also expected to
contribute to reducing NTBs.
Finally, apart from including unprocessed agricultural products, AFTA's scope was
further expanded as new issue areas like services, investment and industrial production
were brought under its ambit for regional cooperation, although further details were left
for the future to be worked out. These were collectively known as the `AFTA-Plus'
programmes and they involved coordinating non-border arrangements in these new issue
areas to complement the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to form a single
regional market (ASEAN Secretariat 1998a: vii). In addition, member governments agreed
to develop a regional mechanism to protect intellectual property (ASEAN, 1995e). The
ASEAN leaders also pledged in their Summit Declaration to develop a mechanism for
dispute settlement (ASEAN, 1995a).
2.2	 Expansion Phase (1996-97)
As noted above, the formal commitment to expand AFTA's scope was made at the Fifth
ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in December 1995. Details on how cooperation was to be
achieved in services, investment and industrial production were worked out by the senior
officials of ASEAN through a series of consultations throughout 1996 and 1997, some of
which are ongoing at the time of writing. In addition, negotiations over the specifics of
agricultural trade liberalisation continued during this period to overcome the impasse that
had emerged in 1995 as a number of countries retracted earlier tariff liberalisation offers.
A formal Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) was also adopted in
November 1996 (ASEAN, 1996b).
20 Joint Press Statement, Seventh AFTA Council Meeting, Brunei Darussalam, 6 September 1995.
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Cooperation in services
The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) signed in December 1995 aimed
at liberalising trade in services within ASEAN, while its goal was to eventually establish
an ASEAN free trade area in services by 2020 (ASEAN, 1995d; ASEAN Secretariat,
1995: 31). The AFAS committed member governments to further negotiations to liberalise
seven key service industries, namely finance and banking, tourism, telecommunications,
shipping, air transport, construction and business services (ASEAN, 1995d). More
specifically, member governments were committed to eliminating substantially all existing
discriminatory measures and market access limitations among ASEAN member countries
within a reasonable timeframe that was, however, not clearly specified. Article IV of the
AFAS pledged member governments to make commitments that went beyond their offers
in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Also, Article VI explicitly denied
the benefits of the Agreement to service providers from non-ASEAN member countries
unless these service providers had established substantive operations in an ASEAN
member country. Thus far, two rounds of negotiations to obtain specific commitments
have been conducted. The first round (1996-1998) produced two packages of broad
commitments while the second (1999-2001) is ongoing.
The ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO)
The ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) Scheme was launched in April 1996 when
economic ministers signed the Basic Agreement on AICO to promote joint industrial
production in ASEAN (ASEAN, 1996a). Under the AICO scheme, participating
companies must be involved in some form of joint industrial production either through
producing component parts for the other company or through the sharing of raw and/or
intermediate resources. Products of an AICO arrangement were set to immediately enjoy
tariff rates of 0-5 per cent among the two countries concerned without having to wait for
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either the fast or normal track programmes under the CEPT. A 30 per cent national equity
requirement was imposed for companies wishing to be considered for AICO privileges,
although a waiver provision was later included to allow firms already operating in the
region but unable to meet the national equity criterion to participate in AIC0.21
The scheme, thus, allowed firms the right to enjoy the benefits of a regional free trade area
for particular approved products well before the 2003 date for the completion of the
CEPT.22 The AICO replaced two previous programmes of industrial cooperation in
ASEAN, namely the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures CAIN) and. the Brard-to-Iirand
Complementation Scheme (BBC).23 Like the AICO, both these earlier schemes had
similarly attempted to facilitate joint industrial production within ASEAN, although the
BBC was specifically targeted at the production of automobile parts and components. The
AICO scheme, initially limited to manufacturing industries, was far more flexible than the
schemes it replaced, particularly the AIN. For instance, the AICO scheme required the
participation at the minimum of only two member countries agreeing to grant the specified
tariff privileges to participating companies, with at least one company to be located in
each participating country. Previously, at least four firms from four member countries
were required to participate in the AIN.24
The ASEAN Investment Area (MA) — negotiations underway during 1996 and 1997
At the December 1995 Bangkok Summit, the ASEAN leaders also agreed to establish an
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), a long-term project that would seek to gradually
eliminate national investment restrictions in favour of more liberal rules for investors.
21 See ASEAN Annual Report 1996-97.
22 Unless specifically mentioned, the completion of the CEPT refers to the time when intra-ASEAN
tariffs reach the 0-5 per cent range, and not when they are set to reach zero.
23 See ASEAN Annual Report 1996-97.
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Throughout 1996, 1997 and in the first nine months of 1998, senior officials worked out
the details of the programme. By October 1998, a Framework Agreement on the ASEAN
Investment Area was ready to be signed by ASEAN economic ministers (ASEAN, 1998d).
The details of the ALA programme are discussed in the following sub-section.
2.3	 The Financial Crisis and Post-Crisis Phase (1998-2000)
Just as the core ASEAN member governments agreed to hasten the implementation of
AFTA and expand its scope in 1994-95, a further set of advances to AFTA commitments
occurred after the Asian financial crisis began in July 1997. Decisions were made to
further accelerate the completion of the free trade area and expand its scope while the ALA
programme was also improved. Programmes begun earlier were continued and
consolidated, most notably the launching of a second round of services negotiations in
1999 that was due to end in 2001. In addition, a number of short-term liberalisation
measures to enhance the investment climate in ASEAN were adopted. Although these
were not formally part of AFTA, they are best regarded as supplementing the AFTA
project. These new initiatives were outlined in detail in a Statement on Bold Measures
adopted by member governments at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in December
1998 (ASEAN, 1998c).
Advancing the CEPT
The ASEAN leaders had, at their Second Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December
1997, recommended the acceleration of both the CEPT and the AIA although they left
details to their ministers to work out.25 In October 1998, the 12th AFTA Council agreed to
accelerate the implementation of AFTA by maximising the number of tariff lines to be
24 Tongzon (1998: 58-65) discusses the AIJV and the BBC in some detail.
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reduced to zero per cent by 2003, rather than the 0-5 per cent ending tariff range. At this
time, individual governments also made significant offers to accelerate AFTA, especially
by submitting previously excluded products for liberalisation. 26 This was significant, since
there had been some previous discussion between the ASEAN member countries in 1998
over whether to delay CEPT implementation because of the regional financial crisis. 27 By
the time of their Sixth Summit, the leaders of ASEAN decided that member countries
should bring forward to 2002 the date by which tariffs in the core ASEAN countries would
reach the 0-5 per cent target. The official completion date remained 2003, however
(ASEAN, 1998c).
A year later in September 1999, the 13 th
 AFTA Council meeting decided to set the target
date for complete elimination of all tariffs at 2015 for the original six signatories. 28 Later,
at their Third Informal Summit in Manila in November 1999, the ASEAN leaders
committed themselves to eliminating all tariffs and import duties by 2010, five years
earlier than the 2015 deadline initially agreed to by their economic ministers only two
months previously.29
25 See Press Statement, Second ASEAN Informal Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the
Member States of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, 15 December 1997.
26 Joint Press Statement, Twelfth AFTA Council Meeting, 6 October 1998, Manila.
27 See Bangkok Post, 'Tariff reductions may be delayed', 26 September 1998; and Bangkok Post,
`AFTA tariff cut delays likely if neighbours can't agree', 19 May 1999. Nevertheless, Thailand,
Malaysia and the Philippines temporarily raised import tariffs and introduced other import
measures on selected items in 1997 and 1998 as a way of dealing with the 1997-98 Asian financial
crisis. See Shimizu (2000: 83) for details. Also see Jakarta Post, 9 February 1999.
28 Joint Press Statement, Thirteenth Meeting of the AFTA Council, 29 September 1999, Singapore.
The target date for new members was set at 2018.
29 The deadline for new members was also advanced from 2018 to 2015 although some sensitive
products would be allowed to follow the original 2018 deadline. See Chairman's Press Statement,
ASEAN Third Informal Summit, 28 November 1999, Manila.
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Advancing the ASEAN Investment Area
Under the terms of the 1998 AIA Agreement, member governments were committed to
gradually eliminating investment barriers, according national treatment and allowing
market access in the manufacturing sector initially to ASEAN investors by 2010 and to all
foreign investors by 2020, beginning immediately where possible. 3° A 1999 amendment to
the original AIA Agreement extended its coverage to include agriculture, forestry,
fisheries, mining, as well as services incidental to all these sectors. 3/ Member governments
were, however, allowed to maintain investment restrictions until 2010 through a
Temporary Exclusion List and indefinitely through a Sensitive List. The latter was only to
be periodically reviewed with no firm timetable provided for its elimination. A decision
later in 1999 stipulated that all temporary exclusions for ASEAN investors in
manufacturing were to end by January 2003 instead of 2010, seven years earlier than
initially envisaged. 32 All other sectors would be open to ASEAN investors by January
2010. No conditions were imposed on the Sensitive List. 33 Foreign investors would only
realise these benefits in 2020.
Short-term measures to enhance the investment climate
Under the Statement on Bold Measures adopted at the Hanoi Summit in 1998, the ASEAN
governments adopted a set of short-term measures to enhance the ASEAN investment
climate (ASEAN, 1998c & 1998e). Each ASEAN government agreed to extend special
privileges to qualified ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors in the manufacturing sector
provided applications were received between January 1999 and December 2000. These
30 For the purposes of the AIA Agreement, an ASEAN investor is deemed to be one who is
accorded the status of a national or home country investor in each of the ASEAN countries.
31 See Joint Press Statement, Second Meeting of the AIA Council, 29 September 1999, Singapore.
32 See Chairman's Press Statement, ASEAN Third Informal Summit, 28 November 1999, Manila.
33 These lists were compiled and published by the ASEAN secretariat in July 1999. See ASEAN
Secretariat (1999b).
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special incentives covered seven areas, among the most significant being 100 per cent
foreign equity ownership in selected sectors and domestic market access (Table 2.6). In
addition, the ASEAN governments also agreed to waive the 30 per cent national equity
requirement for AICO projects, but only for projects approved during the 1999-2000
period. The waiver period was later extended by a year.
Table 2.6
Short-Term Equity and Domestic Market Access Offers Made in December 1998
COUNTRY DOMESTIC MARKET ACCESS EQUITY OFFERS
Brunei n.a 100% foreign equity in high-tech & all
export-oriented industries
Indonesia For all industries except those in
negative list and those operating in
bonded zones.
100% foreign equity in wholesale/retail
trade, all manufacturing, & in listed banks.
After	 15	 years,	 some	 local	 equity
ownership is necessary.
Malaysia For all industries except those in
negative list,
100% foreign equity in all manufacturing
except seven specific activities/products.
No export conditions.
Philippines For all industries except those in
negative list,
In the process of opening wholesale/retail
trade to foreign ownership.
Foreign companies allowed into domestic
construction sector.
Singapore For all industries except those in
negative list,
Extension of 30% corporate income tax
allowance to selected manufacturing and
service industries.
Thailand For all industries except those in
negative list,
100% foreign equity in all manufacturing
projects.
Source: ASEAN (1998c & 1998e)
3.	 AFTA: The Status of Implementation
Contrary to earlier predictions of its failure, the AFTA project was not only sustained, its
pace was accelerated and its scope widened as the above discussion shows to include
potentially contentious economic sectors like unprocessed agricultural products, services,
and investment. Commitments to advance tariff liberalisation were forthcoming
throughout the decade, while programmes were developed to address the problem of non-
tariff barriers. Member governments engaged in extensive consultations and negotiations
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to advance commitments in services and investment cooperation. Yet, as the following
discussion shows, the implementation record was mixed, with delays and setbacks
experienced in agriculture, services and investment although the CEPT scheme was, by
and large, on schedule.
3.1	 Implementation of CEPT Tariff Liberalisation
Tariff liberalisation on goods trade within AFTA was essentially on schedule. Since its re-
launch in 1994 after a disastrous start, or non-start, member governments have each year
lowered tariffs on a range of products under the CEPT framework, with these reductions
gazetted in national annual legal customs enactments. 34 By 1999, 98 per cent of total tariff
lines in the core six ASEAN countries were included in the CEPT framework, the figure
rising marginally to 98.3 per cent in 2001 (Tables 2.7 & 2.8). This was an improvement
over the 1998 figure of 94 per cent and the 1996 figure of 90 per cent.35
At the beginning of 2000, tariffs on 90 per cent of products in the inclusion list, or 38,456
tariff lines, submitted by the core ASEAN countries had already fallen to 0-5 per cent,
well ahead of the 2003 deadline for AFTA. This constitutes about 98 per cent of the total
value of intra-ASEAN imports.36 Moreover, current liberalisation schedules suggest that
by 2003, about 40 per cent of total tariff lines will be at the 0 per cent tariff level,
accounting for nearly 80 per cent of intra-ASEAN imports.37
34 Since 1997, most of the ASEAN countries have enacted legislation covering the entire period of
CEPT tariff reduction. Annual legal enactments continue, however, for products being moved from
the temporary exclusion or sensitive lists to the inclusion list (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998a: 6).
35 Calculated from data in the 1996 and 1998 CEPT packages. See Press Statement, Eleventh AFTA
Council Meeting, Malaysia, 15 October 1997.
36 Information was from the ASEAN Secretariat.
37 Information was obtained from the ASEAN Secretariat.
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Table 2.7
CEPT Implementation Package for 1999
NUMBER OF TARIFF LINES
COUNTRY Inclusion Lista Temporary General Sensitive Total Tariff Lines
Exclusion Exemption Listb (ASEAN-6)
List List
Brunei 6,276 0 202 14 6,492
Indonesia 7,158 25 65 4 7,252
Malaysia 8,859 218 53 83 9,213
Philippines 5,571 35 27 62 5,695
Singapore 5,739 11 109 0 5,859
Thailand 9,103 0 0 7 9,110
ASEAN-6 42,706 (98.0%) 289 (0.7%) 456 (1.1%) 170 (0.4%) 43,621 (100%)
Total
Includes both fast and normal track products
b Unprocessed agricultural products follow a delayed implementation schedule
Source: ASEAN Annual Report 1999-2000
Table 2.8
CEPT Implementation Package for 2001
NUMBER OF TARIFF LINES
COUNTRY Inclusion Lista Temporary General Sensitive Total Tariff Lines
Exclusion Exemption Listb (ASEAN-6)
List List
Brunei 6,284 0 202 6 6,492
Indonesia 7,190 21 68 4 7,283
Malaysia 9,654 218 53 83 10,008
Philippines 5,622 6 16 50 5,694
Singapore 5,821 0 38 0 5,859
Thailand 9,104 0 0 7 9,111
ASEAN-6 43,675 (98.3%) 245 (0.6%) 377 (0.9%) 150 (0.3%) 44,447 (100%)
Total
Includes both fast and normal track productsb Unprocessed agricultural products follow a delayed implementation schedule
Source: Joint Press Statement, Fourteenth AFTA Council Meeting, October 2000
Temporary Exclusion List (almost) eliminated as scheduled
Since January 1996, the core ASEAN member governments have transferred at least 20
per cent of products in their Temporary Exclusion List to the Inclusion List in accordance
with the commitment made in 1994-95. The fmal instalment of products in the Temporary
Exclusion List was moved to the Inclusion List at the start of 2000 as scheduled, and
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tariffs on these products brought down to 20 per cent, after which the rates will be reduced
to 0-5 per cent by 2002/2003. Only the Temporary Exclusion Lists of Malaysia, Indonesia
and the Philippines remain, and these only comprise 0.6 per cent of the total tariff lines of
these countries (Table 2.8). Unfortunately, the products excluded are significant, with
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines excluding respectively automobiles, agricultural
products and petrochemicals from CEPT/AFTA disciplines, leading to substantial tension
with the other members, particularly in the case of automobiles and agriculture. Why these
disputes arose and how they were dealt with will be discussed more fully in Chapters 5
and 6. Moreover, the number of products in the General Exemption List and the Sensitive
Lists was also reduced (Tables 2.7 & 2.8).
Average CEPT tariff rates have fallen
The average regional CEPT tariff rate has fallen since AFTA was initiated, from 12.8 per
cent in 1993 to 3.74 per cent in 2000. 38 Based on tariff implementation packages already
committed to by the different counties, these rates are projected to fall further to 2.63 per
cent by 2003 when AFTA will be completed (Table 2.9). The CEPT programme is, in fact,
projected to reduce ASEAN average tariffs by as much as 70 per cent more than the
reductions undertaken on an MFN basis (Azarcon, 1997: 123).
Averages can, and often do, mask substantial variation in tariff rates for individual
products, however. In 1996 for instance, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand maintained
tariffs in excess of 100 per cent on 29 per cent, 58 per cent and 11 per cent of their tariff
lines respectively (Azarcon, 1997: 107-8). Incidentally, the regional average CEPT rate
was 8.2 per cent (ASEAN Secretariat, 1996: 26). Yet in the same year, Malaysia also
maintained a zero per cent tariff rate on a substantial 53 per cent of its total tariff lines,
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compared to figures of 19 per cent and 4 per cent for Indonesia and Thailand respectively
(Azarcon, 1997: 108). In addition, tariffs on products still excluded remain high. Malaysia,
for instance, continues to maintain tariffs ranging from 25 per cent to 300 per cent on
imports of automobiles, which remain on the Temporary Exclusion List (Tyndall, 2000).
Nevertheless, it is also important to keep in mind that about 90 per cent of all products in
the combined ASEAN Inclusion List, itself representing about 98 per cent of total tariff
lines in the core six ASEAN countries, are now at the 0-5 per cent tariff level (Table 2.10).
Table 2.9
Average CEPT Tariff Rates (%)
COUNTRY 2000 2001 2002 2003
Brunei 1.26 1.17 0.97 0.96
Indonesia 4.77 4.36 3.73 2.16
Malaysia 2.85 2.59 2.45 2.07
Philippines 4.97 4.17 4.07 3.77
Singapore 0 0 0 0
Thailand 6.07 5.59 5.17 4.63
ASEAN-10a 3.74 3.54 3.17 2.63
a Regional CEPT tariff rates are weighted averages, with the number of tariff lines in the Inclusion
List for 1999 used as weights. Average regional tariffs for ASEAN-10 will tend to be higher than
the average for the core ASEAN-6, as new members reach the 0-5% target rate at a later date.
Source: ASEAN Annual Report 1999-2000
Table 2.10
Number of Tariff Lines with Rates of 0-5% at Year 2000
COUNTRY Number of Tariff Lines
at 0-5% Tariff Rate
Percentage of Inclusion List (1)/0)
at 0-5% Tariff Rate
Brunei 6,106 98.0
Indonesia 6,327 88.4
Malaysia 7,809 88.2
Philippines 4,738 85.1
Singapore 5,739 100.0
Thailand 7,737 85.3
TOTAL 38,456 90.0
Source: Press Statement, Thirteenth AFTA Council Meeting, Singapore, 29 September
1999
38 See ASEAN Annual Report 1999-2000
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Analysis of progress on tariff liberalisation in AFTA is complicated by the fact that shifts
in tariff policy in the ASEAN countries during the 1990s were the outcome of
developments on three fronts. During this period, ASEAN member governments
undertook tariff reductions under three programmes: unilateral tariff reforms, tariff
reductions agreed to under the GATT/WTO multilateral framework, and CEPT-based
tariff reductions under AFTA. Thus, it will be useful to compare the CEPT rates in the
ASEAN countries with the MFN or generalised tariff rates applicable to products from all
sources.
39
Generalised or MFN tariff rates were brought closer to CEPT rates on a wide range of
products as MFN rates were unilaterally lowered across the core ASEAN countries,
particularly between 1994 and 1996 (ASEAN Secretariat, 1996: 43). 40 Incidentally,
unilateral measures were far more significant in these countries than the GATT process in
reducing tariffs. Feridhanusetyawan et al (2000) also note that tariff reductions under
Uruguay Round commitments were smaller than those negotiated under AFTA.
Governments in Malaysia and Singapore, nevertheless, decided to extend CEPT tariff
concessions to non-ASEAN traders on an MFN basis. 4I In Thailand, Indonesia and the
Philippines, unilateral tariff reductions closely followed AFTA tariff reduction schedules
39 Post Uruguay Round average 'AIN tariff rates in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were actually
higher than the prevailing applied MFN tariff rates in these countries, the difference ranging from
about six to seven percentage points in Thailand and Malaysia to a hefty 25 percentage points in
Indonesia (OECD, 1998: 17). Post Uruguay Round MFN tariff rates in Indonesia, Thailand, the
Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore were respectively 40.3 per cent, 28.7 per cent, 22.2 per cent,
9.8 per cent and 5.1 per cent. See OECD (1998) and PECC (1995).
4° The following unilateral/MFN tariff reduction programmes were undertaken. Brunei (one
package in July 1995); Indonesia (four packages in May 1995, January 1996, June 1996; and July
1997); Malaysia (one package in October 1995); Philippines (one package in January 1996); and
Thailand (two packages in December 1994 and May 1996). Thailand also lowered tariffs on
intermediate products and raw materials to 0-5 per cent in January 2000. Tariffs were reduced once
as a result of the GATT/WTO agreement of 1994. See Azarcon (1997); Nallappan et al (1998) and
Bangkok Post, 'Protection remains for strategic sectors', 7 June 1999.
41 See Jakarta Post, 18 May 1996.
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(Pangestu, 1996: 9; Gochoco-Bautista, 1998: 210). 42
 This raises the question of whether
the CEPT and AFTA have become redundant. For instance, only about 1.5 per cent of
intra-ASEAN trade in the mid-1990s utilised CEPT rules of origin certification,
suggesting that CEPT-driven regional trade is very low (Teh, Jr. 1999). This was
attributed to the prevailing small difference between CEPT and MFN tariff rates, which
probably did not make it worth the while for manufacturers to apply for CEPT
concessions.43
The picture is, however, expected to change as the completion date for AFTA approaches
when CEPT and MFN rates are likely to increasingly diverge. instance, average
MFN rates in 2000 in Thailand were about 19.9 per cent, compared to an average CEPT
rate of 7 per cent, a substantial difference of almost 13 percentage points (Table 2.11). The
respective MFN and CEPT tariff rates for the other ASEAN countries, shown in Table
2.11, similarly reveal a significant divergence of at least five percentage points in 2000. If
MFN rates remain unchanged, the difference is expected to widen considerably in 2003.45
If MFN rates also fall, the difference will narrow.
In Thailand, for instance, MIN rates are scheduled to fall further, but the difference
between MFN and CEPT rates is, nevertheless, expected to be substantia1. 46
 Under
Thailand's new tariff structure unveiled in 1999, the MFN tariff should exceed the CEPT
41 See Jakarta Post, 18 May 1996.
42 The relationship between unilateral and CEPT/AFTA tariff reductions is discussed in Chapter 3.
43 The then ASEAN Secretary General, Ajit Singh, pointed out in late 1996 that CEPT and MFN
tariff rates were the same in about half of all tariff lines. See Jakarta Post, 10 October 1996.
44 Interview in Jakarta in July 2000 with Dr Robert Teh Jr., Director of the Bureau of Trade,
Industry and Services at the ASEAN Secretariat.
45 Compare the 2003 CEPT tariff rates from Table 2.9 with the MFN tariff rates in Table 2.11.
46 Interview in Bangkok in August 2000 with Ms Chularat Suteethorn, Director of the International
Economic Policy Division, Ministry of Finance, Thailand.
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rate by between 2-15 percentage points on average.47 In selected sectors like
petrochemicals, steel, automobiles and unprocessed agricultural products, MFN rates are
expected to remain higher than that set down in the new tariff structure." Thus, the CEPT-
MFN differential should be even higher on these products. In Indonesia, the average MFN
rate was scheduled to fall to a maximum 10 per cent by 2003, a significant five percentage
points higher than the CEPT rate, although many individual MFN rates were set to fall to a
maximum 5 per cent by 2000 (Nallappan et al, 1998: 50). however, has
been delayed (Fane, 2000: 27), thereby maintaining the MFN-CEPT tariff differential.
Table 2.11
Comparison of MEN and CEPT average tariff rates, 1996 and 2000
COUNTRY MFN Rate
1996
CEPT Rate
1996
CEPT Rate
2000
MFN and CEPT Tariff Rate
(% divergence by 2000)a
Brunei 4.4 1.81 1.28 70.9%
Indonesia 12.4 8.36 4.6 62.9%
Malaysia 7.6 3.76 2.21 70.9%
Philippines 12.7 8.17 4.38 65.5%
Singapore 0.0 0.0 0.0 Nil
Thailand 19.9 13.95 7.08 64.4%
Note: There is a slight discrepancy between the 2000 CEPT tariff rates in this table and in Table 2.9
due to methodological differences in constructing tariff averages. The difference is minimal.
a Based on the assumption that MFN rates remain unchanged.
Source: Azarcon (1997: 122)
Unprocessed agricultural products — some progress but setbacks were also evident
The liberalisation of unprocessed agricultural products under CEPT disciplines was not
expected to advance substantially due to the politically sensitive nature of the agriculture
sector in most of the core ASEAN countries. It was, thus, encouraging that a significant
68.5 per cent of the total 2,025 tariff lines in agriculture were placed in the Inclusion List
47 Under the new tariff structure, import tax on raw materials and primary goods is set at 0-5 per
cent, 7 per cent for intermediate goods, and 15 per cent for final goods. See Bangkok Post,
'Protection remains for strategic sectors', 7 June 1999.
48 Bangkok Post, 'Protection remains for strategic sectors', 7 June 1999.
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when the initial commitment was made in 1994 to expand the scope of AFTA. Only 18.6
per cent of tariff lines were temporarily excluded while 12.9 per cent were deemed
sensitive (Table 2.12). Unfortunately, the latter category included significant crops grown
in the region, especially rice and sugar. Unlike the case of manufactured products, the
unprocessed agricultural items included within the CEPT in 1994 accounted for less than a
third of the value of intra-ASEAN agricultural imports. 5° A substantial 68 per cent of the
value of intra-ASEAN imports of unprocessed agricultural products traded in ASEAN
were excluded while more than one third was deemed too sensitive and thus exempted
from CEPT/AFTA disciplines (Table 2.12).
Table 2.12
The Status of Unprocessed Agricultural Products in CEPT/AFTA, 1994
LIST TYPE Number of
Tariff Lines
Intra-ASEAN Import Value
(US$ million)
Inclusion 1,387 68.5% 125.68 31.6%
Temporary Exclusion 377 18.6% 130.7 32.9%
Sensitive 261 12.9% 141.15 35.5%
Total 2,025 100.0% 397.53 100.0%
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (1996: 29)
Moreover, a dispute emerged between Indonesia and Thailand when the former
backtracked on its earlier commitment to reduce tariffs on 15 agricultural commodities,
notably rice, sugar, cloves, and wheat flour. Negotiations to overcome the impasse were
protracted, although it eventually led to the adoption of new categories and schedules for
agricultural trade liberalisation formalised in a Protocol on Sensitive and Highly Sensitive
Agricultural Products, which was signed by the economic ministers of ASEAN in
49 These unilateral MFN tariff cuts were part of the May 1995 trade liberalisation package
announced by the Indonesian government.
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September 1999 (ASEAN, 1999). The dispute over agriculture will be discussed in detail
in Chapters 5 and 6.
3.2	 Reduction of Non-Tariff Barriers
A great deal of effort was put into reducing the incidence of NTBs to trade in ASEAN
both jointly under AFTA as well as unilaterally (Feridhanusetyawan, 1998: 5). Member
governments were aware that NTBs constituted a significant barrier to creating a regional
market, even if full tariff liberalisation were achieved. The private business sector had,
moreover, long expressed its view that NTBs constitute a serious obstacle to business in
the ASEAN region (Baldwin, 1997: 58-60).
Customs surcharges, the main source of NTBs identified in ASEAN were completely
eliminated by the end of 1996. 51
 As already outlined in the previous section, technical
NTBs, the next largest source of NTBs after customs surcharges, were to be addressed
through programmes promoting transparency and harmonisation as well as through mutual
recognition arrangements. These programmes have already commenced, with most of
them ongoing while a few have been completed. In 2000, a draft text of a harmonised
customs classification system for ASEAN, namely the ASEAN Harmonised Tariff
Nomenclature, was reviewed to iron out remaining inconsistencies, and implementation is
scheduled for 2002. (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2000). Member governments also began
implementing the GATT Valuation Agreement in 1997, well ahead of the WTO deadline
of 2000 for developing counties. These programmes will complement the Green Lane
scheme for CEPT products that had been launched in January 1996 to accelerate customs
50 In contrast, the products in the 1994 CEPT Inclusion List for manufactured products accounted
for 85 per cent of the total intra-ASEAN trade value. See Joint Press Statement, Fifth AFTA
Council Meeting, Thailand, 21 September 1994.
51 See the ASEAN Annual Report 1996-97.
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clearance for CEPT products, although only a few companies initially made use of the
Green Lane scheme (Baldwin, 1997: 59)•52
A programme was also launched in 1996 to harmonise standards in 20 priority product
groups that are significantly traded in ASEAN, using international standards where
available. To this end, an ASEAN Framework Agreement on Mutual Recognition
Arrangements was adopted in December 1998 (ASEAN, 1998f). This agreement provides
the general principles and conditions for developing sectoral mutual recognition
arrangements beginning with the 20 priority product groups, essentially electrical and
electronic items, telecommunications equipment, and rubber products. 53 Harmonised
standards in these product groups are expected to become operational in 2001. Other
cooperative projects among customs authorities in the different ASEAN countries were
also initiated with the aim of increasing the transparency of customs operations to
facilitate regional trade.54
Despite these efforts, NTBs continue to persist, 55
 particularly those arising from domestic
regulations. A study conducted for APEC identified domestic regulations ranging from
licensing requirements, state monopolies, health and sanitary restrictions, as well as
banking regulations as significant NTBs in ASEAN (Baldwin, 1997: 58). Many of the
NTBs deriving from import licensing rules and state monopolies were found in the
agricultural sector, which explains why the majority of business complaints about NTBs in
52 This was probably because in the initial years of the scheme, CEPT tariff rates did not differ too
much from MFN rates, precluding the need for applying for CEPT concessions and rules of origin
certification. See the discussion in Section 3.1 of this chapter.
53 See the ASEAN Annual Report 1996-97.
54 See ASEAN Secretariat (1998a: 21-27).
55 Bangkok Post, `Tarrin concerned over ASEAN non-tariff barriers', 10 September 1999.
120
ASEAN was directed at the agricultural rather than the manufacturing sector. 56 Although
Indonesia was a major offender during the 1990s, particularly with regard to NTBs
involving domestic monopoly arrangements, most of these were removed in 1999-2000
when the government implemented the economic reform packages negotiated with the
IMF (Fane, 2000: 27).
ASEAN member governments also attempted to deal with NTBs by assigning a greater
role to the private sector in identifying these bathers to trade. Firms were encouraged to
lodge complaints over any difficulties they faced when exporting to another ASEAN
country either directly to the AFTA Unit established in the respective national
economic/trade ministries or to the AFTA Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat. This seems to
be a reasonable step, given that NTBs are often invisible and only become apparent when
traders are confronted by problems with exporting/importing. What happens once
complaints are lodged, particularly if an NTB is identified, rests on inter-governmental
negotiations rather than juridical or administrative mechanisms, which may well prevent a
speedy resolution of the problem and introduce further uncertainty into the exercise.
3.3	 The AFTA -Plus Programmes
As already noted, the AFTA-Plus programmes were more difficult to implement.
Negotiations over the specific terms and conditions of these programmes were often
protracted, especially in services. Nevertheless, it is significant that the ASEAN member
governments committed potentially contentious sectors like services and investment to
joint decision-making.
56 See A WSJ, 'ASEAN takes another step towards free trade region', 11 September 1995.
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Industrial cooperation and the AICO scheme
One of the selling points about the AICO scheme was its supposed administrative
simplicity, with the entire process for the approval and granting of AICO privileges not
taking more than 140 days (Baldwin, 1997: 64). Unfortunately, the reality was quite
different, with considerable delays experienced by many private firms submitting
applications. 57 Moreover, only 14 AICO applications were approved over two years
between November 1996 when the scheme officially began and October 1998. 58 This was
not for lack of private sector interest in the scheme. Many foreign business leaders
complained about delays in processing applications and lack of transparency in
approvals, 59 while the restrictive nature of the scheme meant that few approvals were
given.6°
One of these was the 30 per cent national equity requirement for participating companies,
which prevented firms with less than the 30 per cent national equity share to be accorded
AICO privileges. 61 Foreign firms, including those already operating in ASEAN, were
often disadvantaged by this criterion. Member governments later agreed to allow the 30
per cent national equity requirement to be waived, although it was replaced by an ASEAN
cumulative equity requirement and other conditions pertaining to the nature of the project
(ASEAN Secretariat, 1997b: 40). 62 Unfortunately, individual governments had
considerable leeway to decide on when they would grant these waivers, which meant that
applications were often stuck at the approval stage if one of the host countries involved
57 See The Nation, 'ASEAN told to speed up AICO to lure investors', 10 April, 1998.
58 See Joint Press Statement, Thirtieth ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting, Makati City,
Philippines, 7-8 October 1998.
59 Business Times, 'Obstacles to AICO implementation', 17 December 1997; and Business Times,
'Companies doubt ASEAN scheme', 23 August 1997.
60 The Nation, 'Government encouraged to accelerate AFTA time-frame', 24 January 1998.
61 ASEAN Secretariat (1997b: 5) explains how to calculate the 30 per cent national equity
requirement.
62 See also The Nation, `AICO agrees to ease regulations', 3 March 1998.
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was unwilling to consider waiving the national equity condition (Baldwin, 1997: 64).
Member governments also relaxed other AICO criteria. New investors without any
ongoing operations in ASEAN were allowed to submit applications for AICO. Previously,
only firms already operating in the region could submit applications to be considered for
AICO privileges. Since the financial crisis, the 30 per cent national equity requirement
was unconditionally waived for firms submitting applications between 1 January 1999 and
31 December 2000. The deadline was later extended by a year to the end of 2001.6'
These changes, which made it easier to obtain AICO approvals especially by foreign
firms, were probably responsible for the rise in the number of AICO approvals to 36 by
September 1999 and 63 by October 2000. These 63 applications had the capacity to
generate a total of US$700 million in trade transactions per year. 64 In any case, the AICO
scheme will become redundant as the deadline for the completion of AFTA approaches
when tariffs are set to reach the 0-5 per cent level. In fact as already noted, this target was
already reached in 2000 for almost 90 per cent of products traded among the core ASEAN
countries.
Cooperation in services
The framework agreement adopted in 1995 set the stage for a series of further negotiations
to obtain more specific commitments in market access, national treatment and other areas
of services cooperation. A first round of negotiations commenced in 1996 and ended in
December 1998. The negotiating process proved, however, to be rather difficult. Part of
the problem was due to the modality of negotiations that was adopted. ASEAN officials
63 See the ASEAN Annual Report 1999-2000; and the Joint Press Statement, Thirty-Second ASEAN
Economic Ministers Meeting, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 5 October 2000.
64 See the Joint Press Statement, Thirty-Second ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting, Chiang Mai,
Thailand, 5 October 2000.
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submitted voluntary offer and request lists within specific service sectors to the
Coordinating Committee on Services,65 but these very often did not match. It was difficult
to obtain a set of balanced concessions that all members were happy with in sectoral-based
negotiations. Some quarters believe they may have been easier to obtain if negotiations
covering all service sectors had been conducted, which would have facilitated the trading
of concessions across sectors.66 The approach presently adopted in ASEAN services
negotiations is to initially obtain ministerial level commitments in different service
sectors, and then to coordinate these further at a second stage.67
The first round of negotiations produced two packages of commitments, although these
essentially outlined broad parameters for cooperation and did not detail substantive
commitments. 68 Neither were offers forthcoming in all the seven service sub-sectors. An
initial package of commitments in tourism, maritime transport, air transport, business
services, and telecommunications, as well as a protocol of implementation were adopted in
December 1997 (ASEAN, 1997). The arrangements were very flexible. Cooperation in
these sectors did not involve all the ASEAN members. The AFAS allows two or more
ASEAN members to proceed if the other members are not yet ready to participate in these
cooperative arrangements. Thus, in the first package, only tourism cooperation involved
all ASEAN members. Cooperation in maritime transport was confined to Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand; air transport cooperation involved Brunei, Malaysia
and Singapore; and the Philippines offered concessions in business services. 69 A final
65 The Coordinating Committee on Services reports to the SEOM.
66 Interview with Mr Rodolfo C. Severino Jr., Secretary General of ASEAN in July 2000 in Jakarta.
67 Interview with Dr Suthad Setboonsang, then Deputy Secretary General of ASEAN, in July 2000
in Jakarta.
68 Interview with Dr Suthad Setboonsang.
69 From an ASEAN press release, 'ASEAN Economic Ministers Sign Protocol to Implement Initial
Package of Commitments under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services', Kuala Lumpur,
15 December 1997.
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package of commitments together with its protocol of implementation was signed in
December 1998 (ASEAN, 1998a). This second package went further than the initial
package adopted in December 1997, with each government making offers in all seven
service sectors."
A second round of negotiations began in 1999 and is due for completion in 2001 when a
third package of commitments will be adopted. This round of negotiations covers all seven
services sectors. It is also targeted at all four modes of service supply, namely cross-border
supply (Mode 1), consumption abroad (Mode 2), commercial presence (Mode 3), and the
presence of natural persons (Mode 4). Initial commitments were made in Modes 1 and 2,
which would allow service suppliers operating in ASEAN to provide services to users
from another member country without establishing a commercial presence in that country.
Negotiations are ongoing to obtain offers for Modes 3 and 4. 71 It has, however, been very
difficult to get agreement on commitments that would allow non-national service firms to
establish a market presence in an ASEAN country, particularly in very sensitive sectors
like financial services and telecommunications.72
The removal of foreign equity restrictions in the service industry in Thailand and
Indonesia, the result of their respective crisis-induced economic restructuring programmes,
made these countries ready to commit to services liberalisation in ASEAN. This, however,
also added to the difficulties already present in ASEAN in negotiating liberalisation
commitments in services. Other governments had to contend with the prospect that
services liberalisation would lead to even greater competition since foreign firms would
" Interview in Jakarta with Mr Lim Hong Hin, Assistant Director in the Bureau of Trade, Industry
and Services at the ASEAN Secretariat, July 2000.
71 See ASEAN Annual Report 1999-2000.
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find it easier to establish a commercial presence in these liberalised markets, and then sell
their services to other, more closed service markets, like Malaysia for instance. '" It
prompted a Malaysian government official to remark that such a development did not
allow preferential concessions for ASEAN service firms, since foreign service firms with
domestic operations in ASEAN were just as likely to benefit from AFTA-based
comni itments .74
Investment liberalisation
It is difficult to comment on the implementation record of the AIA component programme
as it is still in the early stages of implementation. The ASEAN governments are only
scheduled to grant national treatment and market access to ASEAN investors in all
manufacturing sectors by 2003 except in sectors placed on the sensitive list. The other
sectors included within the AIA framework — agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining and
services incidental to all these sectors — are to be opened to ASEAN investors only from
2010. It is, nevertheless, clear that the ASEAN governments have placed most of the
sectors they wish to exclude from the AIA into the Sensitive List rather than the
Temporary Exclusion List (Table 2.13). 75 The former enjoys indefinite protection from
foreign including ASEAN participation, at least under present rules, while the Temporary
Exclusion List is scheduled to end in 2003. Most of the Sensitive List exclusions take the
form of partial restrictions or additional conditions imposed on foreign investment, usually
regarding land ownership; eligibility for government procurement privileges and
72 Interview with Mr Kong Mun Pew, Director of International Operations (Southeast Asia),
Singapore Trade Development Board in August 2000 in Singapore.
73 Unlike the AIA agreement, the AFAS did not restrict the benefits of ASEAN liberalisation in
services to foreign service providers if the latter were engaged in substantive business operations in
a member country (ASEAN, 1995d). In other words, foreign service providers already operating in
an ASEAN country would be accorded similar privileges as a domestic service firm.
74 Confidential interview.
75 Details are found in the respective lists found in ASEAN Secretariat (1999b).
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investment incentives; corporate equity conditions; employment of foreign employees; and
other market access and export conditions. While the ASEAN governments' commitment
to liberalise investment flows in ASEAN is laudable, implementation may be somewhat
problematic if investment restrictions continue to be necessary for domestic political
reasons. Although the Sensitive List, where most of the excluded or restricted sectors are
placed, is to be reviewed periodically, precisely when the governments concerned will
liberalise these sectors remained undecided at the time of writing.
Table 2.13
Temporary Exclusion List and Sensitive List for the Manufacturing Sector
Temporary Exclusion List Sensitive List
Country Industry Category
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Brunei
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
X
X
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
X
X
X
Nil
X
X
X
Nil
Nil
X
Nil
Nil
X
X
X
X
X
X
Nil
Nil
Nil
X
Nil
Nil
X: indicates the presence of restrictions.
Industry Categories
1: Industries closed to both foreign and national investment
2: Industries closed only to foreign investment
3: Industries open, but with restrictions on foreign investment
4: Others (not specified)
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (1999b: I)
4.	 Conclusion
The preceding discussion describes how AFTA evolved between 1991 and 2000 from a
project that initially focused on tariff liberalisation in manufacturing to include other, more
politically sensitive issue areas like agriculture, investment and services. While an
impressive range of commitments was made, the project's implementation record during
the period under review was mixed. Tariff liberalisation in manufacturing was the most
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advanced, although Malaysia and the Philippines decided to temporarily exclude
respectively automobiles and petrochemicals from AFTA disciplines. Member
governments appear committed to reducing the incidence of NTBs as seen in the wide
range of programmes completed as well as those that are ongoing in this issue area. On the
other hand, agricultural trade liberalisation suffered significant setbacks. Progress was also
more limited in obtaining commitments in services and investment liberalisation. Yet, this
should not detract attention from the considerable advances made in AFTA over the
decade, particularly when compared to the experience of APEC, which a number of
scholars initially suggested would overtake AFTA.76
The distinctiveness of AFTA is clearly evident when it is compared to the previous phase
of economic cooperation in ASEAN that began in 1976-77 and which effectively ended
with the decision to establish AFTA. 77 During this early period of economic cooperation,
practically everything of interest to regional cooperation seemed to be excluded
(Mansfield and Milner, 1999: 603). Although a variety of specific cooperative projects had
been adopted since 1976, these became bogged down in either inconsequential
concessions that made a mockery out of the commitment to cooperation or because
intransigent governments were unwilling to accord tariff and other concessions to firms
and products from their regional partners. 78 Does this mean that during the 1990s the
ASEAN governments were finally able to place regional interests above national ones? Or
is it the case that it is precisely because domestic interests were threatened in some way
76 Buszynski (1997: 566) notes that a number of economists in the region did hold this view.
77 Many of the projects initiated under the earlier phase of economic cooperation continued for
some years even after AFTA was initiated, although they were eventually absorbed into the AFTA
framework. Thus, the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) was absorbed into the CEPT
scheme of AFTA while two industrial cooperation projects (AIJV and the BBC) were replaced by
the AICO.
78 Comprehensive discussions of ASEAN economic cooperation between 1976 and 1990 are found
in ASEAN Secretariat (1997a: 1-88); Frost (1990: 7-14); Suriyamongkol (1988); and Cling (1985).
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that AFTA has been advanced? As the discussion in the rest of the dissertation suggests,
globalisation presents significant challenges to domestic political economies in ASEAN,
or is perceived as doing so, in turn prompting these governments to attempt to manage
these external developments through regional collective action. In short, domestic and
regional interests have become closely inter-linked in an era of globalisation. Precisely
how systemic, domestic and regional dynamics interact in processes of regionalism is a
major focus of the dissertation.
More specifically, the study involves three tasks. One of these tasks is to account for the
AFTA project's initial adoption by ASEAN members as well as the substantial expansion
in AFTA commitments that occurred during the course of the project. A second point that
requires clarification pertains to the treatment of foreign investors in the investment
liberalisation programme. If, as has been claimed by many scholars that AFTA is
primarily an instrument to attract FDI, why have member governments chosen to giant
preferential treatment to ASEAN investors ahead of foreign investors? Any explanation of
AFTA must account for this anomaly. A third task is to explain the shift to a more
cautious programme of trade liberalisation in unprocessed agricultural products,
automobiles and petrochemicals, as well as the slow progress made in negotiating services
liberalisation. Does this signal a weakening of the commitment to AFTA on the part of
particular national governments, and if so, why did the member governments make the
ambitious commitments they did in the first place? A related task is to explain how
governments addressed the disputes that had emerged on some of these issues in AFTA.
Chapters 3 through 6 attempt to provide answers to these key questions.
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CHAPTER 3
GLOBALISATION, FOREIGN CAPITAL AND OPEN/NEOLIBERAL REGIONALISM:
Contradictions and Inconsistencies in AFTA
1.	 Introduction
The previous chapter suggests, in its concluding section, that domestic and regional
interests in ASEAN had become closely interrelated as a result of the pressures of
globalisation, which led to the significant advances in AFTA that the chapter documented.
In this chapter and the next, this argument is developed in some detail. More specifically,
chapters 3 and 4 explain that AFTA was the outcome of the forces of globalisation that
confronted the core ASEAN economies during the 1990s. These system-level dynamics,
nevertheless, were mediated by the domestic political economy, which consequently led to
two distinct types of regional projects within AFTA — open regionalism, to be discussed in
this chapter, and developmental regionalism, which will be examined in Chapter 4.
This chapter reviews and expands on the arguments that have already been advanced to
explain the emergence of AFTA as a project of open regionalism. Structural changes in the
pace, nature and pattern of global investment flows during this period are commonly cited
to account for open regionalism in AFTA. AFTA, it is often argued, was used by its
members to counter the threat of FDI diversion away from the ASEAN economies amidst
intense international competition for globally mobile investment capital.' Accurate to a
degree, this dissertation demonstrates that the concern with FDI was only part of the
AFTA story, albeit an important one.
I See the discussion in the introductory chapter.
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The FDI explanation has been discussed at length in the literature and will not be repeated
here, except to re-iterate its main points. Instead, the chapter emphasises how the
structural power of foreign investment capital, reinforced by its key role in the domestic
political economy of the ASEAN countries, made AFTA vital as a means of defining a
distinctive space of production for global capital in the wider Asia-Pacific region,
particularly in competition with China. Sections 2, 3 and 4 discuss these points. Section 5
argues that although AFTA was a project of open regionalism aimed at engagement with
the global economy, it displayed only limited neoliberal characteristics. Moreover, there
was a clear departure from open regionalism when member governments agreed to
privilege domestic investors over foreign investors in investment liberalisation. This
puzzle, yet to be accounted for in the literature, forms the point of departure for Chapter 4,
which discusses developmental regionalism.
2.	 The Structural Power of Foreign Capital
The pressure to establish a regional free trade area in ASEAN did not come from investors
engaged in some form of direct lobbying of ASEAN governments. Instead, it was
exercised through the structural power of foreign capital given by its vastly growing
potential to relocate to alternative investment sites and its value as a source of key
productive assets for governments wishing to integrate their respective economies with an
increasingly competitive world economy. While globalisation shaped these two elements,
the dynamics of the domestic political economy reinforced these structural pressures
through the key role assigned to foreign investment capital in national economic growth.
Foreign investors had not been active in the deliberations that led to the 1991 decision to
establish AFTA (Lim, 1994: 132). In fact, many foreign investors, including Japanese
investors who were key investors in ASEAN, were surprised by the ASEAN decision,
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with some decidedly pessimistic about the project's viability. 2 Although Japanese firms,
particularly automobile firms, had already begun to engage in a regional division of labour
in ASEAN by the early 1990s, the Japanese had not pushed for a region-wide free trade
area (Lim, 1994: 133). This was because Japan's "private, public-private and state-level
arrangements" helped to coordinate and support the regional activities of Japanese firms
that would have otherwise required a formal regionalist scheme (Doner, 1997). As such, a
generalised free trade area had been somewhat unnecessary to Japanese investors, and may
even erode Japan's comparative advantage in the region compared to other foreign
investors who were not backed by the kinds of informal institutions that supported the
regional activities of Japanese firms. Despite some initial doubts in Japanese business and
policy circles, the Japanese government and the powerful Japanese peak business
organisation, the Keidanren or Japan Federation of Economic Organisations, quickly
registered their support for AFTA. A senior official of the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry lauded the "positive move on ASEAN's part ... [in]
taking the initiative without having been asked by the major foreign investors."3
Rather than direct pressure by investors, it was the structural power of foreign capital that
was significant in influencing the AFTA decision, and later, its consolidation and
expansion. Officials preparing for the 1992 Singapore Summit at which the decision to
establish AFTA was formally adopted admitted that one of the most compelling arguments
advanced for AFTA, and which convinced the leaders of its necessity, was its capacity to
attract FDI to the region (Alcrasanee and Stifel, 1992: 36). Most observers of ASEAN had
not expected such a decision to be adopted, given the difficulties the grouping had
2 New Straits Times, 'Delegate: Thai proposal not viable', 25 July 1991.
3 Business Times, 'Japan throws weight behind AFTA scheme', 13 January 1993.
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experienced in pursuing economic cooperation in the past and its rejection of the idea of a
free trade area as recently as 1987 at the Third ASEAN Summit in Manila.
It is worth emphasising this point, as it shows that the ASEAN leaders were convinced of
the utility of AFTA only when it was expressed in terms of the project's economic benefits
for their respective economies. It weakens the argument advanced in the literature that
AFTA was primarily adopted as an economic instrument to achieve strategic purposes — to
keep ASEAN relevant as a regional organisation in the changing strategic environment. At
most, the strategic motivation driving AFTA was an initial though secondary objective
that was, in any case, overtaken by the FDI imperative. A senior Malaysian trade official,
Mr Razak Ramli, acknowledged that "since 1992, the picture got clearer with regard to the
economic motivations behind AFTA".4
As discussed in the introductory chapter, it is inconceivable that the ASEAN leaders
would have embraced a project that had the potential to introduce real changes to domestic
economies if AFTA had not also promised economic benefits. These economic benefits
came in the form of the potential to attract the necessary FDI to support high growth
strategies in the core ASEAN economies and to ensure their engagement with the world
economy. Thus, the initial idea mooted by Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun in
1991 quickly found support in all the ASEAN capitals. In the early 1990s, economic
growth in the ASEAN counties was believed to be under threat as FDI inflows, a crucial
source of growth, showed a declining growth trend, especially in terms of relative shares
(Table 3.1).
4 Interview in Kuala Lumpur in August 2000. Mr Razalc is Deputy Secretary-General of the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Malaysia.
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Table 3.1
Flows of FDI to host region/economy, 1983-1998 (US$ million)
Host	 region
or economy
Total Flows Developed
countries
All Developing
countries
ASEAN countries a China
1983-88 91,554 71,779 19,757 3,708 (5.2%) 1,823 (2.5%)
1988 159,101 131,313 27,772 6,991 (25.2%) 3,194(11.5%)
1989 200,612 171,722 28,622 7,591(26.5%) 3,393 (11.9%)
1990 211,425 176,436 34,689 12,158 (35.0%) 3,487(10.1%)
1991 158,936 114,792 41,696 13,400(32.1%) 4,366(10.5%)
1992 173,761 119,692 49,625 12,074(24.3%) 11,156(22.5%)
1993 219,421 133,850 78,813 15, 994 (20.3%) 27,515 (34.9%)
1994 253,506 146,379 101,196 19,681 (19.4%) 33,787 (33.4%)
1995 328,862 208,372 106,224 21,643 (20.4%) 35,849 (33.7%)
1996 358,869 211,120 135,343 25,980 (19.2%) 40,180(29.7%)
1997 464,341 273,276 172,533 27,813 (16.1%) 44,236 (25.6%)
1998 643,879 460,431 165,936 21,400 (12.9%) 45,460 (27.4%)
'Includes all ten ASEAN member economies
Figures in parentheses refer to investment flows as a proportion of total flows to developing
countries
Sources: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 1999
ASEAN Investment Database as reported in ASEAN Secretariat (1999a:131-32).
2.1	 The Lure of Regional and/or Large Markets
These pressures alone do not explain what prompted the regional response, since ASEAN
governments could well have adopted further unilateral reforms or used incentives at the
national level to make individual economies more attractive to FDI without engaging in
regionalism. It was the awareness, or at least perceptions, on the part of ASEAN leaders
and policymakers that FDI was attracted to large and/or regional markets - NAFTA, the
Single European Market (SEM) and especially China - that demonstrated to ASEAN
leaders the potential utility of a similar project in ASEAN.
Two developments in the world economy during the early 1990s dominated the concern
with FDI diversion, and helped shape the ASEAN response. The ASEAN governments
had come to realise that the formation of regionalist projects in the developed world,
notably NAFTA and the SEM, were not so much a threat to free trade as much as a
potential source of competition for global production capital. Here, the analyses and views
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of European and North American economists and policy analysts on the implications of
NAFTA and the SEM for other counties and regions, including ASEAN, were keenly
followed by ASEAN policymakers, and were no doubt persuasive (Means, 1995: 149).
While many of these studies reached diverse conclusions, most were agreed that the
largest impact would be on FDI inflows to ASEAN rather than on trade diversion. In
addition, the ASEAN governments saw the emergence of China as an alternative, and
potentially more attractive location for foreign investors compared to the far smaller
individual ASEAN economies due to China's vast market.
The important point to note is that the interest shown by foreign firms in investing in
NAFTA, the SEM and China demonstrated to ASEAN policymakers the potential of large
and/or regional markets in attracting FDI inflows. It made the idea of a single regional
market in ASEAN more compelling. The views of the ASEAN leaders can be summed up
in the words of Thailand's Prime Minister in 1993, Chuan Leekpai who cautioned that
"the possible diversion of direct foreign investment to emerging groupings such as the
SEM and NAFTA is a perpetual reminder that smaller countries have to unite". 5
 The Head
of the Indonesian Board of Investment acknowledged that ASEAN investment officials
had, in 1993, "agreed to work together to invite foreign investors to invest in ASEAN".6
The idea was for the ASEAN countries to cooperate in presenting AFTA as a single
regional site for FDI. Trade officials from Malaysia confirmed that selling AFTA as an
attractive investment location was a key objective of ASEAN.'
Despite initial fears centred on NAFTA and the SEM, by 1993, China became far more
significant as a competing investment location to ASEAN. The call in January 1992 by
5 Business Times, 'Stepped-up liberalisation of trade can be expected: Chuan', 8 January 1993.6 Business Times, 'Indonesia seeking closer collaboration with Singapore', 25 June 1994.
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Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping for faster and deeper economic reforms in China sparked
off an investment boom in that country (Tan, 1993: 11). The sharp rise in FDI flows to
China since then was seen as being increasingly at the expense of the ASEAN countries
(Tables 3.1 & 3.2). Since 1992, the surge of FDI from the Asian NIEs to ASEAN
moderated, with an increasing proportion of Japanese, Taiwanese and Hong Kong
investment flowing to China instead (Parker, 1993: 61). 8 Investments from OECD sources,
including North American and European sources, to ASEAN similarly weakened
(Thomsen, 1999: 16). Thus, by the end of 1992, the FDI situation in the core ASEAN
countries had become extremely worrying to policymakers and political leaders.
Table 3.2
Flows of FDI to the core ASEAN countries, 1983-1998 (US$ million)
Host economy Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
1983-88 -- 341 731 249 1,947 439
1988 -- 576 719 936 3,655 1,105
1989 -- 682 1,668 563 2,887 1,775
1990 1 1,093 2,332 530 5,575 2,444
1991 1 1,482 3,998 544 4,887 2,014
1992 4 1,777 5,183 228 2,204 2,114
1993 14 2,004 5,006 1,238 4,686 1,805
1994 6 2,109 4,342 1,591 8,550 1,364
1995 13 4,346 4,178 1,478 7,206 2,068
1996 11 6,194 5,078 1,517 7,884 2,336
1997 5 4,673 5,106 1,222 9,710 3,733
1998 4 356 3,727 1,713 7,218 6,969
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1999
ASEAN Investment Database as reported in ASEAN Secretariat (1999a: 132)
3.	 Domestic Political Economy Dynamics: Reinforcing the Structural Power of
Foreign Capital
ASEAN policymakers, notably the leaders, recognised the threat to economic growth, and
thus to regime legitimacy and security, to which any diversion of FDI from the ASEAN
7 Business Times, `KL poised to take centre stage in AFTA', 18 September 1993.
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region would contribute. FDI had, by the end of the 1980s, become a crucial source of
economic growth in the core ASEAN economies. 9 It was through FDI that these countries
had emerged from the recession of the mid-1980s to engage in outward-oriented
industrialisation and to become significant exporters of manufactured goods. FDI also
introduced the necessary technology and management/organisational skills that enabled
the ASEAN economies to plug into international production networks. Foreign investment
was, thus, "aggressively encouraged" by these governments (Parker, 1993: 54). 1 ° These
concerns with FDI and growth were, moreover, underpinned by political imperatives as
well, thereby reinforcing quite substantially at the domestic level the structural forces
associated with global capital.
3.1	 Thailand
The initial idea for AFTA, which came from the Thai government of Anand Panyarachun
in 1991, can be traced to concerns of the new, post-coup elite in Thailand with the fall in
FDI. Urban business had, together with the bureaucrats, formed an alliance with the
military in the aftermath of the 1991 military coup, largely as a result of the military's
appointment of Anand, a widely respected corporate figure and former career diplomat, as
caretaker Prime Minister before democratic elections could be held. While the military
justified the coup as a means of ousting the corrupt government of Chatichai Choonhavan
(1988-91), urban business welcomed the fall of the Chatichai government under which the
influence of provincial business had grown at its expense (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995:
355-56).
8 Investors from the Asian NIEs, together with the Triad economies — the US, Europe and Japan —
constituted the largest source of FDI to the ASEAN region. See Tan (1993) and Tham (1998).
9 This point is well covered in the literature and will not be repeated here. See especially Parker
(1993) and Tham (1998).
10 Singapore had begun to promote FDI since the 1960s, and thus already had a liberal FDI regime.
While Malaysia had also embarked on export-oriented industrialisation since the 1970s, its foreign
investment regime was only substantially liberalised from the mid-1980s after the recession.
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Whatever the internal political dynamics and motivations behind the coup, one result was
a fall in foreign investor interest in Thailand as expectations of rising political instability
in the country grew (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995: 356). This worried not only the
caretaker government of Prime Minister Anand, who in June 1991 had initially broached
the idea of AFTA to the other ASEAN leaders, it was also of concern to the Bangkok
business elite, which benefited from FDI through extensive joint-venture arrangements
(Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995: 156). At a more general level, the Thai economy had
become increasingly reliant on exports and FDI since the late 1980s. In 1992, the number
of investment applications fell by 31 per cent, with the biggest decline — 45 per cent —
registered in Japanese investment applications (Tan, 1993: 13). Worried Thai investment
officials, thus, planned 'offensive' strategies to promote FDI into Thailand (Tan, 1993:
14).
In addition to these purely economic concerns, there was also the ever-present fear that the
military would re-assert its influence should economic growth falter. The military had
played a substantial role in Thai politics and economics in the past, but its power and
influence had waned significantly since the late 1980s, notwithstanding the military coup
in February 1991. The transfer of power from the military elite to a democratically elected
civilian government after the 1991 coup was expected to have been complete by 1992 with
the election of the Chuan government. Nevertheless, the military continued to assert itself
behind the scenes during 1993 and 1994, demanding a large military budget, a military
role in development, and the rehabilitation of the army's political role in the interests of
national security (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995: 364). This was worrying to the new elite
coalition in Thailand made up of reforming bureaucrats, ruling politicians, and the
Bangkok-based business elite. Although urban business had initially aligned itself with the
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military, the alliance was shaky from the start and the business elite soon distanced itself
from the military (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995: 356). The concern over FDI and growth
took on added significance in this context, particularly since Thailand had a long history of
military coups being triggered by domestic economic upheavals."
3.2	 Malaysia
In Malaysia, approved investment from Japan, a major investor, fell 30.6 per cent in 1991,
while that from Taiwan, a growing investor, fell by 58.3 per cent. If petroleum projects
were excluded from the Malaysian investment figures, manufacturing sector FDI in
Malaysia registered a staggering decline of 60 per cent in 1992. Policymakers were
especially anxious because of a fall in domestic investments in Malaysia coupled with a 42
per cent decline in foreign investment applications in 1992 over the previous year (Tan,
1993: 12-13). The decline in FDI approvals in Malaysia was partly due to the government
becoming more selective of FDI, preferring projects involving higher levels of technology,
skills and capital (Tan, 1993: 13). Nevertheless, policymakers were clearly worried by the
substantial fall in FDI.
Policymakers were aware that foreign capital remained a key source of economic growth
as well as a means to technological and industrial upgrading, the latter a vital element of
Prime Minister Mahathir's Vision 2020 programme to transform Malaysia into a
developed country by 2020 (Khoo, 1995: 327). This prompted the Malaysian Ministry of
International Trade and Industry to step up its international investment promotions in
order to "pre-empt any slowdown (in FDI)". 12 Malaysian policymakers had, by this time,
also recognised that China was the country's prime competitor for it (Means, 1995: 163).
"See Alagappa (1987).12 Business Times, 'Domestic investments paying off', 11 July 1994.
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As in Thailand, ensuring FDI also had important political implications in Malaysia
through its role in ensuring growth, a crucial means to political stability. High levels of
economic growth brought significant benefits to much of Malaysian society while also
enabling the government to maintain its affirmative action programme for the country's
ethnic Malay majority without excessively eating into the wealth shares of other ethnic
groups. It also provided the resources needed for the government's patronage machinery,
which helped to maintain elite cohesion and thus, the stability of the government and
regime (Crouch, 1996: 246).13
Malaysia had embarked on FDI-led growth as a way out of the mid-1980s recession,
during which time latent cleavages among the political elite had become extremely
pronounced, threatening the ruling government, Prime Minister Mahathir's personal
authority, and the MalayAJMNO-dominated political regime (Crouch, 1996: 106-13).14
The rift was especially deep within UMNO, and between the ruling Malay party and its
ethnic Chinese coalition partner, the Malaysian Chinese Association. At the same time,
rising unemployment and an increase in private bankruptcies led to generalised public
discontent with the government and regime, which inevitably led to communal tensions as
each ethnic group in multiethnic Malaysia saw the other groups • as the cause of its own
difficulties. These ethnic tensions within Malaysian society were exploited, and thus,
exacerbated, by incumbent elites and their challengers leading to expectations of a repeat
1 ' The governing elite in Malaysia had always included politicians from the major political parties
in the ruling National Front coalition representing the three major ethnic groups in the country. By
the late 1980s, prominent businesspersons, especially those from the majority ethnic Malay and
minority ethnic Chinese communities, became closely allied with political elites to form the
dominant elite coalition in Malaysia. See Case (1996).
14 UMNO is the United Malays National Organisation, the dominant Malay political party in the
ruling multiethnic National Front coalition that has governed Malaysia since independence. Its
President and Deputy President become respectively the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister
of Malaysia.
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of the May 1969 ethnic riots in the country. The deteriorating political situation was,
however, arrested through political manoeuvring and coercive action by the ruling
government in the short-term (Crouch, 1996: 106-13). The resumption in economic
growth, the result of domestic economic reforms and the fortuitous inflow of FDI from the
Asian Nffis during the late 1980s also helped to restore growth and consequently, political
stability. It is, thus, unsurprising that the FDI situation in the early 1990s should be a cause
for concern, given its implications for growth and distribution, particularly in view of
recent events in the country.
3.3	 Indonesia
Although FDI increased in Indonesia in 1992 (Table 3.2), this was largely attributed to
several large petroleum and mining projects. If these projects were excluded from the
figures, FDI actually fell by 54 per cent in 1992, compounded by the equally sharp decline
in domestic investments. These developments prompted considerable concern in Indonesia
(Tan, 1993: 13; van der Eng, 1993: 20-21). Since the start of the country's economic
reform programmes in the 1980s, Indonesia had received significant amounts of FDI,
especially from the Asian NIEs.
While the relative share of FDI in the Indonesian economy was less than that of domestic
investments, its importance for the Indonesian economy and for growth rests on its high
export propensity and its use of more sophisticated technology compared to domestic
investors (Lindblad, 1997: 29; Djidin, 1997: 32). Moreover, the government's plan to
attain an average annual growth rate of six per cent during the Sixth Development Plan
(Repelita VI) (1993-98) rested on an investment target of 60 trillion rupiah (US$28
million) over the five-year period (Surbakti, 1999: 75). Domestic private and state
investments were not expected to be able to sustain the needed capital investment,
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especially in the light of the downturn in domestic investments during the early 1990s
(MacIntyre and Sjahrir, 1993: 12). The critical role of FDI was, thus, underscored.
Foreign capital was vital to maintaining economic growth in the country. Growth was a
crucial regime-legitimating device for President Suharto, which allowed him to
consolidate his political rule over an essentially fractious nation by steadily improving
living standards for Indonesians in general and enabling large numbers of ordinary
Indonesians to engage in economic activity (Surbalcti, 1999: 62). The President also used
the material benefits generated by that growth to win friends and co-opt potential
adversaries within the state and more broadly in society (Liddle, 1999: 48). In short,
economic growth provided the ruling elite, notably the President, with the resources
necessary to accomplish economic and political goals through patronage politics (Surbakti,
1999: 62-65). The flow of FDI from the NIEs to China rather than to Indonesia from 1993
was, therefore, viewed with alarm by the Indonesian authorities, made worse by
indications that some firms already established in Indonesia were considering a move to
China (Means, 1995: 169). A senior Indonesian investment official acknowledged China
to be Indonesia's main competitor for FDI.I5
3.4	 Singapore
Although the diversion of FDI from ASEAN to China did not affect Singapore directly,
Singaporean policymalcers were concerned about the indirect effects on the Singapore
economy, particularly its service sector, should economic growth in Indonesia and
Malaysia falter as a result of the decline in FDI (Tan, 1993: 15). Singapore had, by the
early 1990s, embarked on a services-led growth strategy, moving away from the island
republic's traditional manufacturing-led growth strategy of the 1960s to 1980s, and began
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emphasising the city-state as the operational and business headquarters for the regional
production operations of TNCs.
The 'regional service strategy' was, thus, premised on the growth of manufacturing
production, not so much in Singapore but in the other regional economies of Southeast
Asia, in which Singapore-based TNCs helped to coordinate and service. Any fall in
investment to the rest of ASEAN would, thus, threaten Singapore's services-led growth
programme. I6 This explains why Singapore's political elite constantly played on the issue
of FDI diversion to China, even though Singapore was far less directly affected by the
diversion of manufacturing investment to China. Moreover, the political legitimacy of the
Peoples' Action Party (PAP) that had ruled Singapore since independence in 1965 was
derived from its capacity to preside over improved material conditions, making growth a
political imperative as well as an economic one (Rodan, 1989: 202).
3.5	 The Philippines
In the Philippines, the Ramos government elected in 1992, having inherited an economy in
severe crisis, proposed an ambitious development plan — Philippines 2000 — that aimed to
take the country to NIE status by century's end, a mere eight years away. This required a
minimum 8 per cent average annual growth rate to be achieved by, among other means,
economic liberalisation and FDI (Vos and Yap, 1996: 163). The recourse to FDI took on
added significance with the decision by the government to close the US air and naval
bases in the Philippines in 1992, which led to the withdrawal of foreign assistance from
Washington (Hutchison, 1997: 85). This, coupled with the continuing high foreign debt
15 Business Times, 'Indonesia seeking closer collaboration with Singapore', 25 June 1994.
16 See Rodan (1993).
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burden, led to increased reliance on FDI for growth. In fact, the foreign sector assumed a
dominant part in Ramos' 'Philippines 2000' programme (McFarlane, 1998: 173).
Thus, the threat of FDI diversion was a serious one for the Philippines government, which
had, like other states in the region, come to regard China as one of its main competitors in
the FDI game (Gochoco-Bautista, 1998: 211). The economic liberalisation programme
initiated by Ramos also included a political dimension as well. It was designed to
challenge the power of the old landed, agricultural oligarchy, which had re-emerged with
post-Marcos democratisation as key players in the new Philippine 'elite democracy', this
time in new areas of the economy like industry, banking and services rather than in
agriculture (Hutchison, 1997: 83).
4.	 AFTA: Creating an Alternative Regional Space in the Asia-Pacific for
Investment and Production
Concern in the region over the potential to lose FDI to China was, therefore, quite
pronounced. ASEAN policymakers were correct to identify China as their biggest
competitor for it. Although other markets, particularly regionalist schemes elsewhere, did
have the potential to attract FDI away from ASEAN, China was especially significant
because it was part of the Asia-Pacific region. Global capital had, by the early 1990s,
adopted a regional focus to its investment and production strategies (Ng and Sudo, 1991).
This changing logic of global capital meant that TNCs were increasingly practising a
regional as opposed to global division of labour, and establishing production in different
regions — Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific. This was discussed in some detail
in Chapter 1. While the aim of TNCs was to operate business globally, that goal was being
increasingly achieved through the development of "complete and integrated production
and management systems within definable regions" (Rodan, 1993: 234).
144
China by itself offered such a 'regional' site for FDI in the Asia-Pacific region, given its
(potential) market size." What the ASEAN governments attempted to offer to foreign
investors through AFTA was an alternate regional space of investment and production that
exploited the 'regional' logic of global capital. AFTA, thus, helped to define a distinctive
functional space of production in the wider East Asian/Asia Pacific region. Only through
AFTA did the ASEAN leaders and policymakers believe they could meet the FDI
challenge from China, particularly as they had reached a limit in terms of the individual
investment incentives they could offer potential investors. As an Indonesian investment
official explained, "they (the Chinese) give everything ... they give all the incentives
which we could not give".I8
Thus, most scholars agree that fear over the diversion of FDI to China was a major reason
why the ASEAN leaders agreed to consolidate the regional project and begin tariff
reductions by January 1994 despite the emergence of domestic business resistance to
AFTA in a number of member countries. Political leaders also found the potential threat to
economic growth from falling levels of foreign investment sufficiently overwhelming to
advance AFTA further in 1994-95 (Hay, 1996). ASEAN leaders consequently shortened
by five years the time frame when tariffs in AFTA would reach the 0-5 per cent target,
introduced new rules to govern the temporary exclusion list scheme, and agreed to adopt
both a dispute settlement mechanism and an agreement to protect intellectual property
rights in ASEAN. By doing so, they were signalling to foreign investors that they were
17 A study carried out by the Economist Intelligence Unit identified 'Greater China' (China, Hong
Kong and Taiwan) as ASEAN's closest rival for the title of fastest growing sub-regional market in
the wider Asia-Pacific region (Baldwin, 1997: 3). Although the regional financial crisis qualifies
this assessment, the point remains that ASEAN and China present alternative regional market sites
for investors interested in the Asia-Pacific region.
18 Business Times, 'Indonesia seeking closer collaboration with Singapore', 25 June 1994.
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committed to the development of AFTA as a single regional space of production.
Moreover, the AICO scheme was adopted as a compromise between the need to attract
foreign investors through forming a single market and giving domestic industries
sufficient time to adjust to AFTA tariff liberalisation. Notwithstanding the problems
investors encountered in getting AICO approvals, the scheme effectively fast-tracked
AFTA for selected products on application by investors.I9
4.1	 The New Issue Areas: Additional Dynamics?
The FDI explanation is also used to account for the inclusion of agriculture, services and
investment within AFTA in 1994-95 (Hay, 1996: 266-68). The argument is that ASEAN
governments wished to keep AFTA relevant to FDI, given the advances made in the
GATT as well as in APEC and NAFTA during the mid-1990s in addressing agriculture,
services and investment. 29 The additional commitments were necessary in order to
maintain AFTA as a distinctive regional space of investment and production. This
explanation is incomplete, however. It is unable to explain why ASEAN investors were
treated more favourably than foreign investors in the ALA component of AFTA. While a
case may be made that concern with FDI diversion was a factor prompting the inclusion of
services and investment within AFTA, Chapter 4 argues that expanding AFTA's scope to
include investment reflected not merely growth as a goal, but the development of domestic
capabilities as well. The latter led to deviations in AFTA from open regionalism.
In the case of agriculture, its incorporation into world trade disciplines as a result of the
Uruguay Round agreements was largely responsible for its subsequent insertion into
19 AICO is discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2).
20 Developments in the GATT/WTO and APEC are discussed in Chapter 4.
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AFTA.21 The incorporation of agriculture into the GATT/WTO helped the Thai
government, which had originally wanted AFTA to cover agriculture, a key export sector
for the country, to successfully lobby for its inclusion in the CEPT despite the reservations
of other governments, notably Indonesia. 22
 The Malaysian, Philippine and Indonesian
governments, however, insisted on having a separate arrangement to govern trade
liberalisation of the more sensitive agricultural items. Despite making this request, the
Indonesian government unilaterally withdrew 15 agricultural products that it had earlier
included within the CEPT, which led to a dispute with Thailand. Why this happened and
how it was addressed is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. It is sufficient, at this point, to note
that it would have been difficult for the Thai government to advocate including agriculture
in AFTA if it had not already been incorporated within the WTO, given the significant
reservations in the region on the issue. Nevertheless, the other governments agreed to its
inclusion despite these reservations in order to reinforce AFTA as a project of open
regionalism. As Malaysia's Minister of Primary Industries said in 1994, "it is a logical and
natural action wanting to include agricultural products into CEPT since the world
community is committed to free trade liberalisation".23
4.2	 The Financial Crisis Period
The decision by member governments to further accelerate AFTA as well as introduce
additional investment incentives in the region in 1998-99 was also driven by concern with
FDI and growth (Bowles, 2000: 444). The core ASEAN governments had to make sure
that their respective economies remained attractive to FDI amidst the economic turmoil of
the regional financial crisis, and they attempted to accomplish this through regionalism.
21 The general commitments in the Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture are detailed in
Feridhanusetyawan (1998).
22 See NST, 'Thailand takes on regional leadership', 1 October 1994.
23 Business Times, 'Need to address problems in ASEAN's farm sector', 26 August 1994.
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As huge amounts of portfolio capital began flowing out of these economies, the imperative
of maintaining direct investment became paramount, especially since domestic
investments had also suffered a sharp contraction in the region (OECD, 1999: 120). AFTA
became a key tool in the process of maintaining foreign investor confidence in the region,
particularly as China still loomed as an alternative investment site.
Thus, Bowles (2000: 444) points to the joint adoption of a temporary incentive package in
1998 (Table 2.6 in Chapter 2) that gave foreign investors additional incentives in each
ASEAN country over a two year period as evidence that the ASEAN governments were
using regionalism to attract FDI. As already noted in Chapter 2, the most significant of
these incentives was the temporary offer of 100 per cent foreign equity and market access,
mostly in manufacturing. The acceleration of the CEPT, the temporary relaxation of the 30
per cent national equity requirement in AICO and arguably the acceleration of the AIA
were the other measures jointly adopted by the ASEAN governments in order to maintain
investor confidence during a time of economic distress. The recognition by ASEAN
policymakers of the need for joint measures in ensuring foreign investor interest in the
region was also reflected in their decision to embark on joint investment promotion
missions in 1999-2000 to the major investor countries/regions — the US, Europe, and
Japan — a first in ASEAN's history.24
Bowles (2000: 445) also acknowledges that beneath the level of official discourse on open
regionalism, protectionist elements emerged to strain infra-ASEAN relations, with both
tariff and non-tariff barriers used to shield domestic industries during the financial crisis.
Others go further in denying the considerable advances made in AFTA since its inception
24 See the press release from the ASEAN Secretariat, "ASEAN to send investment missions to the
US and Europe", 14 April 1999.
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by pointing to the adoption of tariff and non-tariff barriers during this period as evidence
of AFTA's failure. 25 This is too stark a position. While the adoption of tariff and non-tariff
barriers was a setback for AFTA and did strain regional relations, its significance for
evaluating progress in AFTA should not be exaggerated.
Many of the import restrictions were announced as temporary for a one to two year period,
and were generally part of a set of short-term fiscal measures designed to reduce
immediate pressure on countries' external accounts. Thus, a large proportion of tariffs
were used to restrict big-ticket items, including luxury imports, transport equipment, and
capital goods like steel and heavy machinery (Shimizu, 2000: 83). In the Philippines,
tariffs were raised on certain textile, steel and petrochemical products in response to
business demands, but for one year.26 The Philippine government rejected additional
business demands for protection because, as Trade Secretary, Jose Pardo pointed out,
protection "sends the wrong signal (to international investors)". 27 The point to note is that
these particular 'protectionist' moves were brought on by the pressures of recession, and
should be assessed in that context. The important thing is that despite these temporary
deviations from AFTA commitments, AFTA tariff liberalisation was on target and the
majority of CEPT commitments fulfilled as Chapter 2 shows. The notable exception was
the temporary delay in including automobiles and petrochemicals, respectively by
Malaysia and the Philippines, under AFTA disciplines.
While Bowles (2000: 444) sees the temporary incentive package as an indication of
ASEAN's continued use of regionalism to sustain the FDI-led growth strategy in member
countries, this chapter interprets the incentive package somewhat differently. While not
25 See, for instance, Clad (2000).
26 Jakarta Post, 5 March 1999.
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denying Bowles' point, this chapter suggests that its significance lies in its temporary
nature. The removal of restrictions on foreign equity and market access conditions in the
package when it was announced was limited to investment applications made between
January 1999 and December 2000 only, subject to further review. Moreover, the 30 per
cent national equity requirement in AICO was waived for only two years until 2000, later
extended by a further year.28 These short-term measures are, thus, a curious anomaly,
given the overwhelming pressure to maintain investor confidence and interest in the
ASEAN region because they raised doubts about the commitment of the ASEAN
governments to neoliberal economic reforms.
The short-term nature of these measures suggests that equity ownership and market access
remained a sensitive issue in the ASEAN countries. Although Malaysia extended the
incentive period until the end of 2003, its temporary nature remains unchanged at the time
of writing. While many of Thailand's and Indonesia's temporary liberalisation offers were
eventually incorporated into these countries' unilateral and IMF-led reform programmes,
this does not alter the main thrust of the argument — that national governments were
sensitive, for various reasons, about equity and market access issues. These sensitivities
were also reflected in the AIA programme. Although the AIA was accelerated in 1999 in
direct response to the crisis, only ASEAN investors were to receive the benefits of full
market access and national treatment in 2003 in the manufacturing sector and 2010 in
other sectors, while foreign (non-ASEAN) investors were scheduled to receive these
benefits in 2020. This rather contradictory move, which did not appear to be helpful to the
FDI cause, has still to be explained. It suggests that there were other dynamics, apart from
27 Jakarta Post, 7 April 1999.
28 A number of scholars questioned the significance of these short-term measures when they were
announced, and asked whether they would prove sufficiently attractive to investors during a period
of economic turmoil (Soesastro, 1999: 9).
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the FDI threat, that shaped the development of AFTA, particularly its AIA programme. As
the next chapter reveals, domestic political priorities centred on the need to nurture
domestic capital influenced the design of the AIA.
5.	 AFTA: A Neoliberal Regionalist Project?
Despite the anomaly in the MA, the open regionalism credentials of AFTA, particularly of
the CEPT scheme, cannot be doubted given its primary purpose to engage with
globalisation, notably globally mobile FDI. One key feature of open regionalist projects is
that the exchange of preferences among regional partners is not accompanied by the
imposition of new barriers to non-partners. AFTA, having no common external tariff,
clearly met this condition. Apart from its broadly open regionalist character, is AFTA also
a project of neoliberal regionalism? Scholars like Bowles (2000) believe that it is, despite
instances of protectionism during the fmancial crisis period. This section engages in a
more careful assessment of this claim, using insights from Chapter 1 on neoliberal and
embedded neoliberal regionalism as a guide.
5.1	 The Formal Design of Regional Trade Liberalisation
Apart from the absence of a common external tariff, AFTA's neoliberal credentials were
reflected in the way members were allowed to unilaterally and voluntarily extend CEPT
tariff preferences to non-members on an MFN basis. It meant that the ASEAN member
governments were not denied the chance to adopt unilateral economic reforms that went
faster or beyond the CEPT in order to meet the unique competitive needs of the domestic
economy, provided CEPT commitments were met at the very minimum.
Although member governments availed themselves of this privilege on a number of
occasions, the extension of CEPT preferences to non-members was not always practised,
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however. This is revealed in Table 2.11 in Chapter 2, which shows the fairly significant
divergence in the CEPT and MFN average tariff rates in 2000 and that expected in 2003,
particularly in Thailand and Indonesia. Nevertheless, despite multilateralisation of the
CEPT being a less than universal practice in reality, the presence of an option to extend
CEPT tariff reductions to non-ASEAN members on an MFN basis reinforced the
neoliberal credentials of AFTA.
Whether governments multilateralised their CEPT commitments was influenced by two
developments, namely by the presence of unilateral economic reform programmes and the
need to reduce CEPT-induced tariff distortions. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the
Philippines were engaged in an ongoing process of unilateral economic reforms from the
mid-1980s.29 These economic reforms had initially been undertaken to overcome the
economic recession of 1985-86, or, in the case of the Philippines, the economic crisis
unleashed by the Marcos regime. They were designed to create the conditions for export-
oriented, FDI-led growth. In that context, it made sense to extend AFTA tariff offers to all
parties. Tariff reductions under the CEPT framework in AFTA thus dovetailed with
unilateral tariff reforms.
In many cases, AFTA tariff reduction commitments drove or preceded unilateral (MFN)
reform packages. Thus, the Indonesian deregulation package of May 1995 extended CEPT
tariff reduction commitments outlined the previous year to all parties (Fane and Condon,
1996: 53-54; James, 1995: 32). In the Philippines, AFTA forced a change in the pace of
economic reforms, with AFTA used to push unilateral trade liberalisation (Gochoco-
Bautista, 1998: 210). AFTA, more fundamentally, also influenced the nature of economic
policy in that country. Jesus Estanislao, the Chairman of the Philippine AFTA
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Commission, admitted in 1993 that AFTA would lead to "a radical departure of the policy
orientation" of the Philippine government. 30 In Thailand, general tariff reform was
undertaken as part of the country's preparation for AFTA (Krongkaew, 1997: 24). A
senior Thai Finance Ministry official noted that "CEPT actually pushes Thailand's MFN
tariff reforms".3I
In addition, distortions in tariff structures in countries like Thailand and the Philippines
required the reduction in import duties on raw materials and intermediate inputs to be
undertaken on an MFN basis before or at the same time that AFTA commitments came
into force. Because inputs that went into manufactured products like textiles were largely
imported from outside ASEAN, high MIN tariffs on these inputs in Thailand and the
Philippines made final goods less competitive compared with products made in Malaysia
and Singapore where MFN input tariffs had been reduced much earlier. Once tariffs on
final goods were reduced to a uniform 0-5 per cent under AFTA, manufacturers in
Thailand and the Philippines would have been at a disadvantage if MFN tariffs on relevant
inputs were not reduced correspondingly. Final goods manufacturers in Thailand and the
Philippines thus lobbied their governments to streamline tariff structures, and particularly
to lower duties on imported inputs on an MFN basis to maintain the competitiveness of
their products relative to those produced in the other ASEAN countries with less distorted
tariff structures.
The textile industry in Thailand was among the worst hit. Thai textile firms urged the
government to hasten tariff reform in Thailand before tariffs on final textile products fell
29 See Chapter 2 (footnote 40).
30 Business Times, `AFTA will force Manila to change economic policies', 15 December 1993.
31 Interview with Ms Chularat Suteethorn of the Ministry of Finance, Thailand, August 2000.
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to 0-5 per cent under the country's AFTA commitments. 32 Thai textile producers were
levied MFN import duties of between 20-40 per cent on raw materials and inputs, which
were largely imported from non-ASEAN sources, thus placing them at an enormous
disadvantage compared to producers from Malaysia. These concerns led to a review of
Thailand's tariff structure in 1999, when the import duty for raw materials and primary
goods was set at between 0-5 per cent on an MFN basis, in line with the AFTA rate and
those of the other countries.33
Trends such as these confirm the neoliberal characteristics of AFTA. The competitiveness
of domestic industry was not to be compromised by any desire to maintain preferential
tariffs among AFTA member countries to privilege product sourcing only from within
ASEAN. The aim, after all, was to use AFTA to create a regional space of production
through removing internal barriers to the free movement of economic resources. It was not
primarily designed to increase intra-ASEAN trade, although regional trade would be
expected to eventually rise if investors established transnational production in ASEAN.
5.2
	 The Dominant Discourse: Globalisation, Competitiveness and Efficiency
While the specific design of the CEPT indicated its neoliberal credentials, the discourse or
discourses associated with AFTA were also revealing of the kind of regionalist project that
was being constructed in AFTA. Actors construct and use discourses to tell particular
stories about the world. Discourses help in creating a cognitive structure that in turn helps
shape the expectations of other actors about the world as well as their behaviour given a
set of expected constraints and opportunities.
32 The Nation, 'Textile group pushes for cut in input duties', 9 November, 1999.
33 Bangkok Post, 'Protection remains for strategic sectors', 7 June 1999.
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The discourse associated with AFTA was centred on the neoliberal tenets of
competitiveness and efficiency. It thus reflected the dominant discourse in the core
ASEAN countries that also stressed the importance of competitiveness and efficiency for
firms and the economy in meeting the challenges of globalisation (Soesastro, 1998). In all
these countries, national governments used the notion of `globalisation' to justify and push
through domestic economic reforms through deregulation, liberalisation and
privatisation. 34 Moreover, competitiveness and efficiency were seen as vital for these
economies in the competition to attract FDI and to ensure their integration with the world
economy. While these countries cooperated in attracting FDI through regionalism, they
also engaged in designing investment programmes, including competitive liberalisation,
that were aimed at directing FDI that had been attracted in the first instance by the
prospect of the AFTA market to their respective national economies (Rinalcit and
Soesastro, 1998: 198). The option of multilateralising the CEPT and the absence of a
common external tariff in AFTA allowed competitive liberalisation to take place. It is in
this sense that a neoliberal discourse may be said to have underpinned AFTA.
The discourse, centred on globalisation, competitiveness and efficiency, was one
constructed and dominated by policymakers, and directed at private business. Its goal was
to justify economic reforms in general, and tariff liberalisation in particular, and to make
private business aware that it would no longer enjoy tariff protection as in the past.
Substantial domestic business opposition to AFTA had emerged since the project was
34 See Rinalcit and Soesastro (1998) and Murphy (1999) on Indonesia; Gochoco-Bautista (1998) on
the Philippines; Chantana (1998) and Hamilton-Hart (1999b) on Thailand; and Welsh (1999) on
Malaysia.
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initially announced, and governments attempted to use discourse as one means of
legitimising economic reforms, including unilateral and CEPT trade liberalisation.35
Thus, the Thai Deputy Prime Minister in 1993, Dr Supachai Panitchpalcdi pointed to
'competitiveness' as the main challenge for Thailand, and acknowledged that "we are
using AFTA to force competitiveness on [local businesses], so you work with low
protection". 36 This was a message repeated by successive Thai governments since then.37
Malaysian companies were continuously warned to brace themselves for international
competition with the implementation of AFTA. Trade Minister Rafidah Aziz explained
that liberalisation of the domestic market would "enable local industries to build up the
resilience required to face competition". 38 The Philippine Foreign Secretary urged
domestic firms to shape up for AFTA, which would "force ASEAN industries to be
globally competitive".39 In Indonesia, responses to globalisation were framed in terms of
enhancing the international competitiveness of firms (Rinakit and Soesastro, 1998: 199).
Coordinating Minister for National Development Planning in 1996, Ginandjar
Kartasasmita, re-affirmed the Indonesian government's commitments to AFTA during
discussions with the business sector, warning businesses that the era of government
protection of Indonesian firms was over.40
Other groups apart from policymakers, notably pro-reform business leaders and liberal
economists, were often active participants in the dominant neoliberal discourse as well.
35 Nevertheless, the CEPT incorporated sufficient flexibility, as Chapter 2 shows, to give firms
sufficient time to adjust to the eventual removal of protection. In addition, both Thailand and the
Philippines introduced financial support programmes to help domestic industries hurt by AFTA.
See Business Times, 'Bangkok sets up fund to help local industries', 14 June 1993; and Business
Times, 'Philippine govt to help industry compete in region', 19 November 1992.
36 FEER, 'Thailand: Trade and Investment', 5 August 1993.
37 See The Nation, 'Coming to terms with free trade', 8 April 1997.
38 Business Times, `11afidah: open market can create resilience', 17 August 1992.
39 Business Times, 'Philippines unveils economic blueprint', 20 November 1992.
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This is not to deny the presence of alternative discourses. These did exist, and were
focused on the negative aspects of globalisation, including its environmental, social and
cultural effects. Nevertheless, during the high growth period of much of the 1990s, the
neoliberal discourse of adjusting to globalisation through promoting competitiveness and
efficiency was dominant in these countries and spearheaded by policymalcers. 4I This was
also the discourse associated with AFTA.
During the 1990s in Thailand, the debate was between the globalisers and the localists,
although the globalisers were predominant. Thai policymakers, notably the powerful
technocrats in the civil service, interpreted globalisation as a force compelling neoliberal
economic policies, and responded accordingly in policy formulation. Other advocates of
the competitiveness discourse included the newly emergent commercial interests and the
long-established Bangkok business elite, in addition to the technocrats — notably liberal
economists in the Ministry of Finance, the central bank and the planning agency
(Hamilton-Hart, 1999b: 293). Various policy documents were issued since 1994 that
emphasised competitiveness as the strategy to respond to the pressures of globalisation
(Chantana, 1998: 266).
These policies were fully supported by elite business interests — essentially the Bangkok-
based conglomerates — who favoured a liberal economic environment with an eye to the
benefits that foreign capital brought to their own ventures as joint partners as well as in
boosting the stock market. For instance, large Thai corporations like Siam Cement,
Charoen Pokphand, the Saha Union, and the leading banks were favoured partners for
foreign investors (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995: 156). Other business players outside the
Republika (Republic), 27 September 1996.
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group of Bangkok-based conglomerates were less embracing of liberalisation. The
globalisers, however, dominated public policy and were able to implement their agenda of
liberalisation, while the far less coherent localists were marginal in policy terms
(Hamilton-Hart, 1999b: 287-94). The Thai discourse of competitiveness and efficiency
surrounding AFTA derived from the broader globalisation discourse. Despite the crisis,
the predominant discourse in Thailand remained the neoliberal one (Hamilton-Hart,
1999b: 301-302), at least until the election of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in
January 2001 whose government appears to be less embracing of the neoliberal discourse
and the liberal economic policies of previous governments.42
In countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, however, alternative perceptions and responses
to globalisation and neoliberalism were present even before the financial crisis, though the
latter brought these alternative discourses into sharper relief (Welsh, 1999; Murphy,
1999). These alternative interpretations of globalisation led these governments to adopt
particular policy responses in AFTA that appeared to contradict its open/neoliberal
regionalist character. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Nevertheless,
both Indonesia and Malaysia were also preoccupied with the notion of competitiveness,
which also dominated the discourse on globalisation in Singapore (Yeung, 1999).
The attitudes and responses of both Malaysian and Indonesian policymakers were largely
shaped by the ideas and responses of their respective leaders. As Welsh notes, a large
portion of the Malaysian Prime Minister's Vision 2020 document outlining the strategies
by which Malaysia would attain developed country status by 2020 emphasises neoliberal
market reforms (Welsh, 1999: 266). Yet, Dr Mahathir did not fully embrace the western
41	 •Since the financial crisis, however, opposing discourses have become more prominent
(Soesastro, 1998).
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notion of globalisation and its associated neoliberal policies in all areas of policy. As
Chapter 4 shows, Dr Mahathir re-interpreted globalisation to emphasise its negative
implications for developing countries and their firms as well, which also underpinned the
Malaysian government's position on AFTA's investment liberalisation programme
In Indonesia, President Suharto's broad response to globalisation was not to oppose it, but
to adjust to it (Rinakit and Soesastro, 1998: 193-94). Nevertheless, although Indonesian
economic policy during the 1990s moved in a broadly neoliberal direction, well-connected
big business and powerful political groups were able to influence policy away from the
neoliberal agenda in specific cases that were of direct interest to them. This is discussed in
Chapter 5. Nevertheless, the ideal of competitiveness was a strong one in Indonesian
policy circles, reflected in the extensive neoliberal reforms undertaken, although it did not
go unchallenged in both ideational and policy terms as the discussion in Chapter 4 shows.
As in the Malaysian case, these alternative discourses were also reflected in Indonesia's
response to the AIA.
Unlike the European case, the competitiveness discourse in the ASEAN countries was
initiated and constructed by public policymakers rather than business and corporate actors,
and centred on creating a cognitive structure that would legitimise the withdrawal of
protection and the adoption of other neoliberal policies that may disadvantage private
business. The aim was to drive home the point to the private sector that economic reforms,
including tariff liberalisation, were here to stay and protectionism would not be
entertained. This growth-centred policy was, however, breached on a number of occasions.
In the EU, on the other hand, transnational business elites and their allies had succeeded in
defining the discourse surrounding European integration in terms of competitiveness and
42 See FEER, 'Thailand Incorporated', 18 January 2001.
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efficiency that required a reduction in the scale and scope of state involvement in and
regulation of national economies (van Apeldoorn, 2000: 241). The discourse in ASEAN
was somewhat different, particularly with regard to the state-market relationship.
5.3	 The State-Market Relationship: AFTA and 'Embedded' Neoliberalism
To the extent that neoliberalism also encompasses the notion of limited government
involvement in or direction of the economy, then the neoliberalism inherent in the
competitiveness discourse surrounding AFTA, and in AFTA itself, was a limited or partial
one. Although it incorporated the notion of business or private sector-led growth, this did
not include the associated neoliberal idea of more market and less state at all levels of
governance.
In practice, neoliberafism was largely confined to the international trade regime, while at
the domestic level, governments continued to regulate and impose restrictions on business
activity, including foreign investors, despite domestic economic reforms in the core
ASEAN countries. Chapter 4 discusses these regulations and restrictions in detail.
Moreover, all the core ASEAN governments were actively engaged in supplying the
necessary public goods like education, skills, and infrastructure to support business
activity and attract FDI rather than leaving them to the free market to supply. 43 As such,
while AFTA, particularly through the CEPT, encompassed neoliberal features, the
neoliberalism inherent in AFTA more broadly was only partial or limited.
43 See Rinakit and Soesastro (1998) on Indonesia; Gochoco-Bautista (1998) on the Philippines;
Chantana (1998) on Thailand; and Welsh (1999) on Malaysia.
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6.	 Conclusion: Contradictions and Inconsistencies
One of the most notable contradictions in AFTA, and where its departure from the open or
embedded neoliberal regionalism of the CEPT is clearest, is found in the investment
liberalisation programme. As already noted at various points in this chapter, the
privileging of ASEAN investors over foreign investors in the MA is curious given the
significant concern among the ASEAN member governments to remain attractive to FDI.
Significantly, the terms of the MA relating to ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors were
also not altered during the crucial period of the financial crisis when it would have seemed
logical not to jeopardise the already precarious economic climate. Paradoxically, when the
AIA was accelerated in 1999 in response to the financial crisis, the benefits of earlier
market access and national treatment were directed at ASEAN investors only, while non-
ASEAN (foreign) investors were only to receive these benefits at the original 2020 target
date. The ASEAN Secretary General, in fact, sought to play down this distinction between
ASEAN and foreign (non-ASEAN) investors in the AIA scheme in a bid to reassure
foreign investors.44
 What is puzzling is that this distinction was maintained despite the
marked reductions in FDI to ASEAN in general and individual member countries in
particular.
A report by the ASEAN Secretary General submitted to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in
July 2000 showed that FDI inflows to the region dropped from US$28 billion in 1997 to
US$13.1 billion in 1999. All member economies, except Singapore, registered declines in
FDI in 1999.45 The report also showed that ASEAN economies received 17 per cent of
FDI flows to Asian developing countries in 1999, compared to about 60 per cent during
the early 1990s. China, on the other hand, received about 60 per cent in 1999 compared to
44 Business Times, 'ASEAN set to liberalise investment within region', 30 September 1999.
45 IHT, 'Investment in Southeast Asia plunges', 27 July 2000.
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18 per cent during the early 1990s. The negative correlation was not lost on ASEAN
officials and leaders.46 China's potential accession to the WTO also added to the sense of
urgency among the ASEAN leaders with regard to the FDI situation in view of the
anticipated diversion of FDI to China that would likely follow China's membership of the
multilateral trading system. The ASEAN economic ministers requested a study on how the
accession of China to the WTO would impact on regional trade and especially
investment.47
How do we explain this particular anomaly in AFTA, especially in the face of economic
adversity when reassuring foreign investors would have been the logical step? It is
insufficient to merely cite the emergence of protectionism in one or more of the ASEAN
countries or of policy inconsistency as explanation. We need to delve deeper and ask what
could have accounted for this departure from open regionalism even though the growth
and FDI imperative remained strong during the 1990s in ASEAN, and particularly after
the onset of the regional financial crisis in 1997. Clearly, other dynamics were at work in
addition to the growth and FDI dynamic that drove AFTA. In essence, these dynamics
revolved around the political role of domestic capital in elite governance political systems.
The next chapter examines these dynamics in greater detail.
46	 •Financial Times, 'Foreign investors desert Southeast Asia for China, 13 October 2000.47 Financial Times, `Chuan urges ASEAN to move on free trade', 6 October 2000.
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CHAPTER 4
GLOBALISATION, DOMESTIC CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISM:
The Mediating Role of Domestic Politics
1.	 Introduction
The previous chapter suggests that there were other dimensions to the AFTA story, apart
from open regionalism and the concern with FDI, that have so far been ignored in the
literature. This was clear from the AIA Agreement, which sought to offer full market
access and national treatment privileges to ASEAN investors ahead of foreign (non-
ASEAN) investors. The discrimination against foreign investors was all the more puzzling
since key officials in ASEAN acknowledged that the AIA was part of the wider goal in
AFTA of maintaining ASEAN's attractiveness as a site for FDI. 1 It is not possible to
ascribe this move to protectionist governments concerned with protecting national
investors, since the MA did not completely prevent market competition for any national
investor.2 Nor did the AIA keep out foreign investors; it merely offered all ASEAN
national investors the same privileges accorded to domestic investors. Nevertheless, it is
clear that this particular clause in the AIA sought to privilege ASEAN domestic capital, at
least temporarily. It is, therefore, the role of domestic capital in the domestic political
economy that is key to explaining the AIA anomaly.
This chapter argues that AFTA also incorporated developmental characteristics through
the AIA component, in addition to open/embedded neoliberal regionalism in the CEPT.
The AIA offered the possibility for domestic firms to expand within the larger regional
Interviews with Dr Wee Kee Hwee of the ASEAN Secretariat in July 2000 and with Mr Razak
Ramli of Malaysia in August 2000. Also see Rafidah (2000).
2 By 'national' investor is meant an investor who is regarded as a domestic investor in a particular
state. It does not refer to a public/state investor.
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market, including forming joint ventures and other forms of alliances with other ASEAN
firms, through exploiting the preferential investment privileges the AIA would accord
them ahead of foreign investors. Nevertheless, developmental regionalism in AFTA was
also about engaging with globalisation, except that certain policymakers and leaders were
not prepared to accept the hegemony of foreign TNCs that was a growing feature of
globalisation, and attempted to nurture domestic firms and capabilities as well. The growth
imperative was, thus, infused with domestic priorities pertaining to domestic capita1.3
Before elaborating on this argument, it is necessary to address the possibility that the
distinction the MA made between ASEAN and foreign investors was not all that
significant given what appeared to be fairly liberal FDI regimes in the countries
concerned. This was particularly the case for investment in the manufacturing sector that
was targeted for earlier liberalisation to ASEAN investors in 2003. Some scholars, in fact,
maintain this view (Menon, 1998: 18). Section 2 addresses this point. Following this,
Sections 3 and 4 discuss how expected changes in multilateral rules, especially on
investment, raised concerns in some ASEAN countries with regard to the future of
domestic firms in global competition, which in turn led to the adoption of a developmental
component in AFTA through the AIA. Section 5 explains the concern with domestic
capital in terms of its political role in the domestic political economy of ASEAN countries.
3 The dissertation recognises that domestic capital is not a homogenous group, instead comprising
various segments. Nevertheless, the term 'domestic capital' is employed in the study to distinguish
it from foreign capital, a distinction that is crucial to the dissertation's main argument. The
discussion that follows takes into account the different segments of domestic capital where relevant.
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2.	 National FDI Regimes and the AIA
Investment regimes in the core ASEAN countries comprise at least seven categories in
which restrictions or differential treatment of foreign over national investors can be
maintained. These seven categories cover (a) sectors open to investment, (b) equity
ownership, (c) fiscal incentives, (d) taxation, (e) banking and fmancial regulations, (f)
employment conditions and (g) land ownership. 4 While the first category is relevant to the
AJA market access offer, the rest of the six categories are relevant to the national
treatment issue. If significant conditions or restrictions were imposed on foreign investors
compared to national investors in one or more of these categories, then the AIA proposal
to accord national treatment privileges to ASEAN investors ahead of foreign investors
would be significant.
2.1	 Thailand
During the 1990s, Thailand's investment regime was governed by two pieces of
legislation. The Investment Promotion Act of 1977 (revised in 1992) outlined all
incentives available to both Thai national and foreign investors in priority investment
sectors while the 1972 Alien Business Law (ABL-72) provided guidelines on foreign
equity participation. The latter was especially restrictive, and long subject to demands
from foreign business for its review or repea1. 5 ABL-72 protected 63 business categories
across a range of sectors in manufacturing, services, commerce, agriculture, transportation
and construction from full and/or majority foreign participation, unless export conditions
and/or promoted status were fulfilled. 6 Under the Thai Land Code, foreign investors were
not permitted to purchase land unless operating in a priority sector, although limited 30-
4 These categories are described fully in ASEAN Secretariat (1998b: 1-3).
5 The Nation, 'Pressure grows to end Alien Business Law', 12 December 1997.
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year leases were allowed. Investors generally prefer longer periods of lease for security of
tenure, with 99-year leases being the norm in industrial countries, while owned land is
useful as collateral for local borrowing provided it is permitted (Thomsen, 1999: 21).
When the AIA was initially adopted, these restrictions on foreign investments were in
force under ABL-72. This made the AIA distinction between a national/ASEAN investor
and a foreign investor significant.
In March 2000, ABL-72 was replaced by the Foreign Business Act of 1999, which
liberalised conditions for foreign investment in Thailand.' It reduced the number of
business sectors restricted to foreign participation from 63 to 42, allowed greater access to
foreign majority ownership in Thai industries, and offered liberal land leases of 50 years,
renewable for a further 50 years.' On the other hand, restrictions on foreign participation
remained in many sectors including agriculture and services, particularly computer and
electronics services while new, more restrictive investment rules were introduced to
tighten the conditions under which foreign business operated in Thailand.9 For instance,
ABL-72 expanded the definition of 'foreign' business to include ventures in which
foreigners exercised virtual management control despite owning less than 50 per cent
equity.io
The 1999 Foreign Business Act, thus, continued to make the AIA distinction between
foreign and ASEAN investors a significant one indeed, particularly in the non-
6 ABL-72 restricted foreign equity to 49 per cent unless a 50 per cent export condition was met.
Majority foreign ownership was allowed in priority activities, however, but again, this required 50
per cent or more of the output to be exported.
7 Information on the Foreign Business Act 1999 was obtained from the website of the Thailand
Board of Investment (www.boi.gov.th).
s See The Nation, 'Wider access to trades, land', 26 August 1998.
9 According to Paisan Kumanwisai, panel chaiman of the Senate committee for vetting aliens. See
The Nation, 'Alien business law', 19 June 1999.
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manufacturing sector. Many of the restricted activities under the new Thai law fell under
the AIA categories of forestry, fishing, mining, agricultural activities and in services
'incidental' to manufacturing. While ASEAN investments in these non-manufacturing
sectors were to be accorded AIA privileges only in 2010, the point to note is that the AIA
distinction between ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors had not become irrelevant under
the new investment law. Then Thai Deputy Prime Minister Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi had
also insisted that any new law replacing ABL-72 would not accord national treatment to
foreign investors despite the latter's strong preference for it."
Moreover, the new, populist government of Prime Minister Thalcsin Shinawatra elected in
January 2001 began to show signs that it was considering tightening the conditions of
foreign participation in the economy, especially in still protected sectors like insurance,
finance, and even in heavy industries like stee1. 12 Thaksin's promise to the Federation of
Thai Industries in February 2001 to amend laws that "work against Thai interests" and for
Thailand to cease being a "slave to the world" won the new government much political
support." It reflected the anti-western and anti-globalisation mood in the country, which
was a response to the extensive liberalisation undertaken by the previous Chuan
government both unilaterally as well as under the conditions imposed by the IMF in its
bailout package for Thailand during the financial crisis. Given the substantial public and
domestic business criticism that had been directed against the Foreign Business Act during
its formulation stage, 14 it remains to be seen whether the liberal provisions in the Act are
maintained, particularly since the Act itself allows for an annual review process.
ABL-72 had only considered businesses in which foreigners held more than 50 per cent equity to
be alien or foreign businesses.
"The Nation, 'Thailand to offer 100% bank equity', 3 December 1997.
12 FEER, `Thaksin turns back the clock', 19 April 2001.
13 Ibid
14 The Nation, 'Officials told to explain need to amend laws', 26 November 1998.
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2.2	 Malaysia
Malaysia has maintained a liberal FDI regime in manufacturing since the mid-1980s, the
only significant restrictions being those on foreign equity ownership. Nevertheless,
majority and full foreign ownership is permitted provided certain export conditions are
fulfilled. I5 The Promotion of Investments Act (1986) that liberalised the FDI regime after
the 1985 recession allows full foreign ownership in manufacturing provided more than 80
per cent of production is exported, while majority foreign ownership is allowed if more
than half the produced output is exported. As in Thailand, the presence of these
restrictions on foreign ownership made the AIA clause offering earlier national treatment
to ASEAN investors potentially significant.
During the fmancial crisis, the Malaysian government temporarily relaxed foreign
investment rules, as did the other ASEAN countries. I6 While the more relaxed FDI regime
initially applied to investments made between 31 July 1998 and 31 December 2000, it was
later extended until the end of 2003, subject to further review!' Despite these changes to
FDI rules, equity restrictions remained in several categories of manufacturing activitiesI8
to protect the operations of small and medium-scale Malaysian-owned enterprises that
dominated these activities and that had the potential to act as suppliers to the larger MNCs.
Many were, in fact, already doing so. These activities were also likely to be attractive to
national investors from the other ASEAN counties.
15 See Malaysia (1998).
16 See Table 2.6 in Chapter 2.
17 Information on Malaysian investment policy is available on the website of the Malaysian
Industrial Development Authority, the country's investment agency (www.mida.gov.my ).
18 See ASEAN Secretariat (1998b: 34-40).
168
Equity restrictions also remained in many service sectors, including in banking where the
30 per cent cap on foreign equity remained sacrosanct despite pressures arising from the
financial crisis to raise the equity ceiling. Malaysia also maintained restrictions on the
amount that foreign investors could borrow from domestic banking sources (ASEAN
Secretariat, 1998b: 78). This particular restriction on domestic borrowing was especially
likely to hinder investment from medium-scale enterprises from the ASEAN countries. As
such, the AIA commitment to offer earlier market access and national treatment to
ASEAN investors was a significant gesture, particularly if the temporary relaxation in
equity and market access restrictions is not extended after 2003.
2.3	 The Philippines
The 1987 Omnibus Investment Code substantially liberalised the FDI regime in the
Philippines, allowing up to 100 per cent foreign equity in priority sectors. Although the
1991 Foreign Investment Act further liberalised investment rules (McFarlane, 1998: 163;
Austria, 1998: 80), the government continued to maintain equity limits and other
conditions on foreign investors as part of the 'Filipino First' clause of the Constitution
(Thomsen, 1999: 21). Full foreign equity ownership was permitted in all manufacturing
activities open to foreign investors, 19 provided at least 60 per cent of output was exported.
Otherwise a 40 per cent foreign equity limit was imposed, or 65 per cent in the iron and
steel sector (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998b: 49-51). The provision of investment incentives
was also dependent on equity conditions (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998b: 50). Non-Filipino
companies were required to become Filipino companies within 30 years by reducing the
foreign ownership ratio to less than 40 per cent. Companies that exported all their output
19 Although progressively shortened throughout the 1990s, a negative list of activities either closed
to foreign participation or in which only limited foreign participation is permitted, was maintained.
Austria (1998: 111-15) lists these restricted sectors/activities.
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were exempted from the divestment requirement, however (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998b:
35).
As for land ownership, only Filipino companies, and/or companies with at least 60 per
cent domestic equity were allowed to own land (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998b: 101).20
Otherwise, foreign investors were permitted to lease land for 50 years. Although former
President Joseph Estrada (1998-2001) proposed to remove all restrictions on foreign
ownership of land and utilities, substantial domestic opposition prevented such a move.
Even Estrada's predecessor, Fidel Ramos (1992-98) who had presided over extensive
neoliberal reform of the Philippine economy, opposed offering parity of equity rights to
foreign nationals (Bolongaita, Jr, 2000: 69). Thus, the Philippine FDI regime maintained
significant restrictions on foreign investment ownership and participation in the economy.
This meant that the AIA distinction between national, and thus ASEAN investors on the
one hand, and foreign investors on the other was significant, provided Philippine
nationalistic sentiments were not also directed at investors from the other ASEAN
countries.
2.4	 Indonesia
The FDI regime in Indonesia was liberalised from 1985, albeit gradually to avoid arousing
nationalistic sentiments over control by foreign interests of national economic resources.
As in the Philippines, the Indonesian Constitution, specifically Article 33, mandates state
control over key economic sectors (Borsuk, 1999: 144-47). Extensive liberalisation was
introduced in 1994 in which the divestment clause requiring foreign equity to be reduced
to below 50 per cent within 15 years was eliminated, although with certain conditions
attached. Also, nine previously closed strategic sectors in services, industry, and utilities
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were opened to foreign investment through joint venture operations (Pangestu and Azis,
1994: 21). Full foreign ownership was permitted with few conditions attached while the
minimum Indonesian national equity required for joint ventures was reduced to 5 per cent
from 20 per cent (Negara, 1998: 12).
Furthermore, the IMF restructuring programme adopted as a result of the financial crisis
removed all foreign investment restrictions in the wholesale and retail trade from March
1998, two sectors that had remained untouched by earlier deregulation packages
(Soesastro and Basri, 1998: 24). Nevertheless, significant restrictions on land ownership
remained, which restricted foreign corporations to owning only the buildings for a
maximum period of 50 years (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998b: 100-101). Apart from this, the
FDI regime in Indonesia was fairly liberal, making the MA distinction between foreign
and ASEAN investors somewhat irrelevant in the Indonesian case.
2.5	 Singapore and the other ASEAN countries
Singapore maintained a liberal FDI regime, with virtually no restrictions on foreign
ownership of Singapore corporations except for national security reasons and in certain
industries like banking, shipping, airlines and the utilities. Brunei also maintained a
relatively liberal FDI regime. The new members of ASEAN — Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos,
and Cambodia — generally treated foreign investors better than national investors when
offering incentives and in taxation (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998b: 48, 64), making the AIA
distinction between ASEAN and foreign investors irrelevant. While their foreign equity
policies were often far more liberal than those in the core ASEAN countries, these
governments maintained fairly stringent restrictions on land ownership and leasing, while
domestic borrowing was generally not permitted (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998b: 100-101). In
20 Foreign firms establishing joint ventures with the National Development Council can own land.
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these areas, the AIA clause with regard to foreign versus ASEAN investors was, therefore,
significant.
2.6	 National FDI Regimes and the Foreign-ASEAN Distinction in the ALA
The above survey of FDI regimes in the core ASEAN countries reveals that foreign
investors faced particular restrictions when investing in these countries despite the overall
liberal FDI climate. These restrictions ranged from equity ownership conditions, market
access to certain sectors, land ownership regulations and access to domestic sources of
finance, although the restrictions were not identical across the different countries. These
restrictions made the AIA offer of national treatment and market access to ASEAN
investors ahead of foreign investors significant indeed.
The further liberalisation of FDI regimes in the manufacturing sector, particularly in
Thailand and Indonesia, as a result of the financial crisis somewhat weakened the
distinction between foreign and national/ASEAN investors although it did not completely
remove it. Malaysia's crisis-driven liberalisation was undertaken on a temporary basis,
indicating that the foreign-national distinction in investment remained crucial. For the core
ASEAN countries, the AIA distinction between ASEAN and foreign investors appears to
be most relevant in the category, services 'incidental' to manufacturing, forestry,
apiculture, mining, and fisheries, although market access and national treatment
privileges to ASEAN investors in these sectors were only to be accorded from 2010.
The very fact that the ASEAN governments chose to emphasise the distinction between
ASEAN and foreign investors in the AIA is itself significant, irrespective of later
developments in FDI regimes and in implementation. It is this that requires explanation,
given that AFTA had become a key instrument to direct global investment capital to the
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ASEAN region. This chapter suggests that the answer lies in the way certain governments
in ASEAN interpreted particular global developments in terms of their impact on the
future of domestic capital, especially those segments of domestic capital that had close ties
to the political elite and were important in sustaining elite rule. The rest of the chapter
elaborates on these arguments.
3.	 Multilateral Trade Rules and ASEAN Interpretations of Globalisation
Aside from the pressures generated by the increasing mobility and changing patterns of
global FDI flows, globalisation also manifested itself during the 1990s through the
structural changes that were taking place in the multilateral trading system. As discussed
in Chapter 1, the 1990s witnessed the growing emphasis placed by advanced country
governments on negotiating multilateral rules to govern 'beyond the border' barriers to
free trade, which had the potential to markedly weaken the discretionary authority of
governments on key aspects of domestic policy (Smythe, 2000: 75). Moreover, these
developments were not merely taking place at the WTO, they were also being considered
in regional forums such as APEC and the OECD, especially in the area of investment
rules.
3.1 Multilateral rules: creating a level playing field for foreign/global corporations
The Uruguay Round agreements, and since then the WTO, had significant implications for
FDI, although no explicit set of rules governing FDI per se has so far been adopted. While
the TRIMS Agreement was limited to regulating investment measures that had trade
effects, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) brought the issue of market
access and national treatment for foreign investors to the forefront of global trade
negotiations (Gibbs, 1997: 189). The national treatment principle was, however, watered
down substantially in the GATS due to strong objections from developing country
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governments (WTO Secretariat, 1999). WTO members were, nevertheless, expected to
reconsider the issue during the new round of trade negotiations scheduled for 2000 as well
as the possibility of including investment under WTO rules.21
While the TRIMS did not sanction the right of foreign firms to market access and national
treatment, it was clear that global TNCs were interested in just such guarantees (Sell,
2000: 179-80). TNCs from the industrial world were increasingly keen on developing
global rules that would maximise their freedom of operation globally (Smythe, 2000: 72).
Industrial country governments, led by the US, backed these demands and, in 1991,
instructed the OECD to begin discussions on a more comprehensive investment regime
that also included the national treatment principle. The US had turned to the OECD
because of the difficulties that had been encountered in negotiating the TRIMS agreement
at the GATT (Smythe, 2000: 78-79). The target, nevertheless, was to develop a new global
regime in which non-OECD members would participate, since it was in the non-OECD
countries that foreign corporations faced the most restrictions when investing.
The OECD began formal negotiations on a multilateral agreement on investment (MAT) in
1995, which was to be open to accession by non-OECD countries. The MAT advocated
national treatment, the right of entry and establishment of foreign investment, the right to
full equity ownership, as well as national treatment rights in privatisation (Khor, 2001: 86-
87). The EU countries in particular wanted the MAT to eventually migrate to the WTO to
enable trade leverage to be used in disciplining governments and resolving disputes over
the free movement of investment (Smythe, 2000: 80). Although the MAI was eventually
shelved in 1998 due to disagreements among OECD members as well as strong opposition
from non-governmental groups representing labour and the environment, it generated
21 FEER, 'The heat is on', 21 May 1998.
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enormous controversy in the developing world, including in ASEAN. The MAI episode
clearly revealed to ASEAN policymakers the rising interest among industrial country
governments and global corporations in introducing global rules to guarantee the free
movement of investment in the world economy.22
The investment issue was also pursued in APEC, though with only partial success.
Although the grouping's developing country members were opposed to adopting a binding
trade and investment liberalisation agreement, the United States, backed by Canada,
Australia and New Zealand, succeeded in getting APEC members to adopt a set of
investment principles that included national treatment. Developing country member
governments, however, ensured that the investment code was non-binding on members
(APEC, 1994). Importantly for the argument developed in this dissertation, this episode
signalled to the ASEAN countries the keen interest of industrial country governments and
the TNCs in negotiating global investment rules.
Although investment was kept firmly off the negotiating agenda in the WTO by a group of
developing countries, led by India and Brazil and including Malaysia and Indonesia, it was
not certain that this state of affairs would continue. WTO members had agreed as a
compromise to study the issue further and had set up a working group on investment in
1996. Its brief was not only to study the trade-investment nexus more carefully it was also
to assess the feasibility of incorporating investment into the WTO. Many governments
regarded the reprieve as only temporary, particularly since the WTO was scheduled to
review and re-negotiate the TRIMS in 2000 (Sell, 2000: 182). The expectation was that it
was only a matter of time before such guarantees to foreign investors were written into the
22 Interview via e-mail with Mr Ong Hong Cheong, retired senior analyst in the Bureau of
International Economics, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, May
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WTO regime.23 These expectations were not misplaced. 24 In 1998, the WTO General
Council decided that the Working Group on Investment should continue its work until the
Seattle ministerial meeting in 2000 when members would decide on whether to
incorporate investment within the WT0. 25 The European Commission was particularly
interested in ensuring that the national treatment principle formed a key part of any future
WTO regime on investment (Khor, 2001: 87). 26 The issue of investment rules was clearly
a lasting concern, with global firms and their parent governments continuing to sustain the
issue.
3.2	 The ASEAN Position and Response
Most of the ASEAN countries rejected the idea of a global regime for investment when it
first became clear in the early and mid-1990s that many industrial country governments
were considering such a project.27 Malaysia especially was opposed to the notion of
national treatment. Trade minister Rafidah Aziz rejected the demand for
"free movement of investment across national borders and for national treatment,
... [which] will remove the right of national governments to implement national
level investment policies which may either restrict a foreign presence in certain
sectors, or which may provide preferential treatment to national firms to enable
them to grow and be able to compete with large established foreign firms".28
Indonesia also formally outlined its objections to the inclusion of investment in the WTO
by jointly submitting a petition together with Malaysia and six other developing countries
on the matter.29
2001.
23 Khor (2001: 86).
24 Also see Business Times, 'A multilateral investment pact?' 1 February 1996.
25 From the Report of the W7'0 General Council Meeting 1998. See WTO (1998). All reports and
minutes of General Council meetings are available at the WTO website (www.wto.org ). The Seattle
Ministerial was abandoned due to disruptions by anti-globalisation protestors.
26 Also see The Nation, 'Global battle on trade continues 50 years later', 18 May 1998.
27 Business Times, 'Lengthy agenda for ASEAN meet', 10 September 1996.
28 Business Times, 'Malaysia against restrictive investment rules: Rafidah', 10 July 1996.
29 Business Times, 'Malaysia, seven others jointly oppose new WTO rules', 5 November 1996.
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Thailand initially rejected the idea of a global investment agreement. 3° After the financial
crisis, however, the Thai Cabinet agreed to support the adoption of a broad trade and
investment agreement at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, provided issues like
investment incentives, dispute settlement between governments and private business, and
national treatment principles were excluded. 31 Although Thai support was for a more
limited agreement, compared to the more comprehensive MM, the government was, no
doubt, responding to the country's need to remain attractive to FDI in the face of loss of
investor confidence in Thailand. Singapore was more sympathetic to the idea of a global
investment regime.32
Although practically all the core ASEAN countries rejected the idea of a global investment
regime that would include the principle of national treatment, the concerns were strongest
in Indonesia and especially Malaysia as already noted, and were centred on the future of
domestic firms. 33 These concerns were reflected in the presence of a parallel discourse in
these countries that interpreted globalisation in a somewhat different way from that in the
competitiveness discourse although it did not entirely reject the notion of competitiveness.
3.3	 Interpretations of Globalisation and Competitiveness
Although for the most part globalisation was interpreted in a positive manner in ASEAN,
as a process through which national economies could participate in global wealth creating
activities that would benefit national society, other interpretations and discourses were
also evident. The primary discourse, emphasising competitiveness, continued to focus on
313 Business Times, 'Thais not ready for EU pact', 12 March 1996.
31 The Nation, 'Cabinet to set stance on WTO issues', 20 November 1999.
32 See footnote 30.
33 Ong Hong Cheong confirms this point in the case of Malaysia.
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the importance of adopting neoliberal economic reforms in order to adjust to globalisation
(Soesastro, 1998). In Malaysia and Indonesia, a parallel, sometimes competing, discourse
was also present that deviated from the neoliberal competitiveness/globalisation discourse
in that it focused on the possible demise of domestic firms as a result of having to compete
with well established foreign TNCs. The competing discourse became especially
pronounced during the time of the debates and moves in the OECD, the EU and the WTO
to inscribe global investment rules.
Competing discourses of globalisation and competitiveness: Malaysia and Indonesia
While the competing discourse on globalisation in Malaysia and Indonesia did not reject
the idea of competitiveness per se, it stressed another means by which competitiveness
could be achieved. Notably, it focused on the key role of governments in nurturing
domestic firms through preferential policies as a means of enabling them to develop into
firms capable of competing with the larger TNCs in the global market. It thus reflected
developmental ideas.
In Malaysia, Dr Mahathir, the Prime Minister, had largely shaped discourses on
globalisation, which by the mid-1990s had become a common part of the Malaysian
political and economic scene (Welsh, 1999: 272). The centralisation of power in the office
of the Prime Minister coupled with the personal authority that he largely enjoyed, at least
until the financial crisis, meant that his ideas and interpretations generally prevailed and
were translated into official policy. What was most notable about Malaysian discourses on
globalisation was the embrace of only parts of the globalisation message associated with
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the Washington Consensus.34 Other aspects were redefined or re-interpreted, again largely
by the Prime Minister, while ideas pertaining to liberal notions of politics that were
advocated by western governments, especially the US, were rejected.
In the Vision 2020 document of 1990, which laid the foundation of the Prime Minister's
attitudes and responses to globalisation and his strategies to achieve developed country
status for Malaysia, the neoliberal message of markets, competition and competitiveness
was explicit. Mahathir's aim was to "secure the establishment of a competitive economy
... that is subjected to the full discipline and rigour of market forces" (Mahathir, 1990: 3).
The Prime Minister also appeared to accept the nature of global market competition when
he commented that "entry into the world market pits our companies against all comers and
subjects them to the full force of international competition...a challenge we must accept
..." (Mahathir, 1990: 9). As already noted, the adoption of policies of deregulation,
privatisation and liberalisation in Malaysia were consistent with these ideas and
interpretations.
Despite the emphasis on competitiveness, other concerns were never ignored, only de-
emphasised. By 1996, however, the Prime Minister's long-held concerns about the
inequalities in the global economy re-surfaced in the discourses associated with
globalisation. The timing of his re-interpretation of globalisation, even before the financial
crisis hit Malaysia, was linked to the flurry of activity at the OECD on the MAT, the move
to embrace new issues in the WTO, and the pressure on Malaysia to make better market
opening offers in the GATS financial services negotiations. At the Sixth G-15 Summit in
Harare in November 1996, the Prime Minister pointed out that "in the name of
34 The Washington Consensus refers to a set of orthodox economic ideas that advocate, among
other things, trade and investment liberalisation, deregulation as well as privatisation as a way to
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globalisation, developing countries have been called upon to account for many things, be it
the environment, labour standards, investment laws, financial services, or other
development issues". 35 Mahathir also began enunciating the view that globalisation was a
threat to developing countries in general, and their firms in particular. 36 This interpretation
became increasingly pronounced since the 1997 financial crisis. The competing discourse
also drew attention to the emergence of huge corporations and banks that dominated
economies everywhere through having acquired or absorbed small companies and banks,
particularly in the developing world (Mahathir, 1998: 111). The concern with growth
through embracing neoliberal policies was, from the mid-1990s, also confronted by the
concern with building up domestic firms.
In Indonesia, three competing discourses were evident during the 1990s. All three shared
the same perception of globalisation as an inevitable economic force, which Indonesia
needed to cope with or "survive" (Rinaldt and Soesastro, 1998: 193). These three
discourses, nevertheless, viewed competitiveness and how to achieve it through different
lenses. Although neoliberal ideas about competitiveness appeared to be dominant,
seemingly reflected in the trade and investment liberalisation undertaken during the mid-
1990s, neoliberal policies were essentially limited to the external sector. Reforms to
deregulate the domestic economy, increase market competition and privatise state
enterprises were far more limited, reflecting not only the particularistic interests of the
politically well-connected but also competing concerns in Indonesia with nurturing
domestic capital.
achieving competitiveness and maximising economic welfare (Williamson, 1994).
35 Speech to the Inaugural Plenary of the Sixth G-15 Summit made on behalf of the Asian members
of the G-15, in Harare, Zimbabwe on 3 November 1996. Available on the website of the Prime
Minister's Department, Malaysia (www.smpke.ipm.my ).
36 Mahathir's speech on `Globalisation — what it means to small nations', quoted in Welsh (1999:
273).
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The discourse of the economic nationalists emphasised the importance of economic reform
to meet the competitive challenges of globalisation, but advocated state intervention to
protect strategic industries and sectors from foreign domination and for governments to
help leapfrog technological development (Murphy, 1999: 235). Minister of Research and
Technology, B.J. Habibie, later Suharto's Vice-President in 1998 and subsequently
Indonesian President for a year until late 1999, was the most prominent proponent of these
ideas. These ideas resonated with many Indonesians, who regarded a state-controlled
economic system to be sacrosanct under the country's Constitution (Rinakit and Soesastro,
1998: 196). Moreover, the nationalists were also concerned with the dominance of the
Indonesian economy by ethnic Chinese Indonesian business (Borsuk, 1999: 142).
The discourse of the economic populists, like that of the liberals and the nationalists also
emphasised economic restructuring, but the populists saw a crucial role for the state in
nurturing small and medium-scale, indigenous businesses and the rural economy, rather
than large, strategic industries. Like the nationalists, the populists, the most notable of
whom was Adi Sasono of the Muslim Intellectuals Association, were also concerned by
the dominant position of ethnic Chinese Indonesian capital, which the populists believed
had thrived under the liberal economic policies of the government (Murphy, 1999: 235).
Thus, the populists were in favour of an affirmative action programme similar to that in
Malaysia to upgrade the economic position of the majority indigenous population
(Murphy, 1999: 247).
Although the conventional wisdom in the literature is that neoliberal policies were adopted
in Indonesia due to the dominant position in the bureaucracy and government of liberal
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technocrats,37 this became less salient as the 1990s wore on. By 1994, President Suharto
had appointed many economic nationalists to his cabinet, until then dominated by liberal
technocrats (Borsuk, 1999: 140-43). As Section 4 below shows, policymakers increasingly
embraced the idea that deregulation and liberalisation could be strategically integrated
with state-driven industrial policy to help develop domestic industrial and commercial
capabilities (Robison, 1997: 53). The concern with nurturing domestic capital was clearly
reflected in these discourses, and ultimately in policy.
Thailand and the Philippines
Although competing discourses of globalisation challenging its purported beneficial
effects were present in Thailand and the Philippines, constructed largely by non-
governmental organisations, the powerful liberal technocrats in these respective
governments continued to emphasise a conventional neoliberal policy agenda of growth
and international competitiveness (Chantana, 1998: 271-4; Gochoco-Bautista, 1998: 222).
In both countries, the technocrats were supported by outward-oriented big business,
especially in Thailand. In the Philippines, the neoliberal economic agenda was supported
by the significant constituency that had emerged by the 1990s that advocated economic
reform in order to challenge the power of the old landed oligarchy (Hutchison, 1997).
Nevertheless, departures from neoliberal policies, including in AFTA, were not
uncommon in the Philippines, driven by particularistic business interests with substantial
political influence. Departures from liberal economic policies and from AFTA were less
evident in Thailand, due to the powerful coalition of interests — technocrats and urban-
based big business — in favour of the neoliberal agenda (Krongkaew, 1997: 33-35).
37 This is Stubbs' argument (Stubbs, 2000).
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4.	 Using the AIA to Help Domestic Capital Face Global Market Competition
The ASEAN countries sought to respond to the potential changes in the multilateral
trading system in two ways. One was to jointly accelerate liberalisation in services and
investment ahed of the WTO as a way of further distinguishing AFTA from other
potential sites as a region of investment and production in both the manufacturing and
services sectors. The ASEAN governments were, thus, engaged in a continuous game to
differentiate the ASEAN/AFTA regional market in an environment where investment sites
were seemingly becoming identical at the policy level.
The second response of governments to developments at the multilateral level, especially
in Malaysia and Indonesia, was to advocate the provision of preferential investment
treatment for ASEAN firms in the AFTA regional market. The idea was to nurture
domestic capital to enable it to meet global competition eventually, particularly before
multilateral rules required the full opening up of national economies to foreign firms. The
AIA component of AFTA offered just such an opportunity, without necessarily
jeopardising the role of the CEPT component in attracting FDI. These governments were,
therefore, sufficiently realistic not to adopt inward-looking policies that restricted or
rejected FDI, with both governments remaining committed to FDI and to open regionalism
in the CEPT.
Thus, Article 3 of the AIA lists as one of its objectives, "increasing the flow of
investments into ASEAN from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources" (ASEAN,
1998d).38 This was related to the more urgent goal of encouraging the development of
ASEAN conglomerates through joint ventures or other forms of alliances between
ASEAN investors. A senior Malaysian trade official acknowledged that the AIA was
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designed not only to increase the inflow of FDI into the region it was also aimed at
"developing and helping ASEAN investors". 39 A senior official from the ASEAN
Secretariat explained that "the ASEAN countries saw the need to develop regional MNCs
using the grace period before foreign (non-ASEAN) investors would be accorded the same
privileges".40 In other words, the AIA incorporated developmental features in its design of
regionalism.
4.1	 The Lure of Large Domestic Firms and ASEAN Multinationals
During the three years of discussions and consultations on the AIA, the issue of whether to
accord preferential treatment to ASEAN investors over all other foreign investors emerged
as a key point of discussion. At these meetings, the point was made that privileging
ASEAN investors would be difficult to justify on economic grounds, since foreign TNCs
possessed the strategic assets that the ASEAN countries required in order to participate in
increasingly sophisticated global production (Chia, 1996: 20). Nevertheless, it was also
acknowledged that preferential treatment of ASEAN investors could stimulate intra-
ASEAN investments and facilitate the emergence and growth of indigenous 'ASEAN
multinationals, which were necessary "to compete in a world economy increasingly
characterised by globalisation and competition" (Chia, 1996: 21).41
ASEAN leaders and policymakers were broadly united on the importance of domestic
firms becoming large and/or multinational as a means of meeting global market
38 Author's emphasis.
39 Interview with Mr Razak Ramli in Malaysia, August 2000.
4° Interview with Dr Wee Kee Hwee of the ASEAN Secretariat.
41 It should be noted that a joint-venture firm involving both domestic/ASEAN and foreign equity
would be entitled to the AIA privileges accorded to an 'ASEAN' investor if its equity structure
allowed it to be categorised as a domestic investor by the laws of the host country. This rather
flexible principle was meant to encourage joint ventures between domestic and foreign firms that
would, it was hoped, stimulate technology transfer between the foreign and domestic firm.
Discussion with Dr Suthad Setboonsang, then ASEAN Deputy Secretary General.
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competition. The Singapore government's 'Local Enterprises 2000' strategy, first
enunciated in the country's 1991 Strategic Economic Plan, proposed to groom a group of
promising local enterprises over the next ten years to become the MNCs of the future
(Wong and Ng, 1997: 136). Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, noting the intense
competition that ASEAN firms were facing from global firms, also suggested strategic
partnerships as a means to face such competition. 42 President Suharto advocated large and
medium-sized firms for Indonesia for similar reasons.43 On the one hand, this may well
reflect Suharto's need to justify the regime's preferential treatment of the conglomerates
of his ethnic Chinese allies and family members. On the other hand, Suharto was
supportive of his Research and Technology Minister, B.J. Habibie's plans to develop
large, technologically advanced firms as a means for Indonesia to leap-frog technology
development and join the ranks of the advanced industrial economies (Mardjana, 1999:
51). The private sector also echoed these sentiments. The President of the ASEAN
Business Forum agreed that "we are too small to go out and fight with the Fortune 500
companies",44 while the Thai private sector urged its government to support the creation of
regional Thai firms.45
4.2	 Malaysia: The Main Proponent
Malaysia was especially vocal in advocating large enterprises as a means of facing global
competition, emphasising in particular the idea that ASEAN multinationals or
conglomerates would be best able to weather global market competition rather than
smaller firms. It was the Prime Minister's belief that only products from large firms would
42 Straits Times, 9 October 1996.
43 Bulletin KADIN Indonesia. (Bulletin of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry),
No. 11/XIII, 30 September 1995.
44 Business Times, 'ASEAN firms urged to tap potential in region', 19 March 1997.
45 The Nation, 'Regionalism scope needed under AFTA', 21 August 1997.
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be able to penetrate the world market. 46 Thus, Mahathir advocated using the state to assist
"small and medium industries ... to grow bigger", for all Malaysian firms to become
"sturdy and strong" and be able to "take on the world" (Khoo, 1995: 330).
Comments since the early 1990s by senior officials of the Economic Planning Unit, the
foremost economic policymaking agency in the country, revealed the growing emphasis
placed on nurturing domestic capital and the extent of official discomfort with the
county's overwhelming reliance on FDI. A senior official from the Unit noted that "FDI
cannot be relied upon to build up an indigenous base, which is required for long-term
sustainable industrialisation ... building up indigenous industries, owned and controlled
by Malaysians is more complex but is more important in the long run". 47 The head of the
Unit in 1992 explained that the thrust of economic policy over the next few decades would
be "the creation of Malaysia's own multinationals and global companies" (Ali, 1992).
Thus, it was not surprising to find that Malaysia was the main advocate of the clause in the
AIA offering ASEAN investors market access and national treatment privileges ahead of
foreign investors.48
The Malaysian government saw the AIA as an opportunity for national companies to grow
and develop their industrial and commercial capabilities by exploiting the investment
privileges the investment agreement would accord them in the regional market compared
to foreign investors. 49 Trade minister, Rafidah Aziz advocated regional level mergers and
acknowledged that discussions had been held among ASEAN policymakers on how to
46 Business Times, 'Only large enterprises can compete globally', 29 April 1997.
47 Comment by Abdullah Tahir, quoted in Felker (1998: 247).
48 Interview with Mr Karun Kittisatapom, Director-General of the Business Economics
Department, Ministry of Commerce, Thailand in August 2000.
49 See the comment by a senior Malaysian investment official in Business Times, 'Don't ask for
many exemptions, industries told', 26 March 1999.
186
encourage national firms to form large ASEAN conglomerates to exploit regional market
opportunities as well as to compete effectively in the global market, including in service
sectors. 50 Rafidah also suggested the possibility of an ASEAN financing mechanism, such
as a Pan-ASEAN Export-Import (EXIM) Bank to provide financial backing for ASEAN
conglomerates in their regional operations. 51 Of the other core ASEAN countries, only the
Indonesian government explicitly supported the Malaysian position. In October 1998,
Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Ginandjar Kartasasmita endorsed the Malaysian
suggestion of using the AIA to develop ASEAN multinationals and conglomerates that
would be globally competitive.52
Although policymakers in Thailand found the privileging of ASEAN investors in the AIA
to be contradictory to AFTA's role as an instrument to attract FDI to ASEAN, 53 neither
Thailand nor Singapore rejected the Malaysian suggestion. 54 There were no disputes in
ASEAN over the AIA, unlike the very vocal and public disputes over petrochemicals,
agriculture and automobiles. The regional financial crisis, however, drew attention to the
contradictions inherent in AFTA between privileging ASEAN investors and attracting
foreign investors from outside the ASEAN region. The ASEAN Secretary General was
somewhat critical of the distinction the AIA made between ASEAN and non-ASEAN
investors in view of the urgent need to boost FDI flows to the region as a result of the
financial crisis. 55 A senior Thai investment official also expected the crisis to force the
ASEAN governments to play down the intra-region investment area and focus on
50 New Straits Times, 'Set up ASEAN consortiums, urges Rafidah', 13 March 1997; and Business
Times, `Bumi economic shares won't fall', 11 April 1998.
51 Business Times, 'ASEAN to boost liberalisation, address dwindling FDI', 10 October 1998.
52 Bisnis Indonesia (Indonesian Business), 10 October 1998.
53 Interview with Mr Karun Kittisataporn of Thailand.
54 Follow-up interview with Ms Lim Bee Suan of the Singapore Trade Development Board,
conducted via e-mail in June 2001.
55 Business Times, 'ASEAN cuts deeper into trade, investment barriers', 8 March 1993.
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strategies to attract FDI from outside the ASEAN region. 56 Nevertheless, the distinction in
the AIA between ASEAN and foreign investors remains at the time of writing. Moreover,
even if the distinction were temporarily shelved or eventually removed, the fact that this
form of regionalism was even contemplated requires explanation.
5. Domestic Capital in the Domestic Political Economy of the ASEAN Countries
Malaysian and Indonesian responses to the AIA, specifically the privileging of
domestic/ASEAN investors, lay in the key role played by domestic capital in these
societies, particularly their political role. Although Thailand and Singapore did not
actively champion such a clause in the AIA, the absence of any challenge from these
countries on the issue needs to be explained. As the following discussion shows, the
Malaysian move to privilege ASEAN investors in the AIA did not contradict the aim of
the Singaporean and Thai governments to create the conditions for Singaporean and Thai
domestic capital to expand through the regional market. These two cases will be dealt with
first before examining the Malaysian and Indonesian cases.57
5.1	 Singapore: Economic Restructuring, Domestic Capital and Regionalisation
The mid-1980s recession led the Singapore government to recognise the vulnerability of
the island economy to global economic upheavals as a result of its over-reliance on FDI,
manufacturing production, and exports to developed markets as well as the lack of
indigenous entrepreneurs (Yeung, 1999: 7). This led to the adoption of a new growth
strategy that emphasised services as a vital growth sector, the expansion of domestic
capital, and regionalisation (Rodan, 1993: 229). While FDI remained important, the
56 Bangkok Post, 'Region's ministers reaffirm plan', 6 March 1999.
57 The Philippine case will not be presented. The overwhelming concern in this country during this
period was whether Philippine business would be able to survive the CEPT and the influx of more
competitive imports from the ASEAN region.
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expansion of domestic capital was regarded as crucial for Singapore's competitiveness
(Yeung, 1999: 8) and as a way to reduce the over-reliance of the economy on external
capital (Singapore, 1993: 3). Regionalisation was aimed at "geographically expanding]
the Singapore economy itself' (Rodan, 1993: 225). The regionalisation strategy not only
emphasised Singapore's role as a springboard for global TNCs locating in Singapore to
operate in the region, it was also regarded as a means of enabling domestic capital to
expand beyond the confines of the limited domestic market (Parsonage, 1994: 1-4; Yeung,
1999: 8).
The novel feature about the new growth strategy was the commitment to facilitate the
expansion of domestic private capital, which was a turnaround for the PAP government
that had governed Singapore since the early 1960s. Singapore's development strategy in
the past had relied heavily on FDI, driven by the PAP government's historical distrust of
the predominantly ethnic Chinese domestic capital. The animosity between the PAP and
Chinese business stemmed from the latter's perceived support for 'Chinese chauvinism'
and left-wing/communist political elements within the PAP during the party's factional
struggle during the turbulent 1960s (Turnbull, 1989). The bias towards foreign capital in
development was compounded by the government's belief that domestic private capital
lacked the capability to engage in efficient production (Parsonage, 1994: 10). Moreover,
state capital had taken on the role of domestic private capital, engaging in a range of
activities in services, heavy industry and high technology activities through government-
linked corporations (GLCs) (Wong and Ng, 1997: 124).
After the 1985 recession, the nurturing of domestic private capital, including the building
up of large domestic corporations, became a priority for the government although it did
not envisage the development of domestic private capital through protectionism. Instead,
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the government's approach was to supply the necessary public goods like human
resources, research and development facilities, and information, as well as fiscal and
financial incentives to support domestic capital in market competition (Singapore, 1991).
The regionalisation drive — Regionalisation 2000 — was a key element in creating the
conditions to enable the expansion of domestic capital. Domestic firms were seen as
natural suppliers and joint venture partners to the GLCs, which had already begun
diversifying their operations to the ASEAN region (Rodan, 1997: 160). The concentration
of domestic private firms in the now critical service sector, particularly in finance and
commerce, reinforced the role of domestic capital in Singapore's future growth. Although
domestic private capital in fmance and manufacturing was already investing abroad since
the late 1980s, largely in the ASEAN region (Yeung, 1999: 12), `Regionalisation 2000'
was an effort to actively encourage and hasten the process. Singapore Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong emphasised that "going regional is part of our long-term strategy to stay ahead.
It is to make our national economy bigger, our companies stronger and some of them
multinationals".58
Moreover, the service sector, emphasised as the new growth sector for the economy, was
heavily reliant on the regional market, which made services inextricably linked to the
regionalisation strategy. The competitive advantage of Singapore service firms also lay in
the regional market (Dicken and Yeung, 1999: 119). Lacking the necessary ownership-
specific advantages to compete with global TNCs in global markets, local service firms
were not keen to venture further afield. This explains why Singapore was keenest among
the ASEAN countries to negotiate services liberalisation within AFTA 59. The
government's recognition of the trend towards unbundling and outsourcing of previously
58 Reproduced in Speeches, May-June 1993: 15.
59 Interview with Mr Rodolfo Severino Jr, Secretary General of ASEAN.
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in-house services such as logistics and information technology services in manufacturing
industry (Singapore, 1998: 38) also explains its desire to include services 'incidental' to
manufacturing and other economic sectors in the AIA. 6° The regionalisation drive required
an active regional diplomacy to negotiate the institutional framework necessary to
facilitate the expansion of domestic capital. The Singapore government's support and
championing of AFTA, thus, needs also to be seen in this light, and not solely because of
AFTA's role in attracting FDI.
The regionalisation drive also brought political benefits to the ruling government. As
already noted in Chapter 3, economic growth was a key component of political legitimacy
for the PAP government. The regionalisation strategy allowed the PAP government to
regenerate the bases of its domestic legitimacy by incorporating domestic capital as a
source of growth. It allowed the PAP government to co-opt the only remaining group —
domestic Chinese business — capable of mounting an independent challenge to the PAP
government (Minchin, 1986). Nevertheless, the dominant governing elite in Singapore
remained the alliance of political, essentially PAP elites and bureaucratic elites together
with state capital. Domestic private capital occupied the position of junior partner despite
its centrality to Singapore's new development strategy, since it relied on government
incentives and assistance for restructuring and regionalisation.
The discussion suggests that the privileging of ASEAN investors in the AIA did not
contradict the interests of the Singapore government. In fact, it benefited Singapore's
economic restructuring strategy based on the expansion of domestic capital through
regionalisation. Although the regional financial crisis prompted a re-think of the
regionalisation strategy, with Singapore opting for a more global strategy to diversify risk
60 Interview with Dr Wee Kee Hwee of the ASEAN Secretariat.
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and avoid 'putting all its eggs into the regional basket', regionalisation remains a key
plank in Singapore's growth strategy for the future (Yeung, 1999: 9).
5.2	 Thailand: Domestic Capital and Overseas Expansion
Thailand has always had a sizeable and active domestic business sector since the late
1950s (Unger, 1995: 78). Although Thailand experienced an FDI boom since 1985,
foreign capital did not overwhelm domestic capital, which also expanded considerably
after 1985 (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995: 156). Most importantly, domestic capital,
particularly urban big business, not only played a key part in the rapid economic growth
experienced by Thailand in the late 1980s it also began to expand overseas.
Overseas expansion by outward-focussed elements of domestic capital, assisted by new
tax incentives, the liberalisation of foreign exchange regulations and the advent of off-
shore banking, was concentrated in forestry, property, telecommunications, finance, and
manufacturing (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995: 166). Domestic firms essentially used the
expertise and resources generated through domestic activities to venture into overseas
markets, including but not exclusively in the ASEAN region. Although this trend was
evident in the manufacturing sector, it was especially notable in services where large
family-based Thai conglomerates dominated (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1998: 28). The
Shinawatra group, the Samart group, the Charoen Pokphand group and the Ucom group,
for instance, ventured overseas to Southeast Asian markets in a variety of activities related
to their core domestic business in telecommunications and information technology.
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Unlike Singapore, Thailand did not have a formal policy to develop domestic capital or a
formal regionalisation policy to support the overseas expansion of Thai private capita1.61
Nevertheless, the government's commitment to AFTA served the interests of the
Bangkok-based business elite, which was in close alliance with the liberal technocrats in
government who advocated open economic policies for Thailand, including regional trade
liberalisation. The relationship between this globally oriented segment of domestic capital
and the government was different from that in the past when business demands had served
narrow, particularistic interests. In the 1990s, globally oriented Thai firms were more
interested in getting the government to provide the necessary public goods — education,
skills development and infrastructure — to keep pace with economic growth. Moreover,
they also depended on the government to manage regional foreign relations in order to
facilitate capital's expansion in the region (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995: 168).
As in the case of Singapore, the importance of AFTA to Thailand should also been seen in
this light, as a mechanism that also benefited the growth of domestic capital, especially the
Bangkok-based business elite. Nevertheless, for the Thai government, the most important
reason for establishing AFTA was to attract FDI. 62
 Despite this, the privileging of ASEAN
investors in the AIA did not necessarily contradict the interests of the state elite nor that of
its business allies since the AIA did not jeopardise the workings of the CEPT, which was
the primary instrument used to attract FDI to the region. More importantly, the MA
benefited Thai capital seeking to venture abroad.
61 Thai policymakers had never been entirely successful in directing industrial development through
industrial policy, unlike in Malaysia or Singapore, due to the fragmentary state structure and
faction-ridden politics in the country (Felker, 1998: 8).
62 Interview with Mr Manasvi Srisodapol, Counsellor in the Department of ASEAN Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand in August 2000.
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5.3	 Indonesia: The Political Salience of Domestic Capital
The support given by Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Coordinating Minister for the Economy in
the Habibie government, for the Malaysian proposal to use the AIA to nurture ASEAN
firms and to develop ASEAN multinationals needs to be seen in the light of Ginandjar's
credentials as an economic nationalist. The economic nationalists, discussed in a previous
section, envisaged a key role for the state in directing markets to achieve particular
national goals, particularly technological development and the nurturing of indigenous
Indonesian capital. Dr Habibie and Ginandjar were both in favour of reducing Indonesian
dependence on foreign technology (Djidin, 1997: 26). Habibie also justified his state-
driven high-technology strategy in terms of enabling Indonesia to quickly move to higher
valued-added production in the face of competition from cheap-labour economies like
China and Vietnam (Brown, 1998: 200). Despite his broad commitment to neoliberal
reforms, Suharto had been attracted to and generally supported Habibie's vision (Borsuk,
1999: 163; Liddle and Mallarangeng, 1997: 174).63 Economic nationalist policies thus
encompassed an economic imperative, emphasising growth though with a strong infant
industry or strategic trade flavour, as well as a political agenda, namely the redistribution
of economic wealth from non-indigenous to indigenous hands. 64 Ginandjar's response to
the Malaysian proposal to employ the AIA to develop domestic capital, and President
Habibie's support of it, need to be seen in this context.
Indonesian domestic capital may be divided into ethnic Chinese capital, indigenous or
pribumi capital, and state capital, all of which were politically salient but for different
reasons. The ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs dominated big business in Indonesia, having
gained their economic fortunes and pre-eminent position in Indonesian business through
63 This was unsurprising, as Suharto was rather ambivalent about the value of free markets, seeing
them only in instrumental terms as a means to deliver regime-legitimating growth.
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connections with politically influential persons, including military elites and especially
President Suharto. Because of their Chinese ethnicity, they occupied a very vulnerable
position in Indonesian society (Robison, 1996: 91). In return for political protection and
economic benefits, the ethnic Chinese conglomerates provided funds to the President,
which he disbursed to selected organisations and individuals in return for political support
(Liddle, 1999: 51). The Chinese were, therefore, a crucial link in Indonesian patronage
politics although they were strongly resented by indigenous Indonesian business
interests, 65 the indigenous Indonesian public, the economic nationalists and the populists.
The President and government were generally sensitive to anti-Chinese sentiment, which
indigenous business exploited (Robison, 1996: 95). The government's support to both
state and indigenous private capital needs to be seen against this background.
State-owned enterprises, some of which were part of the strategic industries programme
initiated by Habibie, constituted a large part of the Indonesian economy during Suharto's
rule, were only partially reformed through privatisation during the 1980s and 1990s,66 and
continue to remain salient in the post-Suharto era. The role of public enterprises as agents
of development is legitimised by Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution, which accords
a primary role to state control of "branches of production essential to the state and
governing the life and living of the public" (Mardjana, 1999: 41). Moreover, public
enterprises were considered to be the "fortress for the indigenous", a bulwark against
ethnic Chinese and foreign domination of the economy (Mardjaria, 1999: 47). State
enterprises were found in virtually all sectors, particularly infrastructure, finance,
telecommunications, and high technology industries, the last under the purview of
64 See Brown (1998: 188) on the redistribution imperative.
65 The 1990s witnessed growing cooperation between the ethnic Chinese business elite and the
indigenous business elite, although this was mostly limited to alliances between Chinese business
and Suharto family businesses (Habir, 1999).
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Habibie. Although strongly criticised by the technocrats, and even by indigenous business
interests who feared their potential crowding out by state capital, Suharto generally
supported the strategic industries programme as it reflected his vision of a developed
Indonesia (Borsuk, 1999: 163).
As for private indigenous capital, Suharto also used economic favours like preferential
credit and import licenses to encourage the growth of an indigenous business class during
much of the 1970s and 1980s (Liddle, 1999: 52). These preferential policies enabled the
President to ensure the political support of the indigenous elites 67 who were ultimately
beholden to the President as a result of their special treatment (Liddle, 1999: 68). These
policies continued into the 1990s despite the broad neoliberal reforms undertaken during
this period. Indigenous capital was concentrated in sectors like power, roads, cement,
telecommunications and broadcasting, banking and finance, and retail trade (Nallappan et
al, 1998: 46). Interestingly, many of the indigenous business elites participated in politics
but they did not confine their participation and support to the state party, Golkar and often
worked with opposition parties as well (Robison, 1996: 93). Indigenous business was,
therefore, a politically salient group that the President and government could not afford to
ignore.
The political salience of indigenous and state capital did not, however, end with the fall of
Suharto and the financial crisis. Many Indonesians, including economic nationalist
policymakers, regarded further neoliberal reforms sanctioned by the IMF as attempts by
western interests to impose a form of capitalism on Indonesia that would, once again,
"preyent pribumi Indonesians from taking their rightful place at the economic table"
66 See Mardjana (1999) for a comprehensive treatment of public enterprises.
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(Habir, 1999: 202). The redistribution imperative to achieve economic parity between the
ethnic Chinese and foreign investors on the one hand and indigenous groups, particularly
in business, on the other, remained strong. Nevertheless, the financial and political crisis in
Indonesia meant that the growth imperative, particularly attracting FDI to the country,
became vital. Thus, the government supported the further acceleration of AFTA as a
means to improve the investment climate in Indonesia, despite growing opposition to
AFTA from domestic, particularly indigenous business interests.68
Nevertheless, Ginandjar's championing of indigenous business as well as his sensitivity to
Habibie's strategic industries programme, possibly led him to view the AIA in the same
way as Malaysia — a means to develop globally competitive domestic capital in an
environment in which global market competition was inevitable. 69
 AFTA could fulfil twin
purposes — as an exercise in open regionalism to attract FDI and as an exercise in
developmental regionalism. The latter supported the economic nationalist ideas of
Ginandjar and his other allies, including Habibie, with regard to the nurturing of
indigenous capital, but through regional cooperation rather than domestic policy.
Whether developmental regionalism through the AIA would be feasible as a means to help
develop indigenous Indonesian capital and large-scale, high technology firms remains to
be seen. Smaller indigenous businesses in Indonesia lack the capacity for overseas
investment. Larger corporations would likely benefit, and this would include both
indigenous and ethnic Chinese firms. There was also very little domestic discussion on
67 Small and medium-scale indigenous businesses also gained through patronage provided through
the government political party, Golkar. See Robison (1996: 90-91).
68 Jakarta Post, 10 October 1998; Bisnis Indonesia, 12 October 1998.
69 It was, unfortunately, not possible to obtain direct confirmation of this argument through elite
interviews. Government officials, in particular, were careful not to comment on nationalist thinking
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Ginandjar's support for the Malaysian idea, which was rather unusual for Indonesia's
vibrant press that usually provided extensive coverage of AFTA issues. It was very likely
that this was because other more interesting political developments were unfolding daily
in the county. It also suggests that the idea may not have been thought through carefully.
Nevertheless, it clearly fits in with nationalist thinking and programmes, and Indonesia's
support for Malaysia's developmental approach to the AIA should be understood within
this context.
5.4	 Malaysia: Ethnic Politics, Economic Nationalism and Domestic Capital
The political salience of domestic capital in Malaysia is tied up with the country's ethnic
politics and with the broader economic nationalism of Prime Minister Mahathir. The
original ethnic Malay capitalist project of the 1970s and 1980s soon became bound up
during the late 1980s and 1990s with a broader Malaysian economic nationalism that
sought to develop a more encompassing Malaysian capitalist class that would lead towards
parity with the developed countries (Khoo, 2000: 214). Thus, the Malaysian government's
approach to the AIA, as a means to develop domestic capital through stimulating their
regional expansion on preferential terms, needs to be viewed against these dynamics in the
domestic political economy.
Between 1970 and 1990, a state-directed development programme — the New Economic
Policy (NEP) — drove the Malaysian political economy. The NEP was the outcome of
ethnic riots following the May 1969 elections caused by Malay concerns at the
community's economic marginalisation and fears that they would lose their political
dominance to the relatively better off ethnic Chinese community as a result. Among the
in economic policy in view of possible negative fallout, both from ethnic Chinese and foreign
investors, both of which continue to be vital for growth in crisis-torn Indonesia.
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policy's objectives was the creation of a Malay business (and middle) class and the
achievement of a target of 30 per cent Malay equity in the corporate sector (Tori, 1997:
212). The NEP was vital to the legitimacy and security of the UMNO-dominated regime,
since it enabled both a more equitable distribution of wealth for the Malays as well as
Malay political dominance through control of economic resources. UMNO has long been
the leading Malay party in Malaysia, regarded as the champion of Malay political rights in
multiethnic Malaysia. 7° Although the NEP was replaced by the National Development
Policy in 1991 that scaled back ethnic preferences somewhat (Stafford, 1997:569-76), the
goal of creating a Malay business community continued to be emphasised in the 1990s
(Tori, 1997: 236).
Even the privatisation programme undertaken as part of the economic restructuring
package adopted in response to the mid-1980s recession was actively used to create a
Malay business class to fulfil the NEP goal (Crouch 1996: 39). Although privatisation
benefited largely UMNO-linked Malay businessmen, a limited number of ethnic Chinese
and Indian individuals aligned with the ruling elite also benefited. In turn, these new rich
business personalities who had emerged through patronage provided political leaders with
access to large amounts of funds that could be used in party and parliamentary elections
(Gomez, 1996). It also provided key political personalities, including but not only the
Prime Minister, with their respective support bases drawn from among the new business
elite (Gomez and Jomo, 1997: 117-65). By the 1990s, a politically influential rentier
business community had become part of the governing elite, while political power became
increasingly concentrated in the political executive, notably the Prime Minister (Khoo,
70 Since the 1997 financial crisis and the sacking of then Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim,
Malay support for UMNO has declined, channelled instead to the opposition Islamic party and to
the new party begun by Anwar's supporters.
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2000: 221). The alliance between the political elite and rentier business was, thus, a crucial
component in the Malaysian political economy.
The new Malaysian conglomerates that emerged out of privatisation and other preferential
policies were also a key component of Dr Mahathir's wider economic nationalism.
Especially after the mid-1980s recession, policy had moved beyond the NEP's narrow
focus on building a Malay capitalist class to advocate the growth of large, Malaysian firms
as a means of meeting the competitive challenges of the global economy (Khoo, 2000:
216). The policy shift reflected the strategic vision of the Prime Minister, who was no
longer content with Malaysia remaining a Third World producer of industrial
commodities. Thus, he stressed the building up of Malaysian corporations and
conglomerates able to compete with foreign TNCs in what was perceived to be an
intensely competitive world economy.
Many of these new conglomerates were mostly in the service sectors including
infrastructure, finance and telecommunications in which many restrictions on foreign
capital remained as well as in new import-substitution activities such as those linked to the
national car project (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). Foreign firms were, however, dominant in
the far more efficient, export-oriented manufacturing sector, which operated under a
relatively liberal trade and investment regime. Success in the essentially protected sectors
was less dependent on firms' international competitiveness and indigenous technological
capabilities, and more on restrictions on entry as well as their access to preferential
treatment through political connections (Khoo, 2000: 218). Nevertheless, the Prime
Minister used the state to create and nurture these domestic firms with the ultimate goal
being to enable their participation in global markets.
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A former coordinator of Malaysian participation in OECD workshops, Mr. Ong Hong
Cheong, notes that foreign interest in "national treatment [of investment] was seen by both
the Malaysian government and the private sector to pose the biggest threat to domestic
companies". 71 Ong points out that an
"alarming aspect of the MAT was the open-ended definition of investment,
because it meant that the MAI would be binding on the host country to allow
foreign multinational companies the full right to both establish [a] new presence
and to expand their [existing] presence in the manufacturing, services and other
sectors of the economy in addition to the right to take part in new privatisation
exercises... the MAI could also lead to eventual foreign domination of the
banking and financial sector, a totally unacceptable political proposition".72
Nevertheless, the writing on the wall was clear. As already noted in a previous section, the
expectation was that global rules would eventually allow foreign corporations unrestricted
access to the domestic market. It was clear that Malaysian firms, including the politically
privileged ones, would eventually have to compete with global firms, not only in
international markets but in the domestic market as well. If domestic firms were not ready
for global market competition, their demise would have significant political repercussions
for the NEP goal of advancing a Malay business class, for Mahathir's personal authority,
and ultimately for the stability of Mahathir's ruling coalition as well as the security of the
UMNO-dominated political system. The new business elite nurtured through the state by
Mahathir were also important players in Malaysian patronage politics The developmental
role envisaged for the AIA by the Malaysian side was, therefore, intimately related to
ensuring the survival of these domestic firms that were key players in the Malaysian
political economy.
71 Interview via e-mail.
72 E-mail interview.
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6.	 Conclusion
By examining the interaction between globalisation and domestic political economy
dynamics, this chapter shows that policymakers and leaders in the ASEAN countries were
also concerned with ensuring the growth and viability of domestic firms as with their
anxiety over FDI inflows. While both forms of regionalism associated with AFTA — open
and developmental regionalism — were driven by the growth imperative, distribution
concerns were weaved into the concern with growth in the case of developmental
regionalism, with its especial emphasis on nurturing the development of domestic capital
in anticipation of global market competition.
A number of economists studying AFTA, notably Ariff (1998: 10), have suggested that
AFTA provides a "training ground where ASEAN manufacturers will learn to compete
with one another in the regional market before they can penetrate into the world market."
This line of thinking is distinct from the notion of developmental regionalism advanced in
the dissertation, although it appears to share some similarities. There is an inherent
contradiction in Ariff s notion of AFTA as a 'training ground', which he implicitly
associates with preferential trade liberalisation through the CEPT. Since the CEPT is an
instance of open regionalism, and a means to attract foreign investors to the region, there
is no explanation of how the "AFTA exercise will enable local manufacturers to spread
their wings regionally first and globally afterwards"73 if international firms are also
producing in the region. The latter introduces global market competition in AFTA. The
notion of developmental regionalism advanced in this dissertation is fundamentally
distinct from the 'training ground' argument, as it makes an explicit distinction between
foreign and domestic capital and provides, in addition, an underlying economic model of
how domestic capital could theoretically be nurtured through regionalism.
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While all the core ASEAN governments used regionalism to facilitate the expansion of
domestic capital, governments in Malaysia especially and Indonesia advocated preferential
investment treatment of domestic firms in the ASEAN market through the MA, the idea
being to nurture domestic capital to enable them to meet global competition eventually.
Governments and leaders of these countries were most concerned about the survival of
those segments of domestic capital that were valued for their perceived role in sustaining
incumbent elite rule and in helping to underpin the legitimacy and security of the
prevailing regime. As to whether the developmental idea of using the AIA to build up
domestic firms was workable is not the main concern of the analysis, however, which is to
account for the anomaly the AIA presents to prevailing FDI-centred explanations of
AFTA. Nevertheless, it has now become widely accepted among corporate analysts in the
region that large-sized firms are better able to survive competition with global
multinationals."
Despite the broad commitment to nurture competitive domestic firms through
developmental regionalism, implementation proved to be rather more difficult. As the next
chapter illustrates in its discussion of departures from AFTA commitments, the imperative
of distribution was so overwhelming in certain instances that governments found it
difficult to immediately implement their AFTA commitments, including the AIA. Despite
the latter's perceived potential to stimulate the development of larger, more capable
domestic/ASEAN firms, some governments feared that immediate regional investment
liberalisation and the privileging of ASEAN investors would challenge the dominant
position of favoured domestic firms in the domestic market.
73 Ariff (1998: 10).
74 See FEER, 'Asia learns size matters', 7 June 2001.
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CHAPTER 5
RE-NEGOTIATING AFTA COMMITMENTS:
Domestic Politics and the Distributive Imperative
1. Introduction
The previous two chapters show how both open and developmental regionalism in AFTA
were driven by concern with growth as the ASEAN governments responded to the
pressures of globalisation, although distributive concerns were weaved into the concern
with growth in developmental regionalism as governments also sought to nurture domestic
capital. The tension between growth and distribution in the ASEAN countries was, in fact,
a constant theme during the 1990s. In some instances, distributive concerns overwhelmed
the concern with growth as governments sought to protect certain social groups and
selected firms against the competitive effects of regional liberalisation. In these instances,
governments were prepared to renegotiate their original AFTA commitments to protect the
interests of these politically important social groups and of domestic firms with close ties
to the political elite. Section 2 elaborates on this theme by focusing broadly on the
implementation of regional liberalisation commitments in manufactured goods, investment
and services. Sections 3 through 5 present three specific cases of disputes over
implementation — petrochemicals, agriculture and automobiles — which clearly illustrate
how departures from AFTA commitments occurred to protect firms with close ties to the
political elite.
2. Resistance to AFTA: A General Survey
Despite the advances made in AFTA, as described in Chapter 2, the regional project was
not without problems. Although member governments often made ambitious commitments
for liberalisation, they sometimes failed to implement the commitments already made.
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This problem occurred in virtually all the component programmes in AFTA, although
some issue areas experienced greater setbacks that others.
2.1	 The CEPT
Chapter 3 explains how external pressures from globalisation drove advances in AFTA,
including the renewed commitment in 1993 to implement the CEPT. This occurred despite
growing opposition from certain domestic business interests, particularly in Thailand, the
Philippines and Indonesia who were in favour of going slow on or even withdrawing from
AFTA commitments. These included, for instance, the Philippines Chamber of Commerce
and Industry,' the Indonesian Automobile Industry Association (GAIKINDO), 2 the Thai
petrochemical industry,3 Thai electronics, plastics product and iron and steel firms, and
Philippine apparel, footwear and iron and steel firms. 4 On the other hand, other business
actors from these countries supported AFTA. Thus, Indonesian businesses with export
capabilities like the Salim group wanted AFTA hastened' in some issue areas, while
export-oriented Philippine and Thai industrialists welcomed the adoption of the AFTA
project6 as did the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers.' The picture is one of diversity
of domestic business attitudes to AFTA in the ASEAN countries.
The diversity of business demands with regard to tariff liberalisation in goods trade meant
that poficymakers were, by and large, able to adopt a fairly independent course based on
calculations of the broad policy interest of the government. As Chapter 3 shows, the
Review Indonesia, 8 April 1992.
2 Suara Karya, 9 August 1995.
3 Bisnis Indonesia, 7 December 1992.
See Stubbs (2000: 307-8).
5 Jakarta Post, 17 November 1992; and Suara Kwya, 30 March 1992.
6 Merdeka, 13 August 1992; Jakarta Post, 16 December 1993; and Bangkok Post, 'FT! asked to
submit tariff cut list', 20 May 1999.
7 Jakarta Post, 25 February 1993.
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overriding concern of the ASEAN governments was on growth, efficiency and
competitiveness, particularly where the CEPT was concerned. These governments were
committed to using the CEPT and AFTA as a means to create a regional market to which
foreign investors would be attracted and which would also provide the space for the
expansion of outward-looking domestic capital. As a result, governments generally
resisted demands from firms wishing to delay the CEPT. Governments were, nevertheless,
sympathetic to business concerns about regional trade liberalisation and dealt with them in
various ways. A range of domestic adjustment measures was adopted to help domestic
firms, particularly in Thailand and the Philippines. 8 Moreover, these governments also
negotiated a more flexible mode of CEPT implementation that gave domestic firms
sufficient time to prepare for regional trade liberalisation.
The ASEAN governments continued since then to resist demands from domestic business
to delay CEPT implementation, including during the financial crisis period. 9 In Indonesia,
the head of the National Business Development Centre called for the 2003 target date for
the CEPT to be postponed to 2010 in view of the regional economic crisis. The
government's economic advisory council, however, rejected the demand." ) By this time,
Indonesia had adopted the IMF bailout package of reforms, and reneging on the CEPT
would not have sent the right signals to the international investors that the country was
keen to attract. The Federation of Philippine Industries also asked the government to
suspend CEPT implementation until 2003" but its demand was not entertained except in
8 These included financial and technical assistance, reduced utility charges, as well as fiscal
incentives. See Business Times, 'Bangkok sets up fund to help local industries', 14 June 1993; and
Business Times, 'Philippine government to help industry compete in region', 19 November 1992.
9 Although import restrictions were adopted during 1998-99 in a number of the ASEAN counties,
these were temporary, a direct response to the crisis-induced economic slowdown, and thus not
significant instances of protectionism. See the discussion in Chapter 3 (Section 4.2).
I° Jakarta Post, 'Local businessmen want implementation of AFTA delayed', 12 July 2000.
"Business Times, 'Philippine industries want tariff freeze until 2003', 4 September 1998.
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the case of petrochemicals, which the government temporarily excluded from the CEPT.
Similarly, the Thai government refused to accede to business demands to delay the
CEPT. I2 Although Malaysia excluded automobiles from AFTA disciplines, the
government rejected all other business demands, which were quite considerable, for
delaying CEPT implementation.I3
One question that arises is why out of all other business demands for protection the
Malaysian government negotiated to withdraw, albeit on a temporary basis, automobiles
from AFTA disciplines beginning from 2000. The Malaysian automobile case is especially
interesting because the government came under considerable pressure from the Thai
government and from foreign investors to refrain from this move. As for petrochemicals,
this case is noteworthy less for the Philippine decision to temporarily exclude
petrochemicals and more for Indonesia's move during the 1990s to raise tariffs on selected
petrochemical products without any prior warning to its AFTA partners. In a similar move,
Indonesia had withdrawn 15 categories of agricultural items from AFTA, backtracking on
its initial commitment to subject these items to CEPT liberalisation. In both these
instances, Indonesia's move sparked off a row within ASEAN. These three cases —
petrochemicals, agriculture and automobiles — will be discussed later in the chapter. They
reveal how ASEAN governments, despite the overall commitment to AFTA were,
nevertheless, prepared to re-negotiate their original commitments in particular instances in
order to protect the interests of politically important social groups and of domestic firms
that had close ties to the political elite. The distributive imperative clearly predominated.
12 Interview with Ms Chularat Suteethorn of the Thai Ministry of Finance, August 2000.
13 Confidential interview with a Malaysian trade official, August 2000.
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2.2	 Investment and Services.
Although the ASEAN governments led by Malaysia designed the AIA as a developmental
tool to nurture the growth of domestic capital, the reality of domestic interests meant that
even this project faced some difficulty in implementation. Member governments found it
hard to offer national treatment and market access privileges to ASEAN investors initially,
since even that was expected to adversely affect domestic firms. These governments
managed to negotiate a flexible mode of implementation similar to the CEPT model that
incorporated both a temporary exclusion list and a sensitive list that would delay
investment privileges to ASEAN firms for different periods of time.
Interestingly, member governments chose to place most of the sectors they wished to
exclude from the ALA in the sensitive list rather than the temporary exclusion list, thereby
maintaining indefmite protection from all, including ASEAN, investors." Malaysia, for
instance, had been against the initial suggestion by Thailand to extend national treatment
privileges to ASEAN investors by 2003. 15 This is surprising, given that Malaysia was the
main proponent of using the AIA as a developmental tool, and would at least have been
expected to endorse the early realisation of the AIA. The reality, however, was that many
domestic firms, particularly those in the protected services and import-competing sectors,
were too important politically to be exposed to even the limited competition that
liberalisation to ASEAN investors might entail. Incidentally, national legislation has yet to
be put in place in many member countries to differentiate ASEAN from foreign
investors.' 6
14 See Table 2.13 in Chapter 2.
15 Bangkok Post, 'Trade hurdles must be cleared today', 12 December 1998.
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Moreover, the plan to use the early privileges accorded to ASEAN investors to stimulate
the growth of alliances between ASEAN country domestic firms also became a casualty of
the business-politics relationship so prevalent in the region. A notable example is the
rejection by the Malaysian government of a proposal by the Renong Group, a prominent
Malaysian conglomerate, to form a strategic tie-up with Singapore Telecommunications
(SingTel), a corporation linked to the Singapore government." The Malaysian Prime
Minister had reportedly been against the idea of a close connection between Renong,
which had close ties with the ruling Malay party, UMNO, and the Singapore PAP
govemment.I8
There has been a long history of mutual suspicions between the Malaysian and
Singaporean governments in general, and their two respective governing parties, UMNO
and the PAP in particular. Singapore had briefly been a part of the Malaysian federation
from 1963 to 1965 when it was 'expelled' from the federation due to fundamental political
differences between the two parties. I9
 These differences centred on the notion of a
'Malaysian Malaysia' advocated by the PAP that challenged the 1957 terms of
independence negotiated with the British that emphasised Malay political dominance in
Malaysia in return for citizenship rights for the ethnic Chinese and Indian immigrant
communities (Crouch, 1996: 22). The PAP formula endorsed equal political status for all
ethnic communities. It was clearly difficult for the Malay/UMNO elite to allow a company
with close political connections with the PAP government in Singapore to acquire a stake,
16 Follow-up interview via e-mail with Ms Lim Bee Suan of the Singapore Trade Development
Board, June 2001. The significance of this point should not be exaggerated, since legislation often
lags behind policy shifts in many countries.
17 Details of the episode are found in FEER, 'Changing lanes', 8 June 2000.
18 Renong is, in fact, the former business arm of UMNO. See Gomez and Jomo (1997: 69).
19 See Lee (1998).
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even a non-controlling one, in Renong, a showcase of Malay corporate success and a key
member of the ruling ethnic Malay elite coalition.
As for services, the ASEAN governments found it especially difficult to advance their
negotiations to obtain specific commitments to liberalise trade in services in the financial
and telecommunications sectors.2° Malaysia was especially unwilling to consider
liberalising foreign equity and market access conditions for financial services, which
Singapore and Thailand favoured. This is unsurprising, since domestic banks were key
players in the Malaysian patronage system, and liberalisation would have reduced the
space for patronage-based maneouvering to take place (Gomez and Jomo, 1997).
Similarly, domestic firms with strong ties to the political elite, such as Renong discussed
above, were prominent players in the telecommunications sector, which made it difficult
for the Malaysian government to commit to broad-based liberalisation in this sector that
might have jeopardised their dominant position. To governments in Singapore and
Thailand, advancing negotiations in services was important since domestic capital was
concentrated in finance and telecommunications respectively, and was looking to the
regional market for expansion. In addition, the slowdown in the pace of services
negotiations at the GATS weakened the pressure on ASEAN to keep pace with global
developments in AFTA.2I
The following three cases — in petrochemicals, agriculture and automobiles — illustrate
clearly the sensitivities involved when sectors in which domestic firms with close political
connections are required to liberalise. In these instances, distributive concerns with
20 Interview with Dr Suthad Sethboonsang, Deputy Secretary General of ASEAN, July 2000.
21 Confidential interview with a Malaysian trade official, August 2000.
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ensuring that economic gains or rents went to politically important social groups, and
especially to firms and individuals with strong ties to the political elite, led governments to
attempt to re-negotiate their original AFTA commitments. This led to disputes with other
member governments that did not share these same concerns and for whom the original
commitments yielded superior outcomes.
3.	 Tariff Liberalisation of the Petrochemicals Sector in AFTA
The tensions that emerged in AFTA over tariff liberalisation in the petrochemicals sector
had their roots in the designation of the petrochemical industry as a strategic industry in
four ASEAN countries — Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. These
governments believed that a domestic petrochemical industry was fundamental to
industrial development, particularly in view of the industry's substantial linkages with
other, downstream industries like textiles, chemicals, plastics, and fertilisers. Apart from
the Philippines, the other country projects had been initiated even before the decision to
form AFTA had been made.22
While it would have made economic sense to perhaps settle for one such industry within
ASEAN, national governments were not willing to forgo national plans to develop a
domestic petrochemical industry. Investments had already been committed to the project
in the four countries, which involved state and private, including foreign, capital. Because
huge capital investments and a long gestation period were necessary, state capital was
often necessary, which made national governments committed to ensuring the project's
viability. This often included tariff protection. Private investors, both domestic and
foreign, had also committed to participating in these projects on the understanding that the
22 Singapore already possessed a petrochemical industry that had its roots in the petroleum refining
and petroleum products industries begun in the late 1960s (Rodan, 1989: 96-101).
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projects would be accorded protection, at least initially. Moreover, politically connected
firms that were involved in this sector often used their political influence to demand tariff
protection, in the process overturning official policy as in the case of Indonesia.
It is, thus, unsurprising to find that this sector was subject to tensions among the core
ASEAN governments as each sought to protect its own strategic industry, often reinforced
by demands from the domestic and foreign firms involved. Apart from Thailand and the
Philippines, tariffs on petrochemical products in ASEAN were very low at the start of the
1990s, mostly between 5 to 10 per cent. Malaysia, however, raised tariffs on key
petrochemical items to 30 per cent in 1992, while Indonesia imposed customs surcharges
and hiked tariffs in 1993, 1996 and 1997.
3.1	 Thailand: The Influence of Big Business
The petrochemical industry in Thailand began when the government established an
upstream petrochemical industry in 1989 as a joint venture between state and private
capital, and accorded the industry promoted/strategic industry status (Lucas, 1998: 72).
The upstream petrochemical industry soon grew, producing a range of petrochemical
resins like polyethylene (PE), polypropylene (PP), and polyvinyl chloride (PCV) that were
used in downstream industries like plastics, textiles, and fertilisers. The industry was
comprised almost entirely of Thai capital, particularly the Bangkok-based big business
groups like Siam Cement, Thai Petrochemical Industries, Vinythai and HMC Polymers
(Lucas, 1998).23 Many of these conglomerates had extended their original downstream
activities in plastic products and textiles to venture into the upstream sector to produce
petrochemical resins.
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This move was part of a larger trend in the 1990s of Thai conglomerates moving into
heavy industries like cement, steel and power, in addition to petrochemicals (Phongpaichit
and Baker, 1998: 43). They were encouraged by government policy to deepen Thailand's
industrial structure, which meant substantial investment incentives. Moreover, foreign
capital was increasingly dominating export-oriented manufacturing activities, and Thai
conglomerates had begun to look elsewhere for market opportunities. They found it in
heavy industries, where their local knowledge and political clout provided them with an
advantage over foreign investors (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1998: 28).
By the mid-1990s, however, excess domestic capacity affected profitability, while export
markets were not readily available since most countries in ASEAN and in the other East
Asian countries had their own supplies from domestic firms (Phongpaichit and Baker,
1998: 45). The petrochemical industry, thus, lobbied hard to prevent the scheduled
reduction in import duties on petrochemical items from 27 to 20 per cent due in 1998
under the CEPT fast-track schedule. Downstream producers of plastics and textiles that
used petrochemical inputs, on the other hand, wanted tariffs lowered. 24 These firms,
however, did not have the bargaining power of the large firms owned by some of the
country's most powerful business families that dominated the upstream sector. The latter,
particularly through the Federation of Thai Industries, was successful in influencing the
industry ministry and the Board of Investment to back their demands for tariff protection.25
Both these government agencies argued that the petrochemicals sector was a vital industry
that needed to be nurtured. 26 The Finance and Commerce Ministries, on the other hand,
23 Also see Bangkok Post, 'Producers want tariff protection extended', 10 June 1997.
24 Bangkok Post, 'Thai PET resin firms worry over duty cuts', 9 September 1996.
25 Bangkok Post, 'Industry ministry lobbies against plastic duty cuts', 4 December 1997.
26 Bangkok Post, '1,600 products benefit from duty cut', 29 November 1996.
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opposed the tariff move, citing the need for Thailand to conform to its CEPT
commitment.27
Big business also used the decision by Indonesia to raise tariffs on petrochemicals to press
its own case in Thailand, citing the unfair competition in AFTA that would ensue should
Thailand press ahead with tariff reductions before its ASEAN counterparts. 28 The Finance
Ministry agreed in May 1999 to allow petrochemical tariffs to remain above 20 per cent
for a three-year period to allow affected firms sufficient time to adjust to increased
competition. In doing so, Thailand departed from the CEPT fast-track schedule for
petrochemicals, although petrochemical tariffs were expected to reach the 0-5 per cent
AFTA target by 2003.29
3.2	 The Philippines: Developing a Domestic Strategic Industry
In the early 1990s, the Philippine government initiated moves to establish an upstream and
mid-stream petrochemicals industry, in which state capital would cooperate with domestic
and foreign private capital (Lim, J, 1998: 140). The upstream project experienced great
difficulties, despite initial interest shown by foreign investors from Taiwan and Thailand.
The former later invested in Malaysia. These firms were caught in a domestic controversy
aroused by nationalist sentiment against preferential treatment to foreign firms. Later, a
consortium of domestic, foreign and state capital was formed to develop the project,
although internal disagreements caused further delays (Lim, J, 1998: 141).
The problems facing the industry were compounded when, in a paradoxical move in 1995,
the government issued Executive Order #264 that immediately lowered tariffs on
27 Bangkok Post, 'Agencies in two camps over tariff cut delay', 17 December 1996.
28 Ibid.
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petrochemical items to 10-15 per cent from the prevailing 20-30 per cent. This led to an
outcry by domestic business who alleged that the move would place the Philippine
petrochemical industry at a disadvantage in the regional market (Lim, J, 1998: 141-52).
The Philippine government, thus, sought a temporary delay in submitting petrochemicals
to AFTA disciplines as a way of helping to get the local industry on its feet after the ups
and downs experienced by the project since its inception. Although the Philippines was the
only other country apart from Malaysia (for automobiles) that attempted to temporarily
withdraw a product from AFTA, this move was not as controversial as Indonesia's tariff
hikes on petrochemicals.
3.3	 Malaysia: A Strategic Industry and Politically Important Firms
Malaysia raised tariffs on petrochemical items, notably PP and PE, to 30 per cent in
1992. 3° Although this hurt downstream producers of plastics, who demanded a review of
the tariff, the government maintained the high tariff to protect the fledgling petrochemical
industry, dominated then by Titan Polyethylene, a Taiwanese investor. 31 Moreover, in
April 1994, a new policy was instituted that required government approval for the import
of PP and PE. Malaysian plastics firms criticised this move, since it raised the cost of
petrochemical inputs while also reducing the availability of supply. Ostensibly for a two-
year period, the 'approved import' scheme also benefited Titan, the major producer of PP
and PE in Malaysia. 32 While reiterating Malaysia's commitment to CEPT tariff reductions,
the Malaysian Trade Minister, nevertheless, justified the import approval scheme as
necessary to allow fledgling, strategic industries sufficient time to become profitable.33
29 Bangkok Post, 'Petrochemical, steel tariff cuts gradual', 1 May 1999.
30 Business Times, 'Protection for petrochem products will be temporary', 19 September 1992.
31 Business Times, 'Association: Review protective duty on polyethylene', 26 February 1994.
32 Interview with Dr Leong Choon Heng, Director of Research at the Malaysian University of
Science and Technology, in August 2000 in Kuala Lumpur.
33 Business Times, `Rafidah: 40,000 permits issued for import of resins', 25 May 1994.
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Part of the reason for the favourable treatment meted to Titan may be its importance in the
context of Malaysia's heavy industries programme first begun in the early 1980s by Prime
Minister Mahathir. Petrochemicals were regarded as a key strategic industry vital for
developing an integrated Malaysian industrial sector. Titan, which had been considering
investing in the Philippines, had been wooed by the Malaysian Trade Minister to Malaysia
to spearhead this process. 34 Interestingly, Titan's local partner was PNB (Permodalan
Nasional Berhad or the National Equity Corporation) that had been set up in 1978 to
increase the Malay share of corporate wealth by purchasing and holding shares on behalf
of the community. Moreover, a second petrochemical plant, this time involving the state
oil agency, Petronas, was expected to come on-stream in late 1994.
Petronas, which had substantial financial, including foreign exchange reserves, as well as
PNB were key players in the Malaysian political economy, particularly in Malaysian
patronage politics. 35 The political importance of these domestic investors in the
petrochemicals industry coupled with the role envisaged for the sector in national
development plans explains why the government chose to take actions that ran counter to
the CEPT. Although Malaysia had informed its AFTA partners of its plan to introduce the
import permit scheme, this did not prevent intra-ASEAN tensions, particularly with
Singapore, long a major supplier of petrochemical products to Malaysia.36
34 Malaysian Business, 'Pioneering the big play', 16 October 1993.
35 See Crouch (1996: 201-202). Petronas funds had been used a number of times to bail out other
politically important firms, for instance, the government-owned Bank Bumiputera in 1984 (Gomez
and Jomo, 1997: 38) and the shipping conglomerate owned by the Prime Minister's son in 1998.
See AWSJ, `Petronas's purchase plan fuels question', 9 March 1998. In 2000, Petronas took a 27
per cent equity stake in Malaysia's national car firm, Proton, providing it with much-needed funds
during a critical period in the latter's history. See Business Times, 'Mitsubishi sees only minor
changes in Proton management', 24 July 2000. Proton is discussed in Section 5.2 of this chapter.
36	 •Singapore filed a complaint (#95-01) at the WTO challenging the legality of this move. It later
withdrew the complaint once the Malaysian government removed the offending NTB (Schott,
1996: 8).
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3.4	 Indonesia: Policy Reversals for the Politically Connected
When Indonesia agreed in 1992 to include petrochemicals in the CEPT fast-track inclusion
list, the country's tariffs on petrochemical imports ranged from 5 to 20 per cent. In 1993,
however, the authorities raised the tariff on plastic pellets from 5 to 20 per cent, while also
imposing an additional 20 per cent customs surcharge (van der Eng, 1993: 30). In early
1996, the authorities extended the 20 per cent customs surcharge to cover five additional
petrochemical items. 37 In early 1997, the surcharge was replaced by a tariff of 20 per cent
on eight petrochemical items under Finance Ministry Decree #94. The tariff reduction
schedule in this Decree was made consistent with the CEPT schedule of tariff reduction,
although it challenged members' expectation of a standstill on tariffs under the CEPT.
Two months later in April 1997, an amendment to Decree #94 was issued. Decree #151
transferred these eight items from the CEPT inclusion list to the temporary exclusion list
as well as raised tariffs on them to between 25 and 40 per cent. No prior notice of these
actions had been given to Indonesia's ASEAN partners. According to the new tariff
reduction schedule, tariffs on these petrochemical products would remain above 20 per
cent in 1998, which contravened the CEPT fast track schedule, only falling gradually to
the 0-5 per cent target in 2003. 38 Indonesia's move increased tensions in ASEAN.
It is likely that the close involvement of conglomerates associated with the friends and
family of President Suharto in the petrochemical industry were partly responsible for these
specific tariff reversals in 1993, 1996 and especially in 1997, which occurred amidst the
broad policy trend in the country towards trade liberalisation. The 1993 customs surcharge
and tariff hike on plastic pellets benefited PT Petrolcimia Nusantara Interindo, a joint
37 Jakarta Post, 16 October 1997.
38 Details are found in Bisnis Indonesia, 22 October 1997.
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venture between British Petroleum and Indonesian companies controlled by Suharto's son,
Sigit Harjoyundanto that had just begun to produce similar pellets (van der Eng, 1993: 30).
The additional tariff hikes of 1996 and 1997 benefited the US$1.6 billion olefin project of
the Chandra Asri consortium and the US$600 million Arun Aromatic centre. The Chandra
Asri project located in West Java was a joint venture between Japanese investors and three
influential Indonesians, including Prajogo Pangestu, a prominent ethnic Chinese business
tycoon and a close personal friend of President Suharto as well as Bambang Trihatmodjo,
another of Suharto's sons (Hill, 1992: 17). A third Suharto son, Tommy Mandala Putra,
was involved in the Arun project located in North Sumatra.
The Chandra Asri case is especially interesting because it brings into sharp relief the
influence of patronage politics on economic policymalcing in Indonesia. Although
bureaucrats essentially drive broad policy change in Indonesia, whether they are liberal
technocrats or economic nationalists, the Chandra Asri case reveals how business actors
were able to overturn specific policy decisions through their close connections with the
ruling elite, notably with the President himself (Surbakti, 1999: 67-68). When in
December 1994 Chandra Asri formally petitioned the government to introduce a tariff of
35-40 per cent on competing imports, the finance minister Mar'ie Muhammad, a noted
liberal technocrat, rejected the request. The President then intervened, re-assigning the
authority to grant tariff requests from the finance minister to the Coordinating Minister for
Industry and Trade, Hartarto who was more supportive of Chandra Asri's petition
(Hobohm, 1995: 29).
218
The favouring of Chandra Asri is said to represent the return of a favour by the President
to Prajogo Pangestu.39 As already noted in Chapter 4, ethnic Chinese business groups in
Indonesia have often provided fimding for other troubled firms and state enterprises when
asked by the President, a practice that has safeguarded the operations of Chinese
businesses in a country in which ethnic Chinese are often regarded with suspicion. In
return, these businesses receive benefits that help their activities, such as state concessions
and licenses. Prajogo Pangestu had provided US$220 million in 1990 to help cover the
US$420 million that Bank Duta, the country's fifth largest private bank had lost in foreign
exchange speculation (Djidin, 1997: 28; Borsuk, 1999: 145). Information about the bank's
losses had been kept away from the thousands of ordinary Indonesians who had purchased
shares in the bank. The Bank Duta affair was a potential political minefield for the
President since three of the charitable foundations that he chaired held a majority 72 per
cent stake in the bank (Borsuk, 1999: 145). Suharto turned to his two close ethnic Chinese
allies — Prajogo of Chandra Asri and Liem Sioe Liong of the Salim group — who provided
the necessary bailout funds.
4.	 Liberalisation of Unprocessed Agricultural Products in AFTA
In early 1995, the Indonesian government backtracked on its earlier decision to commit 15
unprocessed agricultural products to CEPT liberalisation by 2003. Indonesia had proposed
to transfer these products from the temporary exclusion list to the sensitive list that would
effectively accord these items indefinite protection. The main product groups withdrawn
by Indonesia were rice, sugar, cloves, and wheat flour. Thailand then threatened to
withdraw 44 agricultural items from AFTA in retaliation.° Although a compromise was
worked out to extend the original 2003 deadline to 2010 for these particular products to
39 Interview with Dr Hadi Soesastro, Executive Director of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies in Jakarta, July 2000.
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accommodate Indonesia, Indonesia soon backed away from the revised arrangement
despite initially endorsing the new deadline. 41 Further negotiations became necessary. The
episode raised considerable tensions within ASEAN, notably between Thailand, an
agricultural exporter, and Indonesia. How the matter was resolved will be discussed in the
next chapter. This section focuses on the domestic political economy dynamics that drove
the Indonesian actions.
The Indonesian authorities explained their actions in terms of the need to safeguard the
welfare of Indonesia's substantial rural community. Indonesian Minister of Trade and
Industry in 1995, Tunky Arivvibowo, pointed out that "all of these items are sensitive
items that have an influence on the welfare of our farmers". 42 The interesting point is that
Indonesian intransigence on this issue is only partly explained by the government's wish
to secure the welfare of farmers. While the CEPT could have introduced cheaper rice and
sugar imports from other producer countries in ASEAN like Thailand and the Philippines,
thereby adversely affecting farmers' incomes, wheat is not grown in any ASEAN country,
while only Indonesia grows cloves.43 It is thus in the case of rice and possibly sugar that
the argument about protecting the welfare of domestic farmers is most relevant. In the case
of the other agricultural items, their withdrawal from the CEPT was related to their role in
the business activities of individuals and firms with close connections to the political elite.
4.1	 Rice and Rice Farmers in ASEAN
Rice is one of the most regulated agricultural commodities in ASEAN, through both trade
policy restrictions and domestic price stabilisation schemes. Both these policy instruments
40 A WSJ, 'ASEAN defuses trade dispute with Jakarta', 11 December 1995.
41 AWSJ, 'ASEAN fine tunes services liberalisation', 12 December 1995.42 AWSJ, 'ASEAN defuses trade dispute with Jakarta', 11 December 1995.
43 AWSJ, 'ASEAN fine-tunes services liberalisation', 12 December 1995.
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helped the governments concerned to maintain adequate supplies of rice, the staple food in
the region, as well as to ensure a stable minimum price to farmers and a stable maximum
price to consumers (Acosta, 1998: 38). The rice stabilisation scheme in Indonesia was
under the sole control of the National Logistics Agency (BULOG). For Thailand, rice was
also a major export, which explains the Thai government's interest in securing market
access for rice in ASEAN, long a closed market for rice imports. This was, however,
easier said than done.
Indonesia
Rice farmers were a politically important group in Indonesia, given the country's large
rice farming, rural community and Indonesia's official policy of self-sufficiency in rice for
purposes of national security (Hill, 1994: 72-78). As already noted in Chapter 3, increased
material wellbeing of Indonesian citizens was one of the key bases of legitimacy of the
Suharto regime, and the country's rice policy and indeed its actions to re-negotiate tariff
liberalisation of the rice sector in AFTA need to be viewed in this context." Although rice
self-sufficiency was attained in 1985, rice imports were, nevertheless, allowed whenever
domestic output was insufficient to meet domestic demand or to replenish emergency
buffer stocks. The authorities, however, preferred to control the quantity and price of rice
imports, with BULOG given sole importing authority. Although formal MEN tariffs on
rice were fairly low, around 17 per cent in the early 1990 S,45 later reduced to zero in the
deregulation package of 27 June 1994, 46 these rates were unbound at the GATT/WTO.
This allowed the Indonesian authorities to maintain higher effective tariff rates whenever
necessary in order to stabilise domestic rice prices and insulate the home market from
44 This was despite the declining political and economic salience of rice since the 1970s, the result
of structural economic transformation and rural income growth (Tomich, 1992: 25).
45 See Acosta (1998: 197).
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import competition. Nevertheless, the import of rice, even if necessary due to domestic
production shortfalls, never became politically acceptable (Manning and Jayasuriya, 1996:
28).
Malaysia and the Philippines
Rice was a politically sensitive product for Malaysia and the Philippines as well, and these
governments joined Indonesia in attempting to re-negotiate the final tariff rate and target
date for liberalisation of rice tariffs. For the governments of both these countries, rice
farmers were an important political constituency, although the political salience of rice
farmers had declined in Malaysia since the 1970s with the fall in the share of agriculture in
the economy. 47 Nevertheless, the majority of rice farmers in Malaysia are ethnic Malays
concentrated in the Northern states of Kedah, Perlis and Kelantan where the opposition
Islamic party, PAS48 is a strong contender for the Malay vote. This demographic fact
continues to give political salience to rice farmers in Malaysia and explains Malaysia's
decision to re-negotiate rice tariffs in AFTA. 49 The Philippine government also chose to
re-negotiate the tariff liberalisation schedule for rice in order to maintain the livelihood of
Philippine rice farmers, much to the disquiet of Thailand. The Philippines maintained
MFN tariffs on rice imports at 30 per cent (Acosta, 1998: 197)."
46 See Pangestu and Azis (1994: 25). The Finance Ministry, nevertheless, set the unofficial
maximum MFN rice tariff at 160 per cent. See Bisnis Indonesia, 2 October 1999.
47 The share of agriculture in GDP declined from 23 per cent in 1980 to 16 per cent in 1992. In
contrast, the share in the Philippines remained at close to a quarter of GDP in 1992. See McFarlane
(1998: 152).
48 PAS is the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (or Partai Agama Islam Se-Malaysia).
49 Although the MFN tariff on rice between 1990 and 1995 was low, set at 0.3 per cent, import
prohibitions and licensing regulations, many of them not fully transparent, offered substantial
protection to domestic rice farmers. See Acosta (1998: 39).
50 Economists predicted that the price of rice would slump if rice tariffs were liberalised under
AFTA (Acosta, 1998: 181).
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4.2	 The Political Economy of Trade Liberalisation of Wheat, Sugar and Cloves
The Indonesian decision to withdraw wheat flour, sugar and cloves from Indonesia's
CEPT inclusion list was surprising since tariffs on these items were very low at the time
the dispute emerged in 1994-95. In fact, prevailing tariffs on wheat flour and sugar were
set at zero, although domestic monopoly arrangements constituted a significant NTB on
imports (Pangestu and Azis, 1994: 25). Although Indonesia undertook fairly extensive
economic reforms during the 1990s, these monopolies remained untouched (Borsuk, 1999:
144). These arrangements benefited powerful state-owned enterprises, especially BLTLOG,
and politically connected firms and individuals who often worked with BULOG to exploit
the rents from these monopolies. BULOG, incidentally, was the sole agency authorised to
import sugar and wheat flour into Indonesia (Chung eta!, 1998: 32).
Under AFTA rules, NTBs on any product included in the CEPT would have to be
removed within five years (ASEAN Secretariat, 1996: 31). 5i If Indonesia agreed to include
these particular agricultural items in the CEPT, it would also have been required to
dismantle the domestic monopolies associated with them. The authorities chose, instead,
to withdraw wheat, sugar and cloves from the CEPT to preserve the monopoly privileges
and rents that accrued to these individuals and firms.
Wheat flour and the Salim group connection
For instance, flour milling was monopolised by PT Bogasari Flour Mill, part of the Salim
Group under Liem Sioe Liong, a long-standing Suharto ally. 52 Bogasari was a joint
venture between Liem and Suharto's adoptive brother and cousin, Sudwilcatmono (Habir,
1999: 183). BULOG sold imported wheat to Bogasari at heavily subsidised prices, which
51 A later decision by the SEOM stipulated that all NTBs are to be removed by 2003. Confidential
interview with a Malaysian trade official, August 2000.
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Bogasari processed and then sold back to BULOG at a 30 per cent premium." Consumers
and downstream industries paid higher prices for wheat flour, although the Salim group
gained cheap wheat flour for its instant noodle activity, one of the fastest growing markets
in Indonesia and the world. AFTA tariff liberalisation would have challenged BULOG's
monopoly on wheat flour imports, which would have ended the monopoly rents that went
to private firms like Salim and Bogasari.
Interestingly, Bogasari's articles of incorporation provided for 20 per cent of its profits to
be channelled to two charitable foundations run by the President's wife and the military
(Habir, 1999: 183). Suharto had established the charitable foundations to dispense funds,
often collected through contributions from his friends and business associates in the ethnic
Chinese community, to selected organisations and individuals in return for political
support (Liddle, 1999: 51-52). It was therefore unsurprising that the government sought to
withdraw wheat flour from the CEPT, despite having initially agreed to its inclusion. It
was likely that the politically influential Liem had made the necessary representations to
trigger the policy reversa1.54
Sugar and the state-owned enterprises
The sugar industry in Indonesia is dualistic, comprising a modern, efficient sector that
operates in southern Sumatra and is essentially privately owned." An inefficient, state-
owned sector operating outdated refineries also exists, concentrated in eastern Java and
52	 •	 9Liem s role in helping the President to bail out Bank Duta was discussed in Section 3.4.
53 FEER, 'Depth of Connections', 16 October 1997.
54 In fact, the wheat flour sector had initially been targeted by the government for deregulation in
the mid-1990s, but was apparently left off the deregulation agenda after Liem had pointed out to
government officials that Suharto's daughter also owned a flour mill. See FEER, 'Depth of
connections' 16 October 1997.
55 The discussion in this sub-section benefited from the author's interview with Dr Hadi Soesastro
of CSIS, Jakarta.
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survives through protection from import competition. Even in the more liberal policy
environment of the 1990s, state-owned enterprises possessed substantial political clout,
largely due to their role in fulfilling Article 33 of the Indonesian constitution that
emphasises state control over the economy.56
 They are regarded as 'agents of
development', and undertake distribution functions (Mardjana, 1999: 42). State-owned
enterprises in the sugar industry were no different.
The control by BULOG of sugar imports, ostensibly to maintain an adequate price to
sugarcane cultivators, also allowed the state-owned refineries to sell their refined sugar
output to domestic consumers at high prices, earning rents in the process. These state
enterprises channelled part of the rents that accrued to local governments in the
provinces.57
 This form of arrangement, common in Indonesia throughout the Suharto
regime, was a key mechanism the central government used to redistribute income to the
provinces, and thus to try and gain political legitimacy. Consumers, however, paid the
price, but the Constitution provided the legal and ideological justification for such actions
in the name of national development and preserving the unitary state in Indonesia
(Mardjana, 1999: 42).
Cloves and Tommy Suharto
Unlike the case of rice, sugar and wheat flour, the sale and marketing of cloves during the
1980s was decentralised. Farmers sold cloves to various traders who resold them to
domestic manufacturers of the special Indonesian spice-flavoured cigarettes known locally
as kretek (Borsuk, 1999: 151). Unfortunately, the income of clove farmers was not steady,
as it depended on the prevailing price for cloves. Nevertheless, there was little evidence of
56 See also the discussion on state capital in Chapter 4 (Section 5.3).
57 Interview with Dr Hadi Soesastro.
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collusion among the traders to buy low and sell high, as the cigarette-makers could bypass
the traders and buy direct from farmers (Borsuk, 1999: 151). This arrangement changed in
December 1990 when the government was directed by President Suharto to set up a Clove
Support and Marketing Board (BPPC), its official aim being to increase the incomes of
clove farmers that it alleged had been suppressed by cigarette manufacturers and clove
traders (Hill, 1992: 23). Cloves were thus designated an 'essential commodity' that needed
to be regulated by the state. The chair of the new board was Tommy, Suharto's youngest
son.
The reality was that in the late 1980s, a group of clove traders, after having failed to corner
the domestic clove market, sought out Tommy Suharto to help them set up a government-
sanctioned clove monopoly to buy from clove farmers and sell to the cigarette
manufacturers (Borsuk, 1992: 151). What the traders had not managed to accomplish on
their own was now to be achieved through political influence and state assistance.
Although the Board initially bought cloves from farmers at prices higher than the
prevailing market price, this could not be sustained in the face of the significant market
distortions the Board's actions were creating (Hill, 1992: 23). Amidst public outcry, the
President intervened and set a new, lower price for cloves, although the Board continued
to sell at far higher prices to cigarette manufacturers. The Board reaped substantial
monopoly profits as a result. The President's personal interest in maintaining his son's
clove monopoly explains why Indonesian policymakers, even if they privately preferred to
see the clove trade deregulated, had to insist on withdrawing cloves from the CEPT."
58 Hill (1992: 23-24) notes that considerable criticism was directed at the clove board by the House
Speaker and the Secretary-General of the government party, Golkar. These individuals, however,
wielded little political power in Indonesia's authoritarian, patronage-based political system centred
on President Suharto.
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4.3	 Post-Financial Crisis Developments
The second IMF bailout package signed in 1998 committed the Indonesian government to
eliminate BULOG's monopoly over the import and distribution of all agricultural
commodities including wheat flour and sugar by February 1998, although rice continued
to be regulated by the agency. The clove marketing board was also to be abolished by June
1998 (Soesastro and Basri, 1998: 24). The Habibie government that succeeded Suharto in
May 1998 managed to implement these reforms despite resistance from business actors
involved in the activities scheduled for deregulation. The ongoing reform process in
Indonesia, accompanied by the breakdown of the old patronage coalition centred around
Suharto,59 has made it easier for the government to reach a compromise with its ASEAN
counterparts and help resolve the impasse in agricultural liberalisation in AFTA. The next
chapter discusses this point in greater detail.
5.	 Trade Liberalisation of the Automotive Sector" in AFTA
All the core ASEAN countries maintained high MFN import tariffs on automobiles during
the 1990s, which also applied to trade in autos within ASEAN since all the ASEAN
governments had placed autos in their respective temporary exclusion lists.6I Except for
Singapore, all the other governments used high tariffs to shield domestic auto producers
from import competition. 62
 By 2000, all items in these lists, including autos, were
scheduled to be brought within the CEPT and their tariffs immediately lowered to 20 per
cent, after which tariffs were expected to fall to the AFTA 0-5 per cent end tariff range by
59 See Robison and Rosser (2000).
60 Although the automotive sector comprises a range of vehicles, the discussion focuses on
passenger cars, on which the automobile dispute in AFTA centres.
61 Malaysia had the highest number of automotive sector tariff lines — 246 —in the TEL, compared
to Thailand's 7, Indonesia's 45 and 56 for the Philippines. Information is from the ASEAN
Secretariat.
62	 •Singapore's high tariffs on autos is part of the government's traffic management system, which
also includes an area road pricing scheme and an auction system for car import permits.
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2002/2003. Malaysia, however, announced in 1999 that it would seek ASEAN approval
for a two-year delay for auto trade liberalisation in AFTA. This raised an outcry from the
other ASEAN countries but especially from Thailand, which was poised to emerge as the
regional centre for auto production spearheaded by foreign capital.
The Malaysian move came at a highly inopportune time — during the fmancial crisis
period. The ASEAN governments, Malaysia included, were under considerable pressure to
attract FDI to restore economic growth, and one of the instruments they employed was the
potential single AFTA market. 63 They were also keen to reassure foreign direct investors
that they remained committed to open markets. Malaysia, especially, had been subject to
considerable criticism over its illiberal policy responses to the fmancial crisis that had
culminated in the imposition of temporary capital controls in September 1998 (Khoo,
2000). Malaysia's decision to delay CEPT liberalisation of its auto sector appeared to be
ill timed and counter-productive from the point of view of remaining attractive to FDI.
5.1	 Indonesia and the Philippines: Late Liberalisers
Although the Philippines had started the decade with high auto tariffs, this was gradually
lowered and by October 1999, MFN tariffs on passenger car imports ranged from 10 per
cent (for completely knocked down units, CKD) to 40 per cent (for completely built up
units, CBU) (Legewe, 2000: 9). Indonesian tariffs on passenger cars too had fallen from
200 per cent to between 65-80 per cent for CBU and from 65 per cent to between 35-50
per cent for CKD under the June 1999 tariff reform exercise (Aswicahyono et al, 2000:
224).
63 This point is discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 4.2).
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Before this, the Suharto children had been major players in the industry, protected by the
industry's high tariff structure. With the end in 1998 to the controversial national car
policy that had allocated preferential benefits solely to Tommy Suharto's Humpuss
conglomerate,64 the Indonesian government adopted a more liberal stance on auto
liberalisation in AFTA, rejecting domestic business demands to delay the CEPT for
autos.65 In a bid to help domestic car producers, however, the government decided against
according CEPT preferences to the import of second-hand or re-conditioned cars, which
were more likely to compete with the domestic industry than new autos.66
5.2	 The Malaysian and Thai Auto Industries: Divergent Development Paths
Malaysia's move to delay liberalising the auto sector in AFTA and Thailand's vehement
response stemmed from the divergent development trajectories of the auto sector in these
two countries.° Malaysia's industry is essentially state-led, while the private sector has
largely driven developments in the Thai automobile sector although the Thai government
had attempted to shape the industry's development path using policy instruments such as
the tariff and local content regulations. Their dissimilar development paths reflected
distinct domestic political economy dynamics. The auto industry in Malaysia was
designed to fulfil multiple objectives, economic as well as political, through the country's
national car project. The Thai industry, on the other hand, was not beset by such demands.
64 Details of Indonesia's national car project are found in Borsuk (1999: 147-49) and Aswicahyono
et al (2000).
65 The Indonesian Automobile Industry Association, GAIKINDO had raised this issue a number of
times since 1999. See Bisnis Indonesia, 8 December 1999; Jakarta Post, 28 June 2000; and Jakarta
Post, 6 July 2000.
66 Interview with Dr Haryo Aswicahyono, an economist with the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies in Jakarta, July 2000.
67 Abdulsomad (1998) provides a comprehensive discussion of the Malaysian and Thai auto
industries.
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Automobile production in Thailand: driven by foreign capital
Despite their distinct trajectories, the 1960s saw similar import-substitution strategies
adopted in both countries based on domestic assembly of cars using imported CKD kits
(Abdulsomad, 1998: 275). It was only from the 1980s that the development paths of the
auto industries in Thailand and Malaysia began to diverge. The Thai industry continued
along the protected, import-substitution path begun in the 1960s and involved private local
and foreign capital. In 1991, however, the Thai industry was liberalised substantially, part
of the broader liberalising trend initiated by the post-coup government of Anand
Panyarachun (Thailand, 2000). Some restrictions were maintained, notably local content
regulations. 68 Nevertheless, the liberalising trend forced domestic automobile assembly
and component firms to improve efficiency and produce higher quality cars and
components to meet international standards for export (Abdulsomad, 1998: 282).
Automotive tariffs under AFTA were reduced to 0-5 per cent in 2000, well ahead of the
CEPT schedule, although MIN rates were set at 33 per cent for CKD and 80 per cent for
CBU (Thailand, 2000: 11).
Substantial investment from foreign auto-makers and component suppliers flowed into
Thailand during the 1990s, partly encouraged by Malaysia's monopolised car sector,
which soon led to Thailand emerging as the centre for automobile and auto parts
manufacturing in Asia (Abdulsomad, 1998: 275-84). By 1995, half of all vehicles
produced in Southeast Asia were made in Thailand. 69 Investors who had established or
were planning to establish automobile plants in the country included the big names in the
industry like Ford, General Motors, BMW, and Honda (Thailand, 2000: 12). Many of
them were looking ahead to liberalisation of the automobile industry under AFTA that was
68 These were removed in 2000 in line with Thailand's commitment to the GATT/WTO (Thailand,
2000: 7).
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scheduled to begin in 2000 and were positioning themselves to exploit the regional market
using Thailand as a production base.
Thus, Malaysia's move to temporarily withdraw automobiles from AFTA disciplines was
a blow to automobile firms located in Thailand. Major foreign automobile players in
Thailand began pressing the Thai government to ensure that AFTA remained on track for
automobiles.70 In fact, BMW's President, Karsten Engel, has said that the expansion of
BMW's Thai plant will depend on the completion of the single AFTA market in
automobiles.71 The Malaysian automobile market was large, accounting for a quarter of
total vehicle sales in the four core ASEAN countries (excluding Singapore) in 1996. The
value of the Malaysian market to automobile manufacturers paradoxically increased as a
result of the financial crisis, since large declines in vehicle sales in the other three
countries meant that Malaysia's share of the regional market rose to about 42 per cent.72
The Malaysian segment of the regional market in automobiles is, therefore, crucial to
global automobile players who had set up in Thailand with an eye on the regional market.
The Malaysian auto industry: driven by domestic capital and multiple goals
Although Malaysia has long had a domestic car industry based on the assembly of foreign
vehicles, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir opted to develop • an indigenous
automobile manufacturing capability in the country through a national car project.
Introduced in the early 1980s, it was part of Mahathir's heavy industries programme.
Proton, the national car company, involved state capital while a minority equity stake was
awarded to Mitsubishi of Japan, which provided the technical input. In the 1990s, a second
69 Malay Mail, 'Cashing in on booming Thai mart', 28 September 1995.
7° Interview with Mr Manasvi Srisodapol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, August
2000.
71 NST, 'BMW: expansion of Thai unit hinges on AFTA', 13 October 2000.
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national car project was adopted called the Perodua, involving a mix of state capital,
domestic private capital and foreign capital, notably through Daihatsu of Japan. The
Perodua catered to the small passenger car segment, and thus did not directly compete
with the Proton. Other national car projects involving Proton, ethnic Malay private capital
and foreign investors such as Citroen of France were also encouraged. The national car
industry developed through extensive state support that ranged from high import tariffs on
competing products, direct and indirect financial assistance as well as government
procurement (Tyndall, 1999: 4).
Despite the rapid growth of the national car industry, the multiple goals of the Malaysian
national car project led to conflicts between the imperative of growth and efficiency on the
one hand and the demands of distribution on the other. The industry had been established
to accomplish three objectives. First, it was set up to promote the development of an
integrated industrial sector with greater technological depth. Second, and related to the
first objective, the project was part of Mahathir's vision to take Malaysia into the ranks of
developed countries possessing an indigenous manufacturing and technological capability.
Finally, the national car project was expected to catalyse the emergence of an ethnic
Malay business community to fulfil the country's New Economic Policy goal of creating a
Malay commercial and industrial class. Although ethnic Malay capital was involved in
automobile manufacturing through the national car project, this was confined to the
business elite with strong links to the political elite. The creation of a more extensive
ethnic Malay business community was to be achieved through stimulating the growth of
ethnic Malay automotive component suppliers to the national car project.
72 Data calculated from information from the respective national automobile industry associations.
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Distribution occurred at two levels. First, the preferential policies supporting the national
car project, including the high tariff wall, redistributed income to the national car firms
from existing producers, namely the local assemblers who were not part of the national car
project and from consumers who had to pay exorbitant prices for car purchases. For
instance, tariffs on CBU ranged from 140-200 per cent while tariffs of 42 per cent were
slapped on CKD imports (Tyndall, 1999: 47). The national car project was also said to
enjoy effective protection rates that were ten times that enjoyed by the non-national cars.73
The resultant gains or rents were redirected to the national car project. At a second level,
there was a further distribution of income, including monopoly rents, from the national car
firms like Proton to the automotive component suppliers who were largely ethnic Malay.
The government had instituted a Vendor Development Programme (VDP) that required
Proton and Perodua to procure component parts from domestic auto-parts suppliers. The
VDP involved nurturing vendors, especially ethnic Malay vendors with little experience in
the industry. It was the main vehicle to achieve the ethnic restructuring objective of the
national car project, and it was responsible for increasing the proportion of ethnic Malay
component suppliers in the country from 23 per cent in 1985 to 49 per cent by 1998
(Tyndall, 1999: 14). The national car firms, however, have had to share their considerable
rents with their vendors by paying high prices for components, which were often of poor
quality. The guaranteed market did not provide sufficient incentive for domestic vendors
to improve efficiency, as they could still enjoy substantial returns. Although most auto
parts were placed on the fast-track schedule of the CEPT, many vendors were not
adversely affected as Proton and Perodua guaranteed purchase of the output from their
official vendors (Tyndall, 1999: 14, 24).
73 Interview with Mr Paramjit Singh Tyndall, Research Fellow at the Malaysian Institute of
Economic Research in Kuala Lumpur, August 2000.
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The Malaysian national car project and liberalisation
Even as early as 1995, market analysts predicted that the national cars would be unable to
withstand global market competition and that early liberalisation was inadvisable. 74 The
Malaysian government too failed to clarify its position on the industry's liberalisation
schedule under the CEPT.75 Moreover, Proton, Perodua and the auto-parts suppliers were
all badly affected by the 1997 financial crisis due to the combined effects of the weakened
ringgit, the reduced purchasing power and cautious attitude of consumers, and domestic
credit tightening measures (Tyndall, 1999: 21). Although tariffs were raised in 1998 to
help the industry cope,76 it was clear that the government had to come to a decision with
regard to CEPT liberalisation. Malaysia was due to lower CEPT tariffs on all products,
including automobiles, to 20 per cent in 2000.
The ambiguous government attitude to tariff liberalisation of the automobile sector
reflected the conflict facing the national car project. On the one hand, the Prime Minister's
aim was not to nurture an inefficient, protected domestic auto industry but to Create an
export-oriented, efficient Malaysian auto industry that would be able to survive in the
global market. 77 On the other hand, it was clear that AFTA liberalisation would pit Proton
against the global automobile giants like Ford, General Motors, Honda, Toyota and
Nissan, which had all set up or were planning to establish manufacturing plants in
Thailand to supply to the ASEAN and wider Asian market. These players were also
74 Investors Digest, 'On the horns of a dilemma', 16 March 1995.
75 Business Times, 'Automotive industry must be profitable on its own: PM', 24 September 1997.
76 The 1998 national budget exercise raised import duties from 140-200 per cent on CBU to 140-
300 per cent, and from 42 per cent on CKD to 42-80 per cent. See Tyndall (1999: 47). This further
hurt domestic assemblers of foreign (non-national) vehicles.
77 Business Times, 'Automotive industry must be profitable on its own: PM', 24 September 1997.
234
expanding their plants in Malaysia in the run-up to AFTA's completion. 78 Proton
especially was not expected to survive what was effectively global market competition
within a liberalised ASEAN market, nor in its home market 79
 given its history of protected
development. 80
 Industry analysts predicted that Thailand's TNC-driven industry would
have a competitive edge over subsidised industries like Proton, which would place Thai
automobile firms well ahead of Proton with AFTA liberalisation.81
Although constantly castigating the national car firms to improve their efficiency and
competitiveness and warning them that the government would not protect them
indefinitely, the Prime Minister, nevertheless, acknowledged that temporary protection
was necessary to develop an indigenous manufacturing capability in the country beyond
mere vehicle assembly. 82
 Dr Mahathir maintained that the Thai automobile industry was
merely an assembly industry relying on foreign capital producing foreign cars and
contrasted it with the Malaysian strategy of developing an indigenous technological and
engineering capability in automobile production. 83
 The dispute between Malaysia and
Thailand over automobiles stemmed from the distinct nature of the industry in the two
counties, with their incompatible priorities. Thailand emphasised growth and efficiency
through foreign capital while Malaysia focused on nurturing domestic capital for both
economic and political reasons, and thus emphasised both growth and distribution.
78 Business Times, 'Big boys are beefing up Malaysian operations', 4 July 2000.
79 Market analyst Valuer Dresdner Kleinwort Benson projected a decline in Proton's share of the
domestic market to about 30 per cent from 65 per cent in 2000 once the Malaysian market is
liberalised under AFTA. See Business Times, 'Proton share of domestic car mart to shrink: study', 8
September 2000.
89 Perodua, in contrast to Proton, was ready for a liberalised AFTA market. Perodua has the only
plant in ASEAN producing small passenger vehicles of less than one litre capacity. The company,
thus, had a niche market in ASEAN. Unfortunately, Perodua has had to toe the official line with
regards to AFTA. Interview with Paramjit Singh Tyndall of the Malaysian Institute of Economic
Research.
81 Bangkok Post, 'Thai car industry a key to sustainable growth', 13 June 1997.
82 Business Times, 'Automotive industry must be profitable on its own: PM', 24 September 1997.
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Although both countries shared broadly similar goals for the CEPT — as a means to attract
foreign capital to the region — differences emerged in the specific case of automobiles.
Despite delaying the liberalisation of automobiles in AFTA, it became clear that the
Malaysian government was preparing for eventual liberalisation of the industry.
Additional steps were taken to improve the efficiency of the national car firms. Proton
expanded its programme to build up an in-house engineering capability by making plans to
purchase a second foreign automobile engineering firm, this time from the US. 84 Proton's
purchase in 1996 of an 80 per cent stake in British carmaker, Lotus Cars, had paid
dividends. Proton had used the engineering capability of Lotus to develop its own
proprietary engine, which was unveiled in 2000 at the Lotus plant in the UK. This
development was expected to enable Proton to reduce its 15-year dependence on
Mitsubishi for engines, thereby saving Proton about 25 per cent in costs." Industry
analysts also endorsed Proton's plans to sell the 1.3 litre and 1.6 litre petrol engine to other
carmakers with assembly operations in the region, given the demand for inexpensive
engines. The engine's modular design also meant that high volume production runs were
not needed to recoup investment costs.86
Both Proton and Perodua also began global sourcing of component parts,87 departing from
their previous policy of obtaining high-cost supplies from their stable of domestic,
especially ethnic Malay vendors. The VDP, which had been the key instrument to
83 See FEER, `Mahathir interview — 2', 24 June 1999. Also see NST, 'PM: Malaysia seeks delay in
opening auto sector', 31 May 2000.
84 Financial Times, 'Proton uses its delay in liberalisation to prepare for rise in foreign
competition', 11 October 2000.
85 Ibid.
86 Business Times, 'S-ENG will give Proton more mileage', 9 October 2000.
87 Interview with Mr Razak Ramli of the Malaysian Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
August 2000.
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implement the ethnic policy in the automotive sector, was clearly being placed on the
backburner. This move suggests that the efficiency imperative had become dominant. This
was reflected in the government's refusal to delay liberalising tariffs on automotive parts
in AFTA, despite expectations by vendors that the government would protect them.88
Finally, and most interestingly, the Prime Minister agreed to allow Proton to sell a further
equity stake in the company to foreign automobile firms, provided this was not more than
30 per cent. 89 Proton's need for foreign technical expertise to stay in the game,
notwithstanding its ownership of Lotus, overcame Dr Mahathir's traditional resistance to
the idea of selling Proton to foreign carmakers. 9° Sources revealed that two US auto firms
had expressed interest in the deal — Ford and Daimler Chrysler. 91 This move suggests that
the goal of developing an efficient and internationally competitive national automotive
industry had become overwhelming, with the Prime Minister warning Proton that "we
cannot protect you anymore".92
Failure of Proton, Mahathir's favoured project, would likely reflect badly on the Prime
Minister and would add to the growing voices of opposition against him, especially in the
ethnic Malay community. While it was clear that the need to emphasise the efficiency of
Proton had become compelling, a pure growth/efficiency strategy that left outcomes to
market forces was not adopted. The market was being kept in abeyance for a period of
time through the CEPT delay to allow time for the national car project to try and meet
international competitiveness standards, and thus to ensure its survival as well as vindicate
Mahathir's vision of producing a Malaysian national car. This suggests, however, that the
88 Business Times, 'Local car part makers to face foreign competition', 8 September 1999.
89 NST, 'Foreign firms to hold not more than 30pc stake in national car', 7 October 2000.
90 NST, 'Attempts to take over Proton revealed', 19 July 2000.
91 From Associated Press, 'Malaysia's Proton narrows search for partner', 9 October 2000.
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two-year exemption from AFTA may well be extended if Proton's post-liberalisation
survival remains in doubt.
6.	 Conclusion
This chapter confirms the second proposition advanced in the dissertation, namely that
when the imperative of distribution became overwhelming, national governments chose to
shield particular segments of domestic capital from regional liberalisation, including
developmental regionalism. Despite the ambitious commitments that had been made to
advance the regional project, and indeed despite the general success in implementing the
CEPT, delays and difficulties were encountered in sectors like services, petrochemicals,
agriculture and automobiles as a result of concerns with distribution. Fairly serious
disputes emerged in agriculture and automobiles, often involving threats of retaliation and
counter-threats, as member governments sought to re-negotiate their original
commitments. These cases in particular clearly illustrate the sensitivities involved when
regional liberalisation touched sectors in which domestic firms with strong ties to the
political elite were dominant.
How member governments addressed these disputes is a question that has yet to be
adequately answered in the literature. As the introductory chapter noted, many scholars
not only expected such disputes to emerge in AFTA they also predicted that the disputes
would lead to a breakdown of AFTA. This clearly did not happen, as the discussion so far
shows. The next chapter attempts to answer this question by analysing how member
governments attempted to rebalance the growth-distribution trade-off at the regional level,
in the process ensuring AFTA's continuation.
92 NST, 'Gear up to face AFTA challenges, PM tells Proton', 17 February 2001.
238
CHAPTER 6
IMPLEMENTATION AS A POLITICAL PROCESS:
Taking Care of Growth and Distribution
1.	 Introduction
Although external pressures stemming from globalisation drove ambitious commitments
in AFTA towards open and developmental regionalism, the previous chapter reveals that
sustaining regionalism itself became an onerous task due to domestic political priorities
that emphasised distribution over growth. The latter led to disputes among member
governments, particularly over agriculture and automobiles that threatened to stall the
AFTA project. Yet, AFTA did not collapse. This chapter focuses on how these conflicts
were addressed at the regional level in ASEAN that enabled the cooperative process to
proceed. The main argument advanced in the chapter is that implementation of AFTA
became a political process, rather than merely a technical one of complying with
commitments already made. Member governments bargained over implementation in
order to address the growth-distribution tension within, and consequently between,
member countries.
The analysis is located outside the globalisation-regionalism theoretical framework that
framed the discussion in chapters 3, 4 and 5, with insights drawn from the TR literature on
international cooperation. Much of this literature emphasises either the role of hegemonic
power in maintaining cooperative processes or the role of institutions in sustaining
cooperation (Keohane, 1989). Yet, AFTA has made significant advances in regional
economic cooperation despite the absence of a regional leader and even though the
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institutional structures considered to be necessary to ensure implementation were not put
in place when the project was initiated.'
The institutional argument is not rejected outright, however. The chapter takes the position
that institutional structures can emerge out of the implementation process itself rather than
simply prior to implementation, particularly in non-hegemonic settings. These emergent
institutions, in turn, structure the game in ways that help to advance the cooperative
process. This is one of the insights from the literature on compliance or post-agreement
bargaining, which is well suited to explaining implementation in settings lacking a clear
leader or hegemon, as in ASEAN/AFTA. Section 2 draws on this literature to advance an
analytical framework to discuss implementation processes in AFTA. Section 3 uses two
specific disputes in AFTA — over agriculture and automobiles — to analyse how
implementation problems were addressed through compliance bargaining that led to both
the downward revision of original commitments and institutional strengthening. Section 4
examines in some detail institution building processes in AFTA as an outcome of
compliance bargaining using a framework of institutionalisation developed specifically for
the dissertation.
2.	 Implementation as a Political Process: Theoretical Insights from the
Literature on Compliance Bargaining and International Institutions
Compliance bargaining between states refers to all those bargaining and negotiation
processes that follow from the conclusion of international agreements, a tend that is quite
common in international negotiations (Jonsson and Tallberg, 1998: 376-97). This
perspective recognises that a cooperative agreement does not solve all problems once and
I This is a common argument in the literature. See, for instance, Mattli (1999: 170-71) and
Ravenhill (1995: 859).
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for all, but instead creates a new bargaining situation once an agreement has been adopted.
It provides useful insights on implementation as a political process, particularly with
regards to what happens in the event of non-compliance. In compliance bargaining
situations, bargaining strategies are adopted by both the 'guardians' and 'violators' of
agreements to advance their respective positions during implementation. This is
particularly true for self-help situations in non-hegemonic settings where a third party
enforcer or prosecutor is absent, a situation that characterises ASEAN.2
In such settings, the managerial approach is likely to prevail in compliance bargaining
processes rather than sanctioning approaches that regard compliance as an enforcement
problem (Jonsson and Tallberg, 1998: 376). 3 The management school does not regard non-
compliance as a deliberate decision by governments to violate an agreement. 4 Instead, it
regards non-compliance as the outcome of ambiguities in the agreement, the limited
technical capacity of governments to comply with the agreement, or unexpected social,
economic or political developments that make compliance difficult to achieve (Chayes and
Chayes, 1993: 188; Jonsson and Tallberg, 1998: 382-83). 5 The use of in-built sanctioning
or punishment measures in agreements (the enforcement approach) is rejected in favour of
managerial solutions, which emphasise persuasion or "jawboning" — the effort to persuade
2 Emmerson's assertion in the late 1980s that ASEAN is not a hegemonic system, but is
characterised by balanced disparity (Emmerson, 1987) still holds today. Indonesia may be the
largest country in ASEAN, but its dominant status by geographical, population and GDP size is
balanced by the more advanced economic status of Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia, the three
richest ASEAN countries in terms of per capita income levels.
3 Works belonging to the management school are Chayes and Chayes (1993, 1995) and Keohane
(1984). The enforcement school includes the work of Martin (1992) and Yarborough and
Yarborough (1992).
4 On the contrary, the enforcement school treats non-compliance as a deliberate decision by a
member state to violate its commitments under the cooperative agreement. In this approach,
cooperation is facilitated by the provision of effective enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms
that deter potential violators. A study of 125 international treaties showed that sanctioning authority
is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used
(Chayes and Chayes, 1995: 32).
5 The last was clearly the main factor for non-compliance in AFTA, as Chapter 5 shows.
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the violator to alter its behaviour (Chayes and Chayes, 1995: 25). Thus, compliance
bargaining strategies adopted by treaty guardians may include persuasion in addition to or
instead of threats to impose sanctions or the mobilisation of social and political pressure.
The violator's main bargaining strategy may also consist of persuasion, apart from
promises of rewards in return for tolerance of deviant behaviour or threats of retaliation.
In such instances, the search for mutually acceptable solutions might entail compromises
that do not fully conform to the original agreement. This will be especially true when
partners in the agreement lack the means of forcing violators into compliance, as in the
case of ASEAN. In such instances, partners may decide to accept a lower level of
compliance rather than risk the cooperative agreement in total (Chayes and Chayes, 1993:
184). Compliance bargaining processes generally also result in institutional strengthening.
Apart from revisions to original commitments, members often attempt to enhance
transparency of the cooperative process, tighten rules and procedures, and improve dispute
resolution mechanisms in order to deal with non-compliance problems themselves
(Jonsson and Tallberg, 1998: 375).
Compliance bargaining and institutions
Institutions work to advance cooperation in two ways. Martins and Simmons (1998: 739-
42) identify informational and distributional models of institutions based respectively on
the two central problems in international cooperation, namely how to prevent cheating and
how to resolve distributional conflict.
Informational models stress the role of international institutions in providing information
to participating governments to help overcome the fear of cheating that is regarded as the
primary impediment to collaboration. Information improves transparency of government
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actions, thus facilitating the negotiation of cooperative agreements, the monitoring of
agreements made, and allows compliance (or non-compliance) to be more easily observed.
While the literature emphasises the primary audience to be other governments, this chapter
suggests that informational institutions can also be directed at influencing non-state actors,
business actors for instance, by signalling to the latter that the commitments made by
governments are credible. Institution building is likely to be especially important when
downward re-negotiation of the original commitments in compliance bargaining processes
raise some doubts with regard to the future of the cooperative project.
Distributional models, on the other hand, address the problem of the unequal distribution
of gains and losses between countries that impedes cooperation. Drawing on insights from
legislative politics at the domestic level, particularly from the American experience,
Martin and Simmons (1998: 741) argue that cooperation can be advanced through
institutional structures that allow participants to link issues and cut deals with each other.
This chapter modifies this argument and suggests that institutions emerging out of a
process of bargaining that results in a lower level of compliance facilitate cooperation by
allowing gains and losses to be traded between countries. Negotiating a lower level of
compliance transfers gains to the violator from the offended party and from others for
whom the original commitment was superior. In the process, the violating government is
able to address domestic concerns with distribution. Nevertheless, all parties gain over the
long run since this act allows a valuable cooperative process, AFTA in this case, to be
maintained. The alternative may well have been the breakdown of the project.
The rest of this chapter fleshes out these arguments using the empirical material already
presented in the preceding chapters, especially Chapters 2 and 5. The discussion focuses
on how compliance bargaining processes that were set in motion by problems encountered
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during implementation of AFTA in turn led to both downward revisions to original
commitments and institution building as member governments attempted to re-balance
growth and distributive concerns at the regional level.
3.	 Compliance Bargaining in AFTA
Two of the most notable disputes in AFTA — over liberalising trade in agriculture and
automobiles — arose out of problems certain member governments had with implementing
commitments already adopted. This was discussed in the previous chapter. The discussion
that follows reveals in greater detail how compliance bargaining processes were set in
motion as a result of these disputes. Although bargaining was protracted, it eventually
allowed the problem to be resolved, though at a lower level of compliance than the initial
agreement. Nevertheless, these bargaining processes also led to institutional strengthening
in AFTA.
3.1	 Compliance Bargaining and Agricultural Trade Liberalisation
Indonesia triggered the dispute in ASEAN over agriculture when in early 1995 the
Indonesian government backtracked on its earlier decision to liberalise trade in 15
unprocessed agricultural products by 2003. The said items, notably cloves, sugar, wheat
and rice had initially been placed in Indonesia's temporary exclusion list in 1994, which
would have required the government to liberalise trade in these items at the latest from
2000 and to remove associated NTBs. In early 1995, Indonesia transferred the 15 products
to its sensitive list, which effectively provided indefinite protection for these items. The
domestic political sensitivities associated with these particular items, discussed in the
previous chapter, explain the Indonesian government's action on this issue and its
subsequent refusal to budge from its original position.
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Indonesia's move provoked a sharp response from Thailand, a major agricultural exporter.
The Thai government then threatened to withdraw 44 agricultural products from AFTA in
retaliation. After intense discussion, a compromise was finally reached later that year. The
Eighth AFTA Council in December 1995 allowed Indonesia to shelter the 15 items until
2010 by creating a new temporary exclusion list specific to agricultural products. 6 To lend
some order to this process, only agricultural items regulated by state-trading enterprises
would qualify for inclusion in the new temporary exclusion list in agriculture, which was
consistent with GATT/WTO practices. In fact, Indonesia had cited this particular GATT
clause when it initially transferred the 15 products to its sensitive list. 7 The items excluded
by Indonesia were regulated by state-trading agencies, namely BULOG for rice, sugar and
wheat and the BPPC for cloves.
The Thai government was placated by the move, which would have extended the
exemption period for these items, including the all-important rice, to 2010 instead of
indefinitely as Indonesia had originally intended. 8 The Thai Finance Minister stressed that
his government could "accept a lateral reclassification of the Indonesian products to
another temporary exclusion category, but not a negative transfer of the items to
Indonesia's sensitive list". 9 Unfortunately, the Indonesian officials at the meeting changed
their minds only a day after the compromise had been adopted, and expressed reservations
about meeting the new 2010 deadline: 9 The issue remained unresolved until the following
April when the Ninth AFTA Council confirmed that the deadline for agricultural tariff
liberalisation would remain Janliary 2010. Member governments were, however, allowed
6 See the Joint Press Statement of the Eighth AFTA Council Meeting held on 10 December 1995 in
Bangkok.
7 Interview with Ms Doojduan Sasanavin, Senior Policy and Plan Analyst with the Thai Ministry of
Agriculture and Cooperatives, August 2000.
8 AWSJ, 'ASEAN defuses trade dispute with Jakarta' 11 December 1995.
9 Ibid.
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to determine the ending tariff rates on those agricultural products in the parallel temporary
exclusion list, which could be higher than 5 per cent.11
The Indonesian government was still keen to delay liberalisation of the fifteen items until
2020. The Philippine government, wishing to delay liberalising trade in rice and sugar,
backed the Indonesian position. Both governments were reported as having refused to
accept the 2010 deadline adopted by the Ninth AFTA Counci1. 12 Indonesia later declared,
in September 1996, that it would wee to accept the 2010 deadline for all the said items,
except rice and sugar that the government deemed to be 'highly sensitive' products.
Indonesia wanted a 2020 deadline for CEPT liberalisation for these two items. This did not
please the Thai govemment.13
This episode is clearly an instance of compliance bargaining in which the disputants,
notably Thailand and Indonesia, employed both persuasion and threats. In the end, a
compromise was reached when ASEAN member governments agreed to allow Indonesia
until 2010 to finalise CEPT liberalisation of the 15 products it had initially Withdrawn
from AFTA. This represented a lower level of compliance over the original commitment,
and was to Indonesia's benefit although the government still attempted to extend the
exemption period to 2020 for sugar and rice. The compromise allowed Indonesia to
preserve domestic monopoly arrangements involving firms and individuals with strong
connections to the political elite. Indonesia's domestic distribution concerns were,
therefore, addressed through compliance bargaining.
10
 A -- -9WJj 'ASEAN fine tunes services liberalisation', 12 December 1995.
NST, 'Council sets deadline for tariff reduction', 27 April 1996.
12 Business Times, 'Officials deadlocked on farm issue', 11 September 1996; Jakarta Post, 11
September 1996.
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Member governments, nevertheless, attempted to tighten up loopholes and introduced
rules and procedures to govern the treatment of agricultural products. Negotiations
continued for the next three years over the issue, which ended in the adoption of the
Protocol on Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Products in September 1999. Indonesia
classified only rice as a highly sensitive product in the Protocol, as did the Philippines and
Malaysia, for which fmal tariff rates of between 0 and 20 per cent were due by 2010.
Thailand was, unfortunately the loser in the short term, since it could not export rice to
Indonesia at preferential rates until 2010, and then only if Indonesia adhered to the
Protocol. Thailand was compelled to compromise on the issue since AFTA had become a
vital part of Thailand's economy. The AFTA market was vital to Thailand, second only to
the US market in 1998." Thailand was, therefore, unwilling to jeopardise the entire AFTA
project by refusing to compromise over agriculture. 15 Thailand attempted to safeguard its
growth priorities over the longer term by agreeing to compromise on this issue. Although
the formal Protocol benefits Thailand by stipulating deadlines and ending tariff rates by all
parties, it does not guarantee that members will adhere to them. Compliance by Indonesia
has, nevertheless, been made easier by the crisis-induced domestic economic reforms that
removed the monopoly interests behind much of Indonesia's response to agricultural trade
liberalisation in the CEPT over the previous five years.
3.2	 Compliance Bargaining and the Dispute over Automobiles
In early 1999, Malaysia requested that it be allowed to delay until 2005 the transfer of
automobiles from the temporary exclusion list to the inclusion list, citing the problems
13 Jakarta Post, 11 September 1996.
14 While the US market took 22 per cent of Thai exports in 1998, almost 18 per cent went to the
ASEAN-10 market, still a significant proportion given the crisis-induced recession in the region.
Trade data was obtained from the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2000.
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experienced by Malaysia's national car project as a result of the 1997-98 financial crisis.
All the ASEAN countries were dismayed by this development, particularly Thailand. The
previous chapter shows how Thailand was poised to be the regional hub for foreign/global
automobile producers planning to produce and export to the rest of ASEAN from Thailand
if a free trade area in automobiles were in place. Like agriculture, this episode of
compliance bargaining also involved threats of retaliation being made between Thailand
and Malaysia, as well as persuasion and offers of rewards.
The dispute over automobiles was far more threatening to the core ASEAN countries than
agriculture. Unlike agriculture, the automobile issue was more relevant to the creation of a
single regional market for manufacturing activity, in which foreign investors in particular
were interested. Moreover, Malaysia's delay request, made right in the throes of the
financial crisis, raised questions among foreign investors about the future of the single
regional market. The delay issue was a key item of discussion during the joint ASEAN
investment promotion missions to the US and Europe in 1999-2000.16
Business leaders, particularly from the US and Japan, were understandably worried.
American automobile firms, like their Japanese counterparts, had invested substantially in
Thailand with the intention of exporting to the regional market once AFTA commitments
in automobiles came into force from 2000. Gerald Kania, President of ASEAN Operations
for Ford Motor Company warned that "implementation of AFTA is central to this region's
ability to attract large-scale capital flows". 17 Other US firms in the telecommunications, air
express and pharmaceutical sectors acknowledged that they were holding off investing
further in the ASEAN region due to the automobile issue. These firms were also weighing
15 Interview with the Secretary General of ASEAN, Mr Rodolfo Severino Jr.16 Bangkok Post, 'Group must get serious about backing free trade', 2 October 2000.
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the benefits of committing their regional investments to China, which had re-emerged as
an attractive investment site with its impending entry into the WT0. 18 Japanese firms with
substantial investments in the ASEAN countries were also worried that Malaysia's move
might open the floodgates with more members clamouring to withdraw other products
from AFTA.19
Thailand, the country with the most to lose from Malaysia's move, began a series of
bilateral discussions with the Malaysian government to seek a solution to the impasse, but
these were unsuccessful. As in the case of agriculture, the Thai government was in a weak
bargaining position. It was noted in the previous chapter that the Malaysian automobile
market constituted the largest segment of the potential regional market for automobiles.
For Thailand, an open Malaysian automobile market was, therefore, the superior option.2°
On the other hand, the Thai government had nothing to offer the Malaysian government as
a quid pro quo.
Although the Thai government threatened to delay reducing tariffs on imports of palm oil
products, a key export item for Malaysia, if Malaysia insisted on exempting automobiles,
the Thai threat was ineffectual. 21 Malaysia's main export markets for palm oil products lay
outside ASEAN, in Pakistan and China (Malaysia, 1998: xxvii). In an interesting twist,
Malaysia reportedly lobbied the Thai government to delay liberalising tariffs on palm oil
products so that it could proceed likewise for automobiles. 22 In the end, the Thai
17 Business Times (Singapore), 'Why US firms find ASEAN less appealing', 6 October 2000.
18 Ibid.
19 Interview with Mr Kong Mun Pew of the Singapore Trade Development Board, August 2000.
29 Interviews with Mr Rodolfo Severino Jr, and with Mr Karun Kittisataporn of Thailand.
21 The Nation, 'Tariff reduction set despite Malaysia move', 30 September 1999.
22 This was pointed out by Mr Cherdpong Siriwit, Director General of the Office of Industrial
Economics, Thailand. See The Nation, 'Tariff reduction set despite Malaysia move', 30 September
1999.
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government decided not to exclude palm oil products from CEPT disciplines, irrespective
of the Malaysian position on automobiles. 23 This was for purely internal reasons, to avoid
disadvantaging domestic food manufacturers who would have otherwise had to pay higher
prices for palm oil inputs, although the mostly small farmers who produce palm oil were
likely to be hurt by tariff reduction in this sector.24
The Thai government instead urged the Malaysian trade authorities to use the emergency
safeguard clause in the CEPT to protect the automobile industry. Malaysian officials
refused, however. Under the terms of the CEPT, the emergency safeguard clause could
only be invoked if CEPT implementation caused injury to import-competing sectors. 25 In
other words, the Malaysia government would have had to first liberalise automobile tariffs
under the CEPT and then demonstrate injury to the domestic industry before it could use
the safeguard provision. The Malaysian government was not prepared to do so, given the
political importance of the national car project. 26
 In the end, ASEAN economic and
foreign ministers agreed to allow Malaysia to defer automobile tariff reduction. They had
little choice, because Malaysian trade officials had made it clear that the government was
prepared to leave the AFTA project if it's 'request' to delay tariff reduction on
automobiles was not granted. Thai foreign minister, Surin Pitsuwan, admitted that if
member governments did not acquiesce to the Malaysian demand, Malaysia "might say
'then to hell with AFTA'".27
23 The Nation, 'la's AFTA decision would cause a schism', 25 October 1999.
24 The Nation, 'Palm oil producers have most to lose', 22 October 1999.
25 See Article 6 of the CEPT Agreement (ASEAN, 1992c). This was confirmed by a Malaysian
trade official in a confidential interview.
26 The explicit instruction of the Malaysian Prime Minister was to defer CEPT tariff liberalisation
in automobiles only. No other sector was to be accorded the same privilege. Confidential interview
with a Malaysian trade official.
27 Financial Times, 'Malaysia trade exemption won through threat', 27 July 2000.
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Although none of the ASEAN governments wished to scupper what had become a crucial
economic project for them, and were therefore willing to go along with the Malaysian
position, they were also keen to place the entire exercise within a rule-based framework to
ensure the process was transparent and predictable. The ASEAN governments were
especially keen to reassure business actors, particularly foreign investors that AFTA
remained on track.28 A decision was made to formulate a Protocol on the Modification of
CEPT Concessions that would be based on GATT Article X.XVIll and would incorporate
a clause on compensation by the offending party.
While Malaysian trade officials rejected monetary forms of compensation, they were
prepared to provide other forms of compensation including compensatory tariff reduction
or technical assistance, which are also found in GATT Article XXVIII. 29 Thai trade
officials admitted, however, that compensation was a second best offer for Thailand.30
Malaysian tariffs were already low, while Thailand did not require development
assistance. Nevertheless, the Thai government planned to ask for compensatory tariff
reduction in agricultural commodities like sugar, rice and flour on which Malaysia
retained high tariffs. 31 In any case, the compensation clause was inserted to also deter
other governments in ASEAN from following the Malaysian example, and for whom
compensation would significantly raise the costs of withdrawing from AFTA disciplines.32
ASEAN officials and ministers were sufficiently realistic to acknowledge that they have
very little means of preventing any further delays by Malaysia in liberalising the
28 Interview with Mr Kong Mun Pew.
29 Interview with Mr Karun Kittisatapom.
313 Interview with Mr Karun Sittisatapom.
31 Business Times, 'Malaysia under pressure over automotive sector duties rollback', 3 October
2000.
32 Interview with Mr Karun Kittisatapom.
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automobiles sector under AFTA, even though the Protocol aims to raise the costs of doing
so through rule building.33 Although member governments have little rule enforcement
powers apart from diplomacy, they were clearly attempting to limit new requests for
delays from members through the Protocol by making the process of modifying
concessions sufficiently restrictive and costly to members. In doing so, they were
attempting to ensure that the conditions for growth were maintained in AFTA, while also
enabling a fellow member to address its particular concerns with domestic distribution.
4.	 Institution Building in AFTA: An Outcome of Compliance Bargaining
The outcome of bargaining over implementation in both the agriculture and automobile
cases led to the downward revision of commitments from those previously agreed.
Conversely, they also led to a process of institutional strengthening. Specifically, the
adoption of the Protocol on Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Products in the case of
agriculture and the Protocol on the Modification of CEPT Concessions in the case of
automobiles both involved inscribing rules and procedures. Rules and procedures
constitute a key dimension of institutionalisation, acting to constrain the future actions of
member governments and to provide greater transparency in cooperation. These functions
are important not only to convince other governments in the project to continue
cooperation they are also useful in convincing non-state actors, investors for instance, that
the regional project remains viable.
In fact, these two protocols were part of a broader process of institution building in AFTA
that took place throughout the 1990s triggered by problems and setbacks with
implementation. The discussion that follows examines in greater detail the process of
institutional strengthening in AFTA, first by developing a more precise framework to
33 Interview with Mr Kong Mun Pew.
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characterise institutions, which is then used to assess the extent of institution building in
AFTA.
4.1	 A Framework to Characterise Institutions
There is, thus far, no study that has determined the nature and extent of institution building
associated with AFTA. Although scholars like Acharya (1998: 212) and Henderson (1999:
23) point out that AFTA appeared to involve a greater degree of formality and institutions
than other cooperative activities in ASEAN, the precise nature of these institutions has not
been established. 34
 This is a necessary task, since the compliance bargaining framework
adopted in the chapter sees institution building as one of the two key outcomes of
bargaining over implementation. Before an empirical assessment can be made of whether
AFTA was indeed accompanied by a process of institutional strengthening, it is necessary
to develop a baseline or ideal-typical model of strong and weak institutions. Such a model
is presented in Table 6.1.
Those studying institutional structures relevant to economic cooperation in ASEAN tend
to regard institutions as synonymous with organisational structures, and thus focus
extensively on administrative structures as well as decision-making hierarchies. 35 While
organisational structures clearly have a role to play in facilitating the establishment and
implementation of cooperative agreements, institutions are best seen as something more
than formal organisations that possess "personnel, budgets, and physical structures".36
Instead, international institutions are best conceptualised as "persistent and connected sets
34 This chapter's study of institutionalisation in ASEAN/AFTA is the first such study of this nature.
A modified version of this chapter has been published as Nesadurai (2001).
35 See Chng (1991) and Pelkman (1992).
36 See Young (1989: 25).
253
of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and
shape expectations" (Keohane, 1989: 3).
Existing studies of regional institutions in general also adopt a limited approach to
characterising institutions, focusing on one or two dimensions of institutionalisation.
Many of them, for instance, emphasise the extent to which supranational structures are
present (Grieco, 1997; Mattli, 1999). Others emphasise the dimension of strength, by
which they mean the degree of compliance with institutional injunctions (Enia and Karns,
1999). This approach, however, confuses institutional structures with outcomes. A better
approach is to focus on institutional design and the theoretical constraints this imposes on
institutional members (Kaliler, 1995: 3). 37 This is the approach this chapter adopts in
constructing the typology of institutionalisation, which is based on four dimensions (Table
6.1).38 The nature of the theoretical constraints imposed on institutional members as a
result of these four different dimensions of institutionalisation is discussed below.
Each dimension of institutionalisation is presumed to vary in two ways, respectively
reflecting low and high levels of institutionalisation. If institutions are defmed as sets of
practices, rules and procedures that constrain activity, shape expectations and prescribe
acceptable forms of behaviour, then by definition a higher level of institutionalisation
involves stronger constraints on, as well as more explicit prescriptions for, national
behaviour. The task is simply to determine whether there was a shift from lower to higher
levels of institutionalisation in AFTA, or institutional strengthening, which represents one
37 This is not to imply any causal relationship between institutional design and institutional strength
on the one hand and compliance on the other. Kahler cautions against 'naïve institutionalism',
namely that dense institutional settings generate successful cooperation (Kahler, 1995: 131-33).
38 The chapter uses insights from Padoa-Schioppa (1985), Lipson (1991), Kahler (1988, 1995) and
Grieco (1997) to develop its typology of institutionalisation.
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of the outcomes of compliance bargaining. Discussion on the effectiveness of these
institutional forms in ensuring compliance is beyond the scope of the dissertation.
Table 6.1
A Framework of Institutionalisation
Dimensions of Institutionalisation Level of Institutionalisation
Low High
Nature of Constitutional Documents
•	 Degree of formality
•	 Nature of commitments
•	 Form of the agreement
Informal;
Non-binding;
Joint	 communiqué	 or
vaguely worded
statement of intent;
Formal;
Binding;
Detailed agreement;
Decision-Making Procedures
•	 Voting style Consensus; Majority voting or partial easing
of consensus requirements
Modality of Cooperation
•	 Substantive policy targets (rules)
•	 If present:
•	 Procedural rules
Absent or ambiguous;
Nationally determined;
Absent or ambiguous;
Present and transparent;
Multilaterally/jointly
determined;
Present and transparent;
Nature of Coordination
•	 Decision-making
•	 Monitoring
•	 Enforcement
Ad-hoc or crisis-driven;
Decentralised/Inter-
governmental;
Decentralised/Inter-
governmental;
Regularised and/or centralised;
Third-party/centralised;
Third-party/centralised
With delegated powers;
Source: Nesadurai (2001: 203)
Nature of the Constitutional Documents
Three features of the constitutional documents underpinning regional cooperation are
relevant to the discussion — (a) the extent of their formality, (b) whether they are binding
on signatories, and (c) the form that such agreements take, whether they are elaborately
written documents, joint communiqués, verbal commitments or even tacit (unwritten)
bargains.
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A formal agreement is defmed as one that enjoys the state's most authoritative imprimatur,
namely ratification (Lipson, 1991: 498). Institutions governed by informal agreements are
presumed to reflect a lower level of institutional constraint on national governments
compared to those based on formal agreements. This is simply because informal
agreements can be more easily abandoned at lower cost than formal agreements, although
this is not always the case in anarchic international settings (Lipson, 1991: 508-9).
Although informal agreements do not necessarily preclude cooperation, the language of
'binding commitments' that is found in formal agreements are instances of diplomatic
communication aimed at other signatories or third parties, revealing states' intentions, at
least, to adhere to a particular commitment (Lipson, 1991: 508). Similarly, a higher level
of institutionalisation is associated with cooperative agreements that stipulate binding
commitments over non-binding ones, while detailed agreements that are clear and
transparent are also presumed to reflect higher levels of institutionalisation. Compared to
vaguely worded agreements or simple joint statements of intent, detailed agreements that
are clear and transparent impose a larger constraint on signatories than the former, since
they specify more clearly promises about future national behaviour.
The institutional constraints provided through formal, binding agreements that are
detailed, clear and transparent work by raising the costs of non-compliance. These costs
are incurred largely in terms of loss of reputational capital if parties are seen to be
reneging on 'binding' agreements to which they had committed themselves, making future
cooperation less likely as other governments become increasingly wary of engaging in
cooperation with the recalcitrant partner. In the case of economic agreements designed to
influence economic actors, reneging on such agreements by governments also carries with
it economic costs if economic actors decide not to engage in the economic activity the
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agreement was designed to promote due to the lack of credibility of participating
governments.
It is also important to remember that international agreements are often designed to be
flexible, since governments, often being uncertain about the distribution of future benefits
under a particular agreement, are naturally reluctant to conclude long-term, inflexible
agreements (Lipson, 1991: 518-19). International agreements are often designed to allow
signatories to partially withdraw without risk to reputations, a prime example being the
GATT escape clauses that allow for post-agreement protection. 39 While this chapter
accepts flexibility as an important attribute of institutions, flexible agreements in which
caveats or escape clauses are well-defined and clearly expressed, including the conditions
under which they can be invoked, are presumed to reflect a higher level of
institutionalisation.
Decision-Making Procedures
Decision rules within institutions can affect the constraints that an institution imposes on
its members. Consensus decision-making allows the party least inclined to accept
constraints on its behaviour to veto other parties that are willing to accept more stringent
constraints. Mechanisms such as majority voting, easing consensus requirements for
particular decisions, delegating responsibilities to technical experts, and setting clear time
limits for particular procedures, especially in dispute settlement (Kahler, 1995) are
assumed to reflect a higher level of institutionalisation. Consensus decision-making in this
chapter is therefore associated with weaker constraints on national behaviour.
39 Kahler has, in fact, attributed the success of the GATT to such flexibility. See Kahler (1995: 24-
26).
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Modality of Cooperation
Coordination within an institution can follow substantive or procedural rules (Kahler,
1995: 4). Substantive institutions feature explicit and detailed rules on substantive policy
targets, such as maintaining a fixed exchange rate, an ending tariff rate, the date by which
a particular tariff rate has to be reached, or a precise timetable for tariff reductions.
Procedural institutions feature a set of procedural rules that are used to suggest a course of
action under certain specified conditions.
At one level, the presence of explicit or detailed rules and injunctions, or substantive
policy targets, is assumed to reflect a higher level of institutionalisation since the degree of
constraint imposed on members will be higher in such instances. At a second level,
institutions in which rules are jointly determined rather than decided unilaterally by each
member are presumed to represent a higher level of institutionalisation. When national
governments are allowed to determine policy targets unilaterally, they are not obliged to
consider joint gains for the system as a whole. Jointly determined rules are expected to
impose a higher degree of constraint upon members relative to unilaterally determined
targets since it is assumed that the former will consider the needs of the system as a whole
(Padoa-Schioppa, 1985: 266-68). Nevertheless, the presence of consensus decision-
making qualifies this argument since then, a party unwilling to accept a higher degree of
constraint on its behaviour will be able to determine the agenda for all members.
This chapter also considers the presence of procedural rules to reflect a higher degree of
institutionalisation, since such rules compel members to adopt a course of action in the
event of disruption or potential disruption to cooperation. Thus, procedural rules may
trigger either dispute settlement processes or at least an obligation for members to consult
each other to address problems that arise in the course of cooperation. In such instances,
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institutional members must, at the very least, jointly consider or debate any departures
from the cooperative agreement.
Nature of Coordination
The three key aspects of institutional coordination, namely decision-making, monitoring
and enforcement can vary along the centralised — decentralised continuum, reflecting
respectively higher and lower levels of institutionalisation. Stronger institutions are
defined as those that display regularised or centralised decision-making in which decisions
on collaboration are made jointly rather than on an ad-hoc basis or only when crises strike.
Regularised decision-making raises the chances for cooperative outcomes over purely ad-
hoc forums, since the former raises the 'shadow of the future' (Axelrod and Keohane,
1985).
Decentralised or inter-governmental monitoring and enforcement are assumed to reflect
weaker institutions compared to third party or centralised arrangements provided with
delegated or independent powers. The former raises the possibility that institutional
constraints on behaviour may be negotiated downwards through inter-governmental
compromises. Third party arrangements like panels of technical experts rarely allow for
the downward re-negotiation of institutional commitments. Instead, such panels usually
uphold institutions by providing rulings on whether institutional commitments have been
breached and often also specify the countervailing actions that need to be taken in the
event of such breaches. The effect of such panels on behavioural outcomes depends on the
way panel results are treated within the institution, however.
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4.2	 Institution Building in AFTA: Nature of the Constitutional Documents
Apart from the initial agreements made among the ASEAN governments in 1992 that
launched AFTA and the Summit Declarations of 1992, 1995 and 1998, all other
agreements signed between the ASEAN member governments are formal and binding
requiring domestic ratification by national legislatures. Table 6.2 shows a progressive
increase in the level of institutionalisation associated with AFTA when we focus on the
nature of its constitutional documents.
Table 6.2
Nature of the Constitutional Documents
Agreements (signed)2 Degree	 of
Formalityb
Type	 of
Commitments'
Form of Agreementd
Framework	 Agreement	 on
Enhancing Economic Cooperation
(28-1-92)
Agreement
	 on	 the	 Common
Effective
	 Preferential	 Tariff
Scheme for AFTA (28-1-92)
Protocol
	 to	 Amend	 the
Framework
	 Agreement
	 on
Enhancing	 ASEAN	 Economic
Cooperation (15-12-95)
Protocol to Amend the Common
Effective	 Preferential	 Tariff
Scheme for AFTA (15-12-95)
ASEAN Framework Agreement
on Services (15-12-95)
Protocol on Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (26-11-96)
Protocol to Implement the Initial
Package of Commitments Under
ASEAN Framework Agreement
on Services (15-12-97)
Framework Agreement on the
ASEAN Investment Area
(8-10-98)
Protocol
	 on	 Notification
Procedures (8-10-98)
Protocol to Implement the Second
Package of Commitments Under
the	 ASEAN	 Framework
Agreement on Services
(16-12-98)
Informal
Informal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Not clearly stated
Not clearly stated
Binding
Binding
Binding
.
Binding
Binding
Binding
Binding
Binding
Vague; Few specifics
Some details provided
Completion period set at 10
years;	 .
Allows
	 for
	
accession	 of
new members
More details provided than
original CEPT Agreement
Statement of Intent
Detailed
	 procedures
provided
Commitment
	
details
provided in annexes
Statement	 of	 intent,
providing	 procedures	 for
future negotiations
Detailed	 procedures
provided
Commitment	 details
provided in annexes
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Protocol	 on	 the	 Special
Arrangement for Sensitive and
Formal Binding Substantive	 targets	 and
procedures outlined
Highly Sensitive Products
(30-9-99)
Protocol	 Regarding	 the
Implementation
	 of the	 CEPT
Scheme	 Temporary	 Exclusion
Formal Binding Detailed	 procedures
provided on modification
of CEPT concessions
List (23-11-2000)
a Other agreements signed but excluded from this table are the three Summit Declarations (1992,
1995, 1998), agreements on intellectual property rights, facilitation of goods in transit within
ASEAN, industrial cooperation, customs harmonisation, electronic commerce, and mutual
recognition arrangements; b Ratification is required for formal agreements while informal
agreements do not require ratification; C Whether binding or non-binding; d Whether detailed or
vaguely worded/statement of intent;
All agreements/protocols relating to AFTA and economic cooperation are available from the
ASEAN Secretariat web-site at www.asean.or.id
It was noted in Chapter 2 that the original AFTA agreements of 1992, namely the
Framework Agreement and the CEPT Agreement, provided few specific details. Member
governments quickly returned to the negotiating table to work out the necessary rules and
procedures to govern the workings of AFTA in general, and the CEPT in particular.
Moreover, protocols on procedural matters were also adopted, notably on dispute
settlement in 1996, on notification procedures in 1998, and on modification of CEPT
concessions in 2000.
The key point to note is that from 1995, the constitutional documents underpinning AFTA
became formal and binding on signatories, while the level of detail provided also
increased. This represented one dimension of the increasing institutionalisation of AFTA.
Moreover, for services and investment, initial statements of intent in the form of
framework agreements were followed by negotiations to firm up commitments. Contrary
to popular perception, this approach to AFTA — cynically dubbed Agree First Talk After°
— is not unique to AFTA. Many international agreements are developed from general
40 According to Narongchai Akrasanee, a prominent Thai corporate executive and a long-time
advocate of closer economic cooperation in ASEAN (Baldwin, 1997: 55).
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framework agreements that move to become increasingly specific protocols through a
sequence of bargaining processes (Jonsson and Tallberg, 1998: 372).
4.3	 The Institutional Mechanism for Decision-Making
Consensus decision-making operates in AFTA at all levels, resulting in a wealdy
institutionalised AFTA as far as this dimension is concerned. A simple majority voting
procedure is, however, incorporated within the dispute settlement procedure outlined in
the Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Thus far, the DSM has yet to be invoked,
with member governments preferring to engage in negotiations among themselves to
resolve disputes.
4.4	 Institution Building in AFTA: Coordination through Rules and Procedures
ASEAN member governments engaged in the progressive tightening of rules and
procedures in AFTA since 1992, but especially in the period after 1995. These rules and
procedures covered a range of issues, including how to conduct future negotiations,
schedules for tariff liberalisation, modification of concessions already made, dispute
settlement and notification procedures, emergency safeguards, and how to treat
exemptions. Substantive policy targets and procedural rules were made more transparent
while new rules and procedures were introduced where previously none existed. While
flexibility continues to be a feature, the conditions governing flexibility were made more
transparent and stringent. Clearly AFTA has undergone a gradual process of
institutionalisation through rule building since its inception.
Strengthening rules and procedures: general CEPT implementation
Although some policy targets were initially indicated in AFTA for the liberalisation of
goods trade, these were not clearly specified, with individual member governments able to
262
determine their respective rates of reduction within the end tariff rates and the 15-year
time period stipulated in the original CEPT Agreement. 4 ' Annual tariff reduction
schedules were thus nationally rather than jointly determined. Moreover, no clear
procedures governed the treatment of exclusions. In 1994-95, ASEAN member
governments introduced and tightened rules and procedures for the CEPT that set a
common date for commencing tariff liberalisation, as well as stipulated how tariffs on
products in the TEL would be liberalised. Although the specifics of tariff liberalisation
were nationally determined, such as the particular commodities to be liberalised and their
respective rates of tariff reduction, some regularity and transparency was introduced by
stipulating common start and end dates and by the obligation for member governments to
issue annual tariff reduction packages.
Strengthening rules and procedures: unprocessed agricultural products
It was noted above that the ASEAN member governments undertook to formally tighten
rules and procedures for the temporary exclusion of unprocessed agricultural products by
signing a Protocol on Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Agricultural Products in September
1999 (ASEAN, 1999). The Protocol stipulates that the original six ASEAN members were
to begin phasing into the CEPT scheme agricultural products on their sensitive lists
between January 2001 and January 2003. The deadline was set at 2010 when tariffs on
these products would have to be at the 0-5 per cent range. Highly sensitive products were
to be phased in beginning anytime between January 2001 and January 2005, but with
phasing in to be completed by January 2010. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were
the only countries to submit a list of highly sensitive products, essentially rice and rice-
related products. They were allowed the flexibility to determine the final tariff rates for
these products, although the Protocol capped this at 20 per cent.
41 See Chapter 2 (Section 2.1).
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Establishing procedures for dispute settlement
The 1992 CEPT Agreement did not include any mechanism for dispute settlement, only
specifying in Article 8 that member states should try to amicably settle any disputes
arising from implementation of AFTA through consultations. In November 1996, ASEAN
member countries adopted a Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism (ASEAN 1996b).
Comprising 12 Articles, this Protocol specifies in some detail the procedures that member
governments need to follow in the event of a dispute.
Thus far, the DSM has yet to be invoked, although a number of disputes have arisen in the
course of AFTA. ASEAN member governments preferred to address these disputes
through diplomatic consultations and bargaining. Senior officials from Indonesia,
Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia interviewed by the author between July and September
2000 reiterated that invoking the DSM could jeopardise political relationships in ASEAN,
something that all member governments wished to avoid. Nevertheless, a DSM was
established to at least make available a framework of procedures and rules in the event it
became needed.42
Although the member governments' preference for diplomatic consultations to resolve
disputes in AFTA seemingly reflects an Asian cultural aversion to legalistic forms of
cooperation,43 the cultural argument should not be exaggerated. The evidence in this
chapter suggests that the ASEAN governments were not averse to adopting more formal
rules and procedures to guide regional economic cooperation. Kahler (1995: 99),
moreover, notes that a preference for diplomacy in dispute resolution exists in many
42 Interview with Mr Razak Ramli, Malaysia, August 2000.
43 See Ravenhill (1998: 159).
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international forums. The European experience in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)
is strikingly similar. Although a Ministerial Council had been established in EFTA to rule
on disputes between members, only very minor conflicts were brought to the Council for
resolution. Major disagreements between EFTA members were settled bilaterally or
multilaterally through consultation so as not to jeopardise the political relationships
between these countries (Curzon, 1974: 51-55).
Specifying notification procedures
The original CEPT Agreement did not provide details on procedures to be adopted should
members wish to nullify the concessions they originally offered to regional partners
(ASEAN, 1992c). The Notification Protocol adopted in 1998 attempted to address this gap
in AFTA (ASEAN, 1998b). Its adoption creates a more predictable and rule-based AFTA,
as member governments and economic actors can now be warned in advance of possible
changes to AFTA concessions.
Member governments decided to adopt such a procedure largely in response to Indonesia's
actions in raising import tariffs on a number of petrochemical items in 1996 and 1997
without informing other members or the ASEAN Secretariat." This created problems for
firms in the other ASEAN countries who were unaware of the alteration until actually
confronted with the new rates at Indonesian customs borders. The Malaysian government
threatened to lodge a complaint against Indonesia at the WTO over the latter's
intransigence over petrochemicals. Supported by the other members, Malaysia pushed for
the adoption of a Notification Protocol to limit similar developments in the future.45
45 Jakarta Post, 16 October 1997.
44 See the discussion on Indonesia and petrochemicals in Chapter 5.
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Introducing procedures for the modification of CEPT concessions
The ASEAN economic ministers signed a Protocol in November 2000 that provides rules
and procedures to govern a more flexible implementation of the CEPT. The Protocol,
closely based on Article XXVIII (Modification of Schedule) of the GATT 1994, was
developed in response to Malaysia's request that it be allowed a two-year delay in shifting
automobiles into the inclusion list and subjecting them to CEPT tariff reductions. The
Protocol enables member governments facing real economic difficulties to delay the
transfer of a product from the temporary exclusion list to the inclusion list or to
temporarily suspend concessions on products already transferred to the inclusion list
(ASEAN, 2000). Modifications were, however, limited to the final tranche of temporary
exclusion list products moved to the inclusion list on 1 January 2000. The Protocol also
provides for compensatory adjustment from the offending party to other members on a
most-favoured nation (MFN) basis through Article 5. Article 6 specifies procedures to
adopt in the event of non-agreement on compensation.
4.5	 Institutional Mechanisms and Modes of Coordination
Decision-making, monitoring and enforcement in AFTA remain decentralised, revealing
ASEAN's preference for inter-governmental mechanisms as opposed to third party or
centralised modes of coordination. This approach to cooperation is, however, not unique to
ASEAN (Kahler, 1995: 121).
Decision-making in AFTA occurs at three principal levels, namely the senior economic
officials meeting (SEOM), the economic ministers meeting (AEM) and the leaders'
summits. Prior to 1995, leaders' summits were held infrequently, with only four held
between 1967 when ASEAN was formed and 1992. In 1992 at the Singapore Summit, the
leaders decided to regularise their summits, agreeing to hold formal summit meetings once
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every three years. At the Bangkok Summit in 1995, ASEAN leaders agreed to meet
annually on an informal basis to help advance AFTA. Thus, leaders now meet either
formally or informally at least once each year.
The AEM meets at least twice annually, once formally and the second time informally.
Between July 1998 and June 1999, the AEM, in fact, met six times. The SEOM meet more
frequently each year, with 11 such meetings held between July 1998 and June 1999
(ASEAN Annual Report, 1998-99: 113). The AEM and SEOM meetings involve serious
negotiations, consultations and ultimately decision-making on outstanding issues,
including implementation issues. The process can be cumbersome and time consuming
though, with issues on which decisions are difficult to reach transferred to the higher level
meeting. Nevertheless, there clearly is a commitment to working through problems and
outstanding issues in AFTA rather than avoiding or deferring them altogether, a charge
sometimes levelled at ASEAN.
Monitoring is also carried out in a decentralised manner, with firms and national
governments providing the main source of information on implementation problems in
AFTA. Firms may notify the AFTA Units located within each national government or
directly to the AFTA Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat of any problems they may have
experienced with regard to impediments to AFTA. Enforcement is also decentralised, with
the SEOM or the AEM the final arbiters on disputes. In addition, the ASEAN Secretariat
has itself been tasked with the overall monitoring of all aspects of AFTA, although the
Secretariat has no sanctioning powers.
Although coordination in AFTA is carried out in a decentralised manner, the inter-
governmental mechanisms for decision-making, monitoring and enforcement are well
267
institutionalised rather than being ad-hoc or crisis-driven. At the very least, they provide
an institutionalised arena for negotiations and bargaining that have helped to advance the
AFTA process on many occasions. This does not always guarantee that decisions made in
such forums will always hasten implementation of AFTA. On a number of occasions,
these institutionalised mechanisms have served as the arena where compromises were
worked out resulting in a lower level of compliance. Nevertheless, as all ASEAN senior
officials and scholars of ASEAN interviewed between July and September 2000 have
pointed out, it is unlikely that AFTA could have advanced as far as it has done without
these compromises.46
4.6	 Compliance Bargaining and Partial Institution Building in AFTA
It is clear that partial institution building took place in AFTA throughout the 1990s,
especially from 1995. While consensus decision-making and the decentralised nature of
coordination limited the constraints imposed on member governments, the tightening of
existing rules and procedures as well as the articulation of new rules and procedures to
govern issues where none existed previously strengthened the institutional foundations of
AFTA. These rules and procedures were articulated through fairly detailed, binding
protocols that required domestic ratification. The AFTA process also included clear
agendas for negotiations as well as negotiated timetables. While flexibility was
maintained, the conditions governing flexibility were made more transparent and stringent.
Although decision-making, monitoring and enforcement remained decentralised, decision-
making processes were increasingly regularised, particularly at the level of leaders'
summits.
46 Stubbs makes a similar point on the value of compromises, although he argues that this was
primarily the result of the regional political culture, namely the 'ASEAN Way'. See Stubbs (2000:
312) and the discussion in Section 2.3 in the introductory chapter. I prefer an interest-based rather
than a cultural argument.
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Institutional strengthening in AFTA, notably through rule building, was a process
phenomenon, the outcome of compliance bargaining. When problems emerged among the
ASEAN countries on particular AFTA agenda items, a process of negotiations and
bargaining between these countries was set in motion. The presence of regularised inter-
governmental mechanisms for decision-making — such as the meetings of senior officials,
ministers, and leaders — facilitated this process by providing an institutionalised arena
where negotiations could take place. While persuasion was the principle means employed
to resolve problems, threats of retaliation were also used by one or another ASEAN
member government, in a clear departure from the 'ASEAN Way' of inter-state relations.
5.	 Conclusion
This chapter uses the compliance bargaining framework together with insights from the
literature on international institutions to develop the dissertation's third proposition — that
implementation was itself a political process that attempted to take care of both growth
and distributive concerns in AFTA. The discussion shows that this was accomplished
through bargaining processes that attempted to address non-compliance with AFTA
commitments. Two outcomes resulted. First, bargaining generally led to a re-negotiation
of the original commitment and the adoption of revised, lower targets. This took care of
the domestic distributive concerns of affected member counties, and thus, prevented the
collapse of the entire project. Second, partial institution building occurred, largely through
the tightening of rules and procedures in AFTA. The latter raised the costs to members of
reneging on their original and re-negotiated AFTA obligations. They also signalled to
business actors, notably foreign investors, that AFTA remained a credible project despite
the re-negotiations and setbacks.
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This processes of compliance bargaining allowed the ASEAN member governments to
resolve disputes between themselves over particular AFTA agenda items. Although a
lower level of compliance prevailed than the original commitments would have entailed,
nevertheless intra-ASEAN tensions were diffused. The ASEAN Secretary General, Mr
Rodolfo Severino, Jr. used the metaphor of 'safety valves' to illustrate the role played by
such processes.° Compromises were necessary in AFTA because they helped to defuse
the tensions that often emerged due to divergent domestic political priorities, but they also
helped to advance the regional project as a result. Far from being the product of regional
cultural norms, these processes of working out a modus vivendi were driven by the
respective interests of member government in creating a balance between the imperatives
of growth and domestic distribution. It was clearly not an ideal arrangement for all
members, particularly Thailand, but it was the best available under the circumstances that
allowed the core ASEAN governments to maintain what was for them a valuable project
of economic regionalism.
47 Interview in July 2000.
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CONCLUSION
This study began with three empirical questions. (i) Why did the ASEAN countries,
already committed to open trade and investment regimes since the end of the 1980s and
which were already trading extensively worldwide and participating in international
investment flows engage in forming a regional free trade area? (ii) How are we to interpret
the discriminatory treatment between ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors in the regional
investment liberalisation programme, if AFTA was adopted as a tool to help attract global
investment capital? (iii) What accounts for the subsequent shift to a more cautious
programme of liberalisation in sectors like agriculture, petrochemicals, automobiles and
services?
To briefly summarise, the study leads one to conclude that AFTA encompassed two forms
of regionalism, both of which were stimulated by the forces of globalisation that the core
ASEAN economies were confronted with during the 1990s. On the one hand, the CEPT
programme to liberalise trade in goods was an exercise in open regionalism, designed to
attract globally mobile foreign capital to the region. On the other, the investment
liberalisation programme displayed the features of what I call 'developmental
regionalism', designed to nurture the development of domestic capital in anticipation of
global market competition by according domestic investors temporary privileges ahead of
foreign investors. Nevertheless, domestic concerns with distribution sometimes
overwhelmed the concern with growth that had driven the turn to both open and
developmental regionalism, and consequently led to departures from some of the original
commitments that were made. This made implementation of AFTA commitments a
political process, rather than merely a technical one, and involved a great deal of
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negotiations and bargaining that sought to balance the growth priorities of member
governments with their concerns with domestic distribution.
Globalisation and AFTA: mediated by the domestic political economy
Both open regionalism and developmental regionalism were stimulated by the structural
forces of globalisation, and were ultimately about engaging with these forces. Structural
change in the pace, nature and pattern of global investment flows led to fears in the region
about the possibility of investment diversion to other parts of the world, most notably to
China. This was a major concern among ASEAN leaders and policymakers during the
1990s, providing the primary stimulus to adopting and sustaining AFTA as a project of
open regionalism.
The shift in global capital flows was not the only systemic force impinging on these
countries. Globalisation manifested itself in other ways as well, through changes in its
institutional underpinnings and as an emerging hegemonic cognitive structure. The
ASEAN member countries were confronted with the possibility that new multilateral rules
would be written to allow TNCs maximum freedom of operation in all countries,
particularly through the WTO that was already endowed with increased authority and
responsibilities in new issue areas. ASEAN leaders and policymakers also perceived an
unrelenting globalisation centred on intense international competition involving
global/foreign firms. While these additional forces of globalisation did, to some extent,
reinforce open regionalism in ASEAN as an instrument to attract global capital flows, they
also raised additional concerns in some countries with regard to the future of domestic
capital, particularly of politically important business actors. Chapters 3 and 4 discussed
these arguments in detail.
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Although domestic capital was important in all the core ASEAN countries, it was
especially important in Malaysia and Indonesia, often enjoying close political relationships
with incumbent political elites and thereby helping to sustain elite coalitions and the
stability of the prevailing regime. Concern over the future of domestic firms in global
market competition was, therefore, especially pronounced in Malaysia and Indonesia,
which respectively advocated and actively supported the idea of using regionalism as a
developmental tool to preserve the future of domestic firms amidst impending global
market competition. The idea of developmental regionalism was especially salient in
sectors outside manufacturing, particularly in the category termed 'services incidental to
manufacturing'. None of the other ASEAN countries challenged the idea, since there was
little conflict between the FDI dynamic of regionalism and the developmental dynamic.
The former was centred on the CEPT and the latter on the AIA. Developmental
regionalism, moreover, did not contradict the interests of the other ASEAN governments,
particularly in Singapore and Thailand, which was to create the conditions for Singaporean
and Thai domestic capital to expand through regionalism.
Thus, the ASEAN member countries endorsed the privileging of ASEAN investors over
foreign investors in the AIA programme, intending the investment preferences to stimulate
the growth through regional expansion of domestic firms into larger and more capable
enterprises able to compete effectively with TNCs, including through forming ASEAN
multinationals. All the core ASEAN governments were broadly united on the importance
of domestic firms becoming large and/or multinational as a means for them to survive
global market competition. Chapter 4 discussed these points in detail. Whether the idea
was a workable one is a separate issue, and beyond the focus of the dissertation.
273
The point to be stressed is that different forms of regionalism emerged out of the forces of
globalisation due to the mediation of domestic political economy dynamics in the core
member countries that centred on the growth-distribution tension. Both open regionalism
and developmental regionalism were driven by the growth imperative, and were about
engaging with globalisation. Nevertheless, proponents of developmental regionalism did
not fully accept the hegemonic position of foreign/global firms associated with
globalisation, and attempted to nurture domestic firms and capabilities in an environment
that was considered to be harshly competitive to developing country capital. The growth
imperative was infused with a need to accommodate to domestic distribution priorities
centred on elements of domestic capital that were considered to be politically important to
ruling elites.
The tension between growth and distribution at the domestic level, which was especially
evident in Malaysia and Indonesia, led unsurprisingly to these two countries being
involved in major disputes in AFTA over implementation. Although these governments
had committed themselves to all three component programmes in AFTA, the reality of the
domestic political economy meant that the imperative of distribution overcame the
concern with growth on a number of occasions that led to departures during
implementation from the CEPT, AFAS, and the AIA. Chapter 5 elaborated on this point.
Notwithstanding an excellent track record in the CEPT, Malaysia chose in 1999 to delay
liberalising tariffs on automobiles and was also responsible for some of the delays in
negotiating liberalisation in the financial services and telecommunications sectors.
Indonesia was involved in two major disputes in AFTA over agriculture and
petrochemicals. This chapter thus demonstrated that the domestic level was a significant
level of analysis, and not merely a transmission belt for structural forces. It was the
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interaction between the systemic and the domestic that was, and remains, key in
explaining developments in AFTA.
The tussle between growth and domestic distributive concerns within member counties,
which consequently led to tensions and disputes between them, meant that implementation
became a political process that attempted to balance both growth and distributive concerns
among members, rather than merely a technical one of complying with commitments
already made. The study revealed in Chapter 6 that this was accomplished through
bargaining processes that took place to address non-compliance during AFTA
implementation. Two outcomes resulted. First, bargaining generally led to a re-negotiation
of the original commitment and the adoption of revised, lower targets. This took care of
domestic concerns with distribution in affected member countries. By consequently
preventing the collapse of the entire project, it also took care of the growth concerns of
other members for whom AFTA was important in sustaining the conditions for growth.
Second, partial institution building occurred, largely through the tightening of rules and
procedures in AFTA, which raised the costs to members of reneging on their original and
re-negotiated AFTA obligations while also signalling to business actors, notably foreign
investors, that AFTA remained a credible project despite the re-negotiations and setbacks.
Institution building, therefore, also addressed the growth imperative.
The lPE framework of analysis and the globalisation-regionalism relationship
The story of AFTA presented in the dissertation, and summarised above, was guided by
the theoretical approach adopted. The study was broadly located within an IPE framework
of analysis, which consequently emphasised the following elements: the close
interrelationship between states and markets, or between politics and economics; the
integration of the domestic and international levels of analysis; and the central role of
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capital in the contemporary world economy. Domestic capital in particular was a crucial
analytical variable. It is the contention of the study that the neglect of one or all of these
considerations has been responsible for many of the shortcomings of the literature on
AFTA to date.
As a consequence, it was felt necessary to locate the study of AFTA within the lPE
literature on the globalisation-regionalism relationship. The dominant model of this
relationship, the model of open regionalism, is also regarded as a project of neoliberal
regionalism underpinned by neoliberal ideas and practices. It is a model that is
underwritten by a liberal political economy perspective and neoclassical ideas about
economic efficiency and the benefits of engaging with market competition. Much of the
current interpretation of AFTA in the literature implicitly follows this line of theoretical
argument, viewing AFTA as a project of open regionalism designed to engage with the
global market. The present study does not challenge the broad notion of AFTA as a project
of open regionalism. Nevertheless, by adopting a modified economic realist theoretical
perspective combined with the elite governance model of domestic politics, the study
offers a more nuanced reading of open regionalism in AFTA as well as advances the
argument that AFTA also displayed the features of developmental regionalism.
In theoretical terms, the economic realist perspective offered substantial analytical
purchase over liberal and structuralist perspectives in explaining regionalism as a response
to globalisation, though it needed to be combined with a suitable model of domestic
politics for richer insights. Chapter 1 elaborated on these points. The value of economic
realism as a theoretical tool comes from its recognition that states continue to matter, and
more importantly, that the governments of these states can, and often do consciously
manipulate inter-state relations to try and alter international political economy structures in
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line with domestic interests. Regionalism can. be interpreted as one such instrument for
states to pool their resources in order to influence the international political economy. The
dominant liberal model of open regionalism in the literature takes global market outcomes
as a given and beneficial to all, with regionalism merely a means to subordinate national
economies to these beneficial forces of globalisation. In the liberal reading of regionalism,
therefore, regionalism involves very little purposive political action by governments of
states to alter global market outcomes.
The domestic level was a necessary level of analysis, because it was at this level that
globalisation was mediated by the growth-distribution dynamic of elite governance
political systems, which, in turn, shaped individual country preferences towards
regionalism. The conventional realist practice of deriving the preferences of state actors
solely from the systemic level, notably from the dynamics of inter-state power political
competition, was therefore rejected. The dominant liberal model of open regionalism in
the literature similarly derives the motivation for regionalism from the systemic level,
from global market pressures on firms and the economy. The traditional approach to
European integration — neofunctionalism — suffers from a similar neglect of the domestic
level (Moravcsik, 1993: 477). An attempt by Moravcsik to overcome this weakness by
developing a combined international-domestic model of European integration (the liberal
intergovernmental model) was, however, criticised for similarly assigning a determining
role to structure despite explicitly modelling the domestic level as a source of national
preference formation (Gofas, 2001: 4-5). In his model, Moravcsilc, (1993: 495) derives the
interests of domestic social groups in relation to their international competitiveness, with
governments then implementing their wishes in a pluralist model of domestic politics.
Domestic politics, thus, merely acts as a transmission belt for structurally derived interests
with regard to European integration (Rathbun, 1999: 4, fn3).
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Unlike Moravcsik, this dissertation attempts to derive the preferences of ASEAN member
governments with regard to AFTA agenda items from domestic political priorities shaped
by domestic state-society relations centred on the imperatives of growth and/or
distribution. Both these imperatives are ultimately linked to political concerns centred on
the legitimacy and security of governing regimes in ASEAN. These domestic priorities
shape the way external events and developments are interpreted by domestic actors as well
as influence government responses to these external forces, which in turn serve as a set of
constraints and opportunities for the attainment of these domestic priorities. The
discussion in the introductory chapter, in fact, pointed out that the realist tradition does
accord analytical priority to the domestic level, unlike its neorealist counterpart.
The integration of the domestic level in the dissertation also allowed the analysis to
explicitly consider domestic capital as a key analytical variable, and importantly, allowed
business actors to be identified as part of domestic society rather than simply as atomistic
profit-maximising agents with no social identity. The dominant liberal model does not
make an adequate distinction between foreign and domestic capital, focusing instead on
globally oriented business whose competitive position regionalism helps advance. If a
distinction is made at all, it is usually to view domestic business as agents of protectionism
likely to resist regional liberalisation. Chapter 1 also suggested that this was because of the
model's focus on the industrial world where domestic capital is likely to be well
developed, unlike in the developing world. In settings where domestic capital is not as
well developed as foreign capital but plays crucial political roles, governments may well
respond to globalisation in ways that attempt to preserve and nurture domestic capital in
anticipation of eventual global competition.
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The theoretical literature on the globalisation-regionalism relationship identified a
dominant model of open/neoliberal regionalism as already noted, and a second model of
regionalism based on resistance by domestic social groups to globalisation. The latter was
a useful corrective to the highly economistic open/neoliberal model of regionalism in the
literature. Nevertheless, the discussion in Chapter 1 criticised the second model for
integrating the domestic level only in superficial fashion, and repeating many of the
shortcomings of the dominant neoliberal model, notably the separation of economics and
politics. The weaknesses of the main models of the globalisation-regionalism relationship
in the literature were overcome in the present study by the adoption of a modified
economic realist framework.
The combined economic realist-domestic politics framework allowed a third theoretical
model — developmental regionalism — to be advanced, which also drew insights from
strategic trade theory in economics rather than liberal/neoclassical economics.
Developmental regionalism, like open regionalism, is premised on engagement with
globalisation in the long-term but offers domestic firms some form of temporary shelter
from global competition or some advantage to meet competition in the medium-term. It
is, therefore, not a model of resistance to globalisation, but neither is it a model of
complete acquiescence to global market forces. Economic realist insights, moreover,
allowed a subtle distinction to be made within the dominant open regionalist model to
reveal two variants, neoliberal regionalism and the FDI model of regionalism, the latter
more likely to reflect embedded or limited neoliberalism encompassing elements of state
intervention in markets. The distinction between the two variants is not a trivial one. The
discussion in Chapter 1 suggested that the two variants of open regionalism were likely to
display distinct features and crucially for this discussion, to project different future
trajectories for regionalism.
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The theoretical framework adopted in the study also helped to address the divide between
structure and agency, a key conceptual issue in IPE. The combined economic realist-
domestic politics analytical framework allowed for the possibility of agency on the part of
key actors in two possible ways. First, domestic actors, principally but not exclusively
governments, interpreted and responded to specific aspects of globalisation in ways that
were shaped by domestic social and political settings. In short, globalisation did not
manifest itself as an objective structure. Second, governments displayed agency to the
extent that they attempted to alter the structures and processes of the global economy
through inter-state cooperation in fulfilment of the common interests of the state or
political community
Governments were driven to this action by the essentially zero-sum nature of global
market forces presumed in the economic realist perspective on IPE, where benefits for
some are at the expense of others. This dynamic was revealed in the discussion in Chapter
3 on the concern in ASEAN with FDI diversion to other countries, notably China. It was
also implicit in the notion of developmental regionalism discussed in Chapter 4, in which
its proponents aimed at nurturing domestic capital through according them temporary
advantages over foreign capital in the regional market in anticipation of global market
competition. It is clear that there is a strong redistributive element associated with AFTA,
both in terms of re-directing FDI to the region and in conferring privileges, albeit on a
temporary basis, to domestic/ASEAN capital over foreign capital.
Both these arguments share the fundamental notion that ASEAN leaders and policymakers
did not accept the prevailing structures of globalisation and attempted to use regionalism
to alter the outcomes of global market forces. This was evident in both open regionalism
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and in developmental regionalism. Open regionalism, initiated as a means to redirect
globally mobile FDI to the ASEAN region, may be considered to be an activist response
by national governments seeking to influence the workings of global market forces, this
time in the way FDI was allocated worldwide. Available studies of AFTA do not
emphasise this particular point, although they do recognise it as a project of open
regionalism designed to remain engaged with global markets. As already noted, theirs is
an implicit liberal interpretation of AFTA. Although their argument that AFTA was
specifically about countering the FDI threat from China is correct, it cannot be fully
accommodated within liberal perspectives that see global market forces in essentially
beneficial and non-zero-sum terms. This reflects the lack of explicit attention to theorising
in these generally atheoretical studies of AFTA, a point that was noted in the introductory
chapter.
AFTA and the future of wider regionalism
An economic realist reading of AFTA, specifically the FDI model of regionalism suggests
that ASEAN member governments would be cautious about any development that
threatened to blunt the contours of the ASEAN region as a distinct functional space of
investment/production. This implies that the prospects for ever-widening processes of
regionalism from the original regionalist project would be far more limited than liberal
readings would suggest. The cautious response of all the ASEAN leaders and
policymakers to China's proposal to form a free trade area between China and ASEAN is,
therefore, completely understandable from the economic realist point of view.' China
would by itself offer foreign capital a 'regional' site of production by virtue of its size and
internal industrial complementarities, which could prompt foreign investors to establish
These responses are detailed in Business Times (Singapore), 'All eyes on China push for FTA', 24
November 2000.
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production networks within the Chinese territory with little production linkages with
ASEAN, instead trading the output produced to ASEAN. This would defeat the purpose of
the regionalist exercise for the latter, which is to stimulate investment to the region and the
establishment of regional production networks involving their respective economies.
Most analysts have referred to the internal problems in AFTA over implementation as the
major stumbling block to a wider free trade zone. 2 This study suggests that the region's
competitive dynamic with China over FDI is likely to prove the bigger obstacle. The
ASEAN countries side-stepped the issue of a free trade zone with China by agreeing to a
one-year feasibility study on the proposal? Although this is not to suggest that a wider free
trade zone with China will never materialise in the future, the argument put forward is that
the ASEAN governments will probably delay the process for so long as they regard China
as a major competitor for FDI. ASEAN member governments may not concur with liberal
expectations that wider regionalism, particularly with China, would necessarily be a good
thing on economic grounds.
It is perhaps for similar reasons that APEC seems to have lost whatever attractions it may
have once had for those ASEAN governments initially supportive of the idea of Asia-
Pacific regionalism. Not only has AFTA advanced further than APEC, particularly in the
CEPT, notwithstanding a few setbacks, APEC would subsume ASEAN and blur its
distinction as a regional production space. As noted in Chapter 1, while globalisation
involves agglomeration tendencies that emphasise a regional division of labour rather than
a global one, it is still unclear what the 'ideal' contours of such a regional space are. Under
2 Financial Times, 'Governments ponder Asian trade zone' 25 November 2000.
3 Ibid
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such uncertainties, ASEAN/AFTA as a production region may well be obliterated within
APEC if producers preferred the APEC regional space over the ASEAN/AFTA space.
AFTA and regionalisation dynamics in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific
Despite setbacks in AFTA, the project appears to have the potential to alter the dynamics
of regionalisation in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region. Although intra-
ASEAN trade levels remained modest during the 1990s, averaging around 20-25 per cent
of total trade, this is not the main criterion with which to judge AFTA, since the
regionalist project was primarily designed to boost FDI to the region. Investment flows to
the region were fairly stable during the 1990s, at least until 1997 and despite the growing
competition posed by China. Investment inflows averaged about 20 per cent of global FDI
flows to developing countries and about 30 per cent of global FDI flows to Asian
developing countries until the financial crisis (ASEAN Secretariat, 1999a: 131).
Moreover, intra-ASEAN investment flows strengthened significantly during the 1990s,
particularly flows from the core members to the newer members (ASEAN Secretariat,
1999a: 13). Macro data on investment flows is, however, limited because it does not reveal
whether the flows were influenced by the AFTA project. Neither does macro data indicate
the prospects for an ASEAN regional division of labour through regionalised production
operations.
Surveys of business decisions and of pronouncements by corporate leaders were more
revealing. A survey of 150 firms in the East Asian region conducted for the Economist
Intelligence Unit in late 1996 revealed that these firms regarded AFTA as the regional
project most likely to be realised or implemented compared to APEC. More significantly,
a third of those surveyed admitted that AFTA had a major impact on their business
operations, while 41 per cent believed the impact was moderate. Only 6 per cent admitted
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that AFTA made no difference to their business operations. Moreover, almost 62 per cent
of corporate leaders surveyed acknowledged that they had incorporated AFTA as a factor
in their future regional production strategies.4 A survey conducted among Asian regional
business executives by the Far Eastern Economic Review revealed essentially similar
results.' It revealed that more than three quarters of Asian executives surveyed made
investment decisions that took the AFTA regional market into account. Studies by Japan's
Export-Import (EXIM) Bank, the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), and the
Nomura Research Institute also revealed that an increasing number of Japanese firms were
stepping up regional operations in view of the AFTA market, especially in the
automobiles, automotive components, and electrical and electronic sectors.6
These surveys suggest that business leaders regarded AFTA as a viable regional project
that influenced their production and investment decisions. A wide range of TNCs and
other Southeast Asian firms, in sectors like food and beverages, cosmetics,
petrochemicals, automotive components, automobiles, electrical items, textiles and apparel
developed regional production and investment strategies based on calculations involving
AFTA. Major TNCs involved included Ciba-Geigy, Nestle, Electrolux, General Electric,
Dow Chemicals, Goodyear, Philips, Colgate-Palmolive, Unilever, Ford Motors, General
Motors, BMW, Volvo, Mercedez Benz, Kia, Hyundai, Matsushita, Sharp, Toshiba, Honda,
Toyota, and Nissan, among others.' A functioning regional space of production appears to
be taking shape in ASEAN through the AFTA project.
4 The survey results were reported in Baldwin (1997: 126).
5 FEER, 7 August 1997, p. 39.
6 Reported in ASEAN Secretariat (1999a: 16).
7 From various issues of The Nation, Bangkok Post, Business Times (Singapore), Business Times,
and New Straits Times (Malaysia).
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Promising lines of further enquiry
Two further lines of research that emerge from the present study of AFTA should be
identified in this conclusion. The first stems from the suggestion in the dissertation that the
prospects for wider regionalism, particularly a formal free trade zone with China, is rather
limited. Despite the cautious approach of the ASEAN governments to China's proposal,
other regional projects involving the ASEAN countries and the Northeast Asian
economies including China have been adopted, particularly since the fmancial crisis. One
of these projects is the 'ASEAN Plus Three' forum, which focuses on cooperation on
monetary and financial issues among ASEAN and the countries of Northeast Asia, leading
some scholars to suggest that this represents the beginnings of East Asian monetary
regionalism (Dieter, 2000). The point here is that other dynamics are intruding into the
region, apart from the competitive dynamics associated with FDI. These make cooperation
with China more attractive. The issue of how the interaction of competitive and
cooperative dynamics between ASEAN and China shapes regionalism promises to be not
only an attractive line of further research but also a major policy issue in coming years.
The second possibility for further research stems from the point emphasised in this
concluding chapter that AFTA may be in the process of altering ASEAN's regional
dynamics through influencing corporate investment and production decisions. There are
broader political implications of the growing interest in the ASEAN/AFTA region
currently shown by TNCs from the US and Europe. The most important of these is
whether these emergent tends will challenge the dominant position of Japanese firms in
ASEAN even as the latter similarly step up investment in the ASEAN region. If
developmental regionalism bears fruit, it too could weaken the relative position of
Japanese firms in the regional economy. The ASEAN region has traditionally been viewed
as part of a Japanese regional division of labour, that in turn, underpins Japan's influence
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in the region and its imputed role as regional leader (Hook, 1996). Mittelman, for instance,
sees the ASEAN countries as "highly enmeshed in the Japanese vector of the globalisation
process" and consequently to be subject to a Japanese regional hegemony (Mittelman,
2000: 126-7). Further research is needed that explores how investment and production
structures in the region may be changing due to AFTA, and the implications of such
material economic changes for the distribution of regional political power. Both lines of
research identified above have wider implications for the international politics of East
Asia.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
A. ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia
1. Mr Rodolfo Severino, Jr.
Secretary General of ASEAN
2. Dr Suthad Sethboonsang
Deputy Secretary General of ASEAN
3. Dr Robert Teh, Jr
Director, Bureau of Trade, Industry and Services
4. Mr Lim Hong Hin
Assistant Director , Bureau of Trade, Industry and Services
5. Dr Wee Kee Hwee
Assistant Director , Bureau of Investment, Finance and Surveillance
6. Dr Aladdin D. Rillo
Senior Officer, Bureau of Investment, Finance and Surveillance
B. Indonesia
7. Mr Ketut Suarka
AFTA Division, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Jakarta
8. Mr Sutriono Edi
AFTA Division, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Jakarta
9. Mr Ramelan
Services, Investment and AICO Division, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Jakarta
10. Dr Hadi Soesastro
Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta
11. Dr Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan
Senior Economist, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta
12. Dr Haryo Aswicahyono
Economist, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta
C. Singapore
13. Mr Ridzwan bin Haji Dzaffir
High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore
(until 1998, Director-General of ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Singapore Trade Development Board)
14. Mr Kong Mun Pew
Director, International Operations (Southeast Asia), Singapore Trade Development Board
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15. Ms Lim Bee Suan
Trade Officer, International Operations (Southeast Asia), Singapore Trade Development Board
16. Dr Henry Wai-Cheung Yeung
Assistant Professor in Economic Geography, Department of Geography, National University of Singapore
17. Dr Leonard Sebastian
Fellow, Regional Strategic Studies Programme, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore
D. Malaysia
18. Mr Razak Ramli
Deputy Secretary General, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Kuala Lumpur
19. Mr Paramjit Singh Tyndall
Research Fellow, Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MITER), Kuala Lumpur
20. Dr Leong Choon Heng
Director of Research, Malaysian University of Science and Technology, Kuala Lumpur
21. Mr Ong Hong Cheong
Retired Senior Analyst, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia [e-mail interview]
22. Anonymous
E. Thailand
23. Mr Karun Kittisataporn
Director-General, Department of Business Economics, Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok
24. Ms Chularat Suteethorn
Director, International Economic Policy Division, Ministry of Finance, Bangkok
25. Mr Lavaron Sangsnit
Chief, AFTA Unit, Ministry of Finance, Bangkok
26. Mr Manasvi Srisodapol
Counsellor, Department of ASEAN Affairs (Division of Commerce and Industry),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok
27. Mr Siriruj Chulakaratana
Plan and Policy Analyst, Office of Industrial Economics, Ministry of Industry, Bangkok
28. Ms Doojduan Sasanavin
Senior Plan and Policy Analyst, Office of Agricultural Standards and Inspection
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Bangkok
29. Dr Nipon Puapongsakorn
Consultant, Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), Bangkok
All interviews were conducted between July and September 2000, with the exception of the e-mail
interview with Mr Ong Hong Cheong of Malaysia, which was conducted in May 2001.
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